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SUMMARY 
 
The subject of this dissertation is presidential term limits in Latin America (1990 - 2010). In 
contemporary presidential democracies there is a wide variation in how many times a 
president can run for reelection. In some countries presidents can be reelected for an 
unlimited number of terms; others allow presidents to be reelected for up to two consecutive 
terms; others establish that presidents must wait at least one or two terms before competing 
again for the presidential post; and others establish that presidents can be in office only for 
one term -- i.e. reelection is prohibited. The three papers comprising this dissertation seek to 
explore the relationship between these different presidential term limits provisions and 
political and economic outcomes in Latin America.  
 
Keywords: presidential term limits, presidential reelection, Latin America, Political Business 
Cycle theory. 
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Introduction: 
Presidential term limits, democracy and economic outcomes 
Presidential reelection in Latin America (1990-2010) 
 
The subject of this dissertation is presidential term limits in Latin America (1990 - 2010). In 
1992, Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori successfully modified his country’s Constitution 
to allow consecutive presidential reelection. He ran for reelection and managed to rule Peru 
for a second term. During the next decades, Argentina (1993), Venezuela (1999), Costa Rica 
(2003), Colombia (2004), Ecuador (2008) and Bolivia (2009), followed Peru’s example.  
Presidential term limits have been slowly abandoned to allow presidents to run for 
consecutive and even unlimited reelection in several Latin American countries. In the three 
papers of this dissertation I investigate the political and economic effects of these institutional 
changes. 
Elections create a momentary monopoly in power. We can compare the workings of 
presidential democracies with economic markets. After elections are celebrated, a political 
monopoly is established for the number of years that the presidential tenure lasts. But the 
truly valuable properties of the free markets arrive when there is competence -- lower prices 
and incentives to provide the better product for customers. The same can be said about 
democracy -- for it to bring about its best features it needs to offer meaningful political 
options for voters and real electoral competition.
1
 This is why setting limits to the presidential 
term is important for the survival, consolidation, and -- ultimately -- sustainability of 
presidential democracies.  
                                                          
1
 The importance of political plurality and viable political options for voters in democratic regimes are questions 
widely discussed in the political science classic books. See, for instance, Joseph Schumpeter (1942), Capitalism, 
socialism, and democracy; Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956), Polyarchy: Participation and 
Opposition (1971); On Democracy (1998). 
12 
 
Without term limits, presidents can keep accumulating power and resources, making it 
difficult for challengers to compete against them. Thus, just like in economic markets, when 
there are no mechanisms for ending those political monopolies, the challengers, knowing that 
they are in disadvantage, may get discouraged to compete in elections. This dynamic may in 
the long run decrease the number of meaningful options for voters. Elected presidents obtain 
what is known as the 'incumbency advantage' which refers to all the resources that presidents 
have at their disposal while in office and which, if left unchecked, can create a seriously 
uneven playing field for competitors.
2
 By setting term limits, there is an automatic 
elimination of political monopolies, generating renewal and change in power, and 
encouraging competence among challengers.
3
 Thus, implementing term limits helps to keep a 
minimum level of competiveness by preventing current presidents from participating in 
electoral contests.  
Term limits are also necessary because the abuse of power can never truly be averted. As said 
before, presidential democracies create temporary monopolies in power, with citizens not 
having the possibility of changing the chief executive during a specific number of years. 
During that time, there is no real way to prevent the president to abuse his power. Often this 
abuse is subtle, not necessarily a wide attack on the rights and liberties of the majority but the 
rights of the minorities who may find difficult to replace the president by democratic 
elections.  In presidential democracies, once a president has been elected, voters cannot 
switch to another executive -- as it can happen in parliamentary democracies --, because the 
                                                          
2 About why is critical for democracies to count with a fair playing field, see Steven Levitsky and Way (2010), 
“Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 1, January 2010 , 
pp. 57-68. 
3 See Einer Elhauge, et.al, (1997), "How term limits enhance the expression of democratic preferences," 
Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 5, pp. 59-80. 
13 
 
terms are fixed. As Maltz (2007) has pointed out, term limits are a control on political 
power.
4
 
Limiting the presidential term also helps to maintain democratic governability as it creates 
opportunities for ambitious challengers to access power. This is even more important for new 
democracies and democracies that are still in the process of consolidation. Setting limits to 
the presidential tenure may change the decisions of ambitious politicians to keep participating 
in democratic elections.
5
 Thus, appropriate term limit provisions will help to keep incumbents 
and challengers playing by the democratic rules.  
In contemporary presidential democracies there is a wide variation in how many times a 
president can run for reelection. In some countries presidents can be reelected for an 
unlimited number of terms; others allow presidents to be reelected for up to two consecutive 
terms; others establish that presidents must wait at least one or two terms before competing 
again for the presidential post; and others establish that presidents can be in office only for 
one term -- i.e. reelection is prohibited.
6 
 The three papers comprising this dissertation seek to 
explain the relationship between these different presidential term limit provisions and 
political and economic outcomes.
7  
                                                          
4 See Maltz, Gideon, (2007), "The Case for Presidential Term Limits", Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, 
Number 1, January 2007, pp. 128-142. 
5 For democracies to survive, it is crucial that the losers of elections accept defeat and keep participating in 
future elections. See Adam Przeworsky, (1991),  Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America (ch 1). New York: Cambridge University Press.  
6
 For a historical account of how term limits were adopted see the work of John Carey (1996), Term Limits and 
Legislative Representation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; (2001), “Reelecciones presidenciales: pros 
y contras”, Foreign Affairs en Español (2): 77-92, May 2001; and (2003), “The Reelection Debate in Latin 
America”, Latin American Politics and Society, Vo. 45, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 119-133. 
7 A vast number of studies have been devoted to study the impact of term limits, elections, and economic 
factors. See for instance the works of Alt, James, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose (2011), “Disentangling 
Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 
73, No. 1, January, pp. 171-186. Alesina, Alberto and Roubini (1992), “Political Cycles in OECD Economies”, 
Review of Economic Studies (1992) 59, pp. 663-688. Besley, Timothy and Anne Case (1995), “Does Electoral 
Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, August, 1995, pp. 769 – 798. Brender, Adi and Allan Drazen (2008), “How Do Budget 
Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries,” The 
14 
 
The history of Latin America, and other countries around the world, shows that politicians 
find hard to step out of power. The only institutional devise that modern democracies have 
found to tame this tendency is by establishing presidential term limits. This institutional 
innovation that started in Latin America in the XIX century has expanded to the majority of 
presidential democracies.
8
 The papers are focused on Latin America because it is the region 
where we can find the majority of presidential-type democracies. One characteristic of 
presidential democracies –as opposed to parliamentary democracies—is that the permanence 
of presidents in office is fixed: presidents are elected for ruling a number of years that are 
specified in constitutional laws.
9  For example, in the United States the length of the 
presidential term is four years: presidents cannot be removed from office before the end of 
that period. In the case of parliamentary democracies, the permanence of the Prime Minister 
in the post is not fixed -- it depends on the confidence of the majority of the assembly 
members.
10 
 In effect, the assembly can remove the Prime Minister anytime. For instance, on 
June 2013, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard was removed from the post just a ‘couple 
of months before the next general election’11 In the case of Latin American presidential 
democracies, there is a wide variation in the length of presidential terms and in the number of 
terms that presidents can run for reelection. This allows us to explore the effects of this 
variation on economic and political factors. Additionally, as several scholars have pointed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
American Economic Review, Vo. 98, No. 5, pp. 2203-2220. Drazen, Allan (2009), “Do Leaders Affect 
Government Spending Priorities?”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15368. H. Abbie 
Erler, (2007) “Legislative Term Limits and State Spending”, Public Choice, Vol. 133, No. 3.4 (Dec., 2007), pp. 
479-494. Johnson, Joseph M. and Mark Crain (2004), “Effects of term limits on fiscal performance: Evidence 
from democratic nations”, Public Choice, 119: 73-90. Nieto-Parra, Sebastian and Javier Santiso (2009), 
“Revisiting Political Budget Cycles in Latin America,” OECD Development Centre, Working Paper No. 281. 
Rogoff, K. (1990), “Equilibrium political budget cycles,” American Economic Review, 80, pp. 21-36. 
8 See “The Reelection Debate in Latin America”, Latin American Politics and Society, Vo. 45, No. 1 (Spring, 
2003), pp. 119-133. 
9
 About the characteristics of presidential systems versus parliamentary systems see the work of Shugart and 
Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University 
Press. Arend Lijphart (ed.) (1992), Parliamentary versus Presidential Governments, Oxford University Press. 
Juan Linz (1990), “The Perils of Presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy. Mainwaring and Shugart (ed.) (1997) 
Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 See “Julia Gillard ousted as Australia prime minister” The Guardian, 26 June 2013 
15 
 
out, choosing this region allows us to control for cultural and historical factors which are 
considered to have effects on the relationships studied.
12
 
This topic has been particularly important in Latin America. There has been two important 
cycles of presidential term limits reforms in Latin America. One at the ending of the XIX 
century, which resulted in the implementation of several no-reelection clauses by the 
constitutionalist movements of those years, and another that started around the 90's which has 
gained an important momentum in recent times. From Mexico to Argentina, presidential 
reelection has been one of the most controversial topics in the region. It has dominated the 
political debate in the last decade, from Venezuela where the debate polarized the 2007 and 
2009 referendums on unlimited presidential reelection,
13
 to similarly controversial moves in 
Colombia in 2010
14
 to a nowadays wary debate in Argentina
15
 and Ecuador
16
 and, most 
recently, Nicaragua,
17
 with newspapers and its opinion columns frequently commenting on 
this topic. Thus, the debate about term limits provisions has extended beyond the academic 
world: it has become a topic of real interest for politicians, the media, and citizens. In effect, 
presidential term limits provisions are one of the few political institutions that have actually 
undergone reform in several countries with presidential regimes. The purpose of these 
reforms has been the elimination of reelection limits, allowing presidents to extend their 
tenure; in this regard, the majority of the reforms have sought to change the no-reelection rule 
by provisions allowing at least one consecutive reelection. There has also been modifications 
on the length of the term, usually to reduce the number of the years of the term. 
                                                          
12
 About the benefits of comparing Latin American countries when studying political problems, see Geddes, 
Barbara (1991), “A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies,” The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 2 (Jun.), pp. 371-392). 
13
 “Chávez for ever? Venezuela’s term-limits referendum,” The Economist, February 19th, 2009. 
14
 2009; “Uribe edges towards autocracy. Presidential re-election in Colombia,” The Economist, May 14th, 2009. 
15
 “Crece debate por nueva reelección de Cristina Fernández,” [A growing debate about a new re-election of 
Cristina Fernández], La Razón, August 31, 2012. 
16
  “Ecuador: Dictatorship of the 21st Century?, The Miami Herald, February 27, 2013”. 
17
 “El nicaragüense Ortega busca una reforma para avalar la reeleción,” CNN Mexico.com, Novermber 4, 2013.  
16 
 
After championing for decades the inclusion of term limits provisions in their Constitutions, 
Latin American countries are leading a counter reform wave in which limits to the 
presidential reelection have been eliminated or made less restrictive (see below, Table 1).  
Table 1. Reelection reform in Latin America (1990 - 2010). 
Country Previous Rule New Rule 
Year of 
Reform 
Argentina  After one interim term Two consecutive terms, then one 
interim term 
1993 - 
Bolivia  After one interim term Two consecutive terms, then no 
reelection 
2009 - 
Brazil  After one interim term Two consecutive terms, then one 
interim term 
1998 - 
Colombia  No reelection Two consecutive terms, then no 
reelection 
2004 - 
Costa Rica No reelection After two interim terms 2003 - 
Ecuador  No reelection  Two consecutive terms, then no 
reelection 
2008 - 
Peru I After one interim term Two consecutive terms, the one 
interim term 
1992-2000 
Peru II Two consecutive terms, the 
one interim term 
After one interim term 2001 
Venezuela I  After two interim terms Two consecutive terms, then no 
reelection 
1999 
Venezuela II Two consecutive terms, then 
no reelection 
No limits 2009 
Source: elaborated by the author with information from Jones (1995), Carey (2003), current constitutional 
texts, and The Economist Historical Archive, the Political Handbook of the World (2010), and BBCMundo's 
reports (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america) to situate the exact year of the reform.  
 
As I write these lines, Nicaragua is undergoing a process of constitutional reform that 
illustrates very well the ironies of this recent trend. Daniel Ortega joined a revolutionary 
movement that ended up overthrowing the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in 1979;
18
 
afterwards, in 1985, he was elected president of Nicaragua for one term,
19
 leaving the post in 
1990. In 2007 he returned to the presidency and now he is trying to change the constitution to 
eliminate the provisions forbidding consecutive reelection.
20
 The proposal for allowing 
                                                          
18
 “El nicaragüense Ortega...” 
19“El nicaragüense Ortega busca una reforma para avalar la reelecion,” CNN Mexico.com, Novermber 4, 2013. 
20“El nicaragüense Ortega…” 
17 
 
consecutive reelection has come along with other measures to increase the constitutional 
powers of the president.
21
 Alberto Lacayo, an opposition leader from the BDN (Bancada 
Democratica Nicaraguense), stated that “[t]hese reform proposals contain everything that led 
to the overthrowing of Somoza. The fight was for not having a dynastic and corrupt family in 
power, for not been ruled by the military, for having civic liberties, for not having a 
permanent president.”22 This quote sums up very well the paradoxes of the recent trend for 
abolishing presidential term limits in Latin America. 
Paper one, "Dealing with Zero-Sum Games in Presidential Democracies," analyses the 
relationship between presidential term limits and democratic governability. Specifically, how 
different term limit provisions affect the probability that challengers accept electoral defeat 
and keep participating in democratic elections. The paper follows the ‘rational choice’ 
literature which sees institutions as the result of strategic decisions made by individuals 
seeking to maximize their own benefit.
23 
I sustain that incumbents and challengers have 
conflicting interests regarding reelection rules and that this conflict is the main source of 
reform. Thus, after proposing this way of evaluating reelection rules, the paper underlies a 
theory of how reelection rules affect democratic governability. For illustrating the logic 
behind these theoretical arguments I revise the democratic history of Mexico (1910 - 2012). 
Paper two, "Enforcing a limited government in presidential semidemocracies," 
investigates how presidential term limits can be enforced. Taking into account that term 
limits provisions have several positive effects for democracies, the next important question to 
be asked is how to preserve this political institution. Principally, I analyse the role of 
                                                          
21
 “El nicaragüense Ortega…” 
22“El nicaragüense Ortega busca una reforma para avalar la reelecion,” CNN Mexico.com, Novermber 4, 2013, 
mytranslation. 
23
 About this perspective see Fiorina (1995) “Rational Choice and the New(?) Institutionalism”, Polity, Vol. 28. 
No.1; and Shepsle, Kenneth, (1998), Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions, New York, 
W.W. Norton. 
18 
 
democratic players in preventing presidents from eliminating term limits. In order to expose 
the ‘microfoundations’24 behind term limits enforcement, I compare the cases of Peru and 
Colombia.  Contrary to accounts that show presidents as the main actors when it comes to 
reelection reform, these cases show that for reelection reform to occur the participation of 
several political players is important, particularly congresses and constitutional courts. In this 
sense, the cases of Peru and Colombia show that in enforcing term limits provisions, a proper 
system of checks and balances is crucial. Thus, even when favourable economic and political 
conditions provided incentives for ambitious incumbents to eliminate presidential term limits, 
the intervention of congresses and courts proved to be the difference for the preservation of 
these provisions.  
Finally,  paper three, "Winning Voters Over," explores how different reelection provisions 
affect public spending. The paper follows the ‘Political Budget Cycles’ literature, which 
argues that elected officials will increase public spending around election years because they 
believe this will help them win elections.
25
  A widely held assumption in the literature 
sustains that when the incumbent is not eligible for reelection there will be increases in 
spending during elections anyway -- the justification for this assumption is that this will 
happen because the incumbent wants his party to win elections even if he doesn’t get a direct 
benefit from this political strategy.
26
 The paper tests this assumption by comparing cases in 
which the incumbent is eligible for being reelected with those in which the incumbent faces a 
term limit. Different from other studies, the paper analyzes social expenditure (spending on 
education, healthcare, and poverty mitigation programs) as this is the kind of spending we 
                                                          
24
 In Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Jon Elster explains the advantages of studying the ‘causal 
mechanisms’ of political developments in order to achieving a more certain and accurate knowledge of 
causality. Elster (1989), Cambridge University Press. 
25
 About this theory see Drazen, Allan, (2001), “The Political Business Cycle After 25 Years,” in NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, Volume Author/Editor: Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, pp. 
75-138. 
26
 Ibid. 
19 
 
would expect politicians to be more tempted to manipulate with electoral ends, and also 
general government expenditure. The results show that the status of the incumbent is indeed 
relevant in explaining the impact of elections on public spending, however, I will sustain, 
incumbents that can be reelected face some dilemmas for spending. And they have found 
smart ways to overcome those dilemmas -- while they tend to increase social spending more 
than incumbents that cannot be reelected, they also try to keep general spending on 
responsible levels so as to avoid fiscal unbalances.   
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I 
 
Dealing with Zero-Sum Games in Presidential Democracies 
Presidential Term Limits and Democratic Governability:  
The case of Mexico (1910 - 2012). 
 
He himself justified the present revolution when he said, "Let no citizen impose 
and perpetuate himself in the exercise of power, and this will be the last 
revolution."  --   Francisco I. Madero, quoting dictator Porfirio Díaz, The Plan of 
San Luis Potosí, October 5, 1910.
27
     
All governments, democratic and nondemocratic, would like to assure themselves 
continuity over a long period of time. -- Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary 
Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?," 1994.           
 
Abstract  
 
For democratic consolidation it is critical that losing candidates concede defeat (Przeworski, 
1991). In this paper I argue that presidential term limits provisions (PTL) can reduce the 
negative impact of lost elections by providing more opportunities for challengers to capture 
the presidency. Challengers will prefer to wait for the next election instead of contesting the 
election's result. In other words, such provisions can form part of an institutional structure 
that encourages opposition leaders to keep participating in democratic elections. To test this 
proposition, I examine the Mexican case (1910-2012). The main independent variable of the 
study is presidential term limits provisions (PTL) and the dependent variable is democratic 
governability. The study of term limits provisions will help us to understand under what 
conditions opposition leaders accept zero-sum electoral outcomes. 
I. Introduction 
                                                          
27
 Madero, The Plan of San Luis Potosi, 1910, translated by Mark Wasserman in The Mexican Revolution. A 
Brief History with Documents, 2012, The Bedford Series in History and Culture, Palgrave MacMillan, New 
York, p. 37. 
22 
 
The objective of this paper is to explain the effects of different presidential term limits rules 
(PTL) on democratic governability. In presidential democracies there are important variations 
regarding the length and renewal of the chief executive’s tenure. Some constitutions allow 
presidents to run for reelection as many times as they wish while others place some 
restrictions or ban reelection completely. These institutional variations may have important 
effects on the functioning of presidential systems. According to Przeworski (1991), it is 
critical for democratic governability that losing candidates concede defeat. In this paper, I 
will argue that limiting the presidential tenure may help to increase the political players’ 
acceptance of electoral defeats. When presidents are term-limited, challengers have increased 
chances to capture the presidency, therefore, in case of losing a presidential election they may 
prefer to wait for the next election and try again instead of contesting the electoral result. 
Thus, by providing more incentives to opposition candidates to accept electoral outcomes, 
PTL provisions can be useful tools for enhancing democratic governability in presidential 
regimes. 
 
The institutional structure of presidential democracies has long been considered to lead to 
zero-sum outcomes (see Linz, 1994). I will argue that PTL are one of the most effective 
institutional devises to alleviate the political tensions created by this type of electoral 
competition, one in which the 'winner takes all and the loser loses all'. Setting limits to the 
presidential tenure can reduce the impact of losing an election in presidential democracies 
and therefore increase the chances of a loser’s acceptance of defeat. In particular, limiting the 
number of times that a president can run for reelection seems to have a positive effect in 
reducing the disparities that opposition candidates face in elections. Thus, PTL provisions can 
be part of an institutional incentive structure that encourages political players to keep 
participating in the democratic game and to accept electoral results. 
23 
 
Presidential term limits rules, however, can be unstable as both incumbents and challengers 
have incentives to change them. Thus, at their core, these provisions are not a self-enforcing 
institutional equilibrium.
28
 In effect, incumbents and challengers have an interest in 
reforming these rules – the incumbent wants to modify PTL so that he can stay longer in 
office whereas the challenger wants to set limits to the presidential tenure as a way of ending 
the incumbency advantage and thus increasing his chances of accessing power. While 
incumbents can use democratic procedures to change the rules, challengers have a less clear 
path for promoting electoral reform and they may be tempted to mobilize citizens to oust a 
long-serving incumbent by non-democratic means instead of waiting for the next election. 
This may be a real problem for democratic governability, leading to cycles of reform and 
conflict until a compromising solution that satisfies both incumbents and challengers is 
reached -- a solution that is perceived as fair for both of them, that is, a Rawlsian 
equilibrium.
29
 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I revise the literature about the 'winner-
takes-all' problem of presidential democracies and how different term limits provisions may 
help to deal with its negative consequences. In the second section I investigate how different 
arrangements may affect the political ambitions of incumbents and challengers and how this 
in turn may affect democratic governability. In particular, I consider the effects of these 
provisions on democracies that meet two conditions: first, they are presidential systems and, 
second, they are democracies in the process of consolidation. Finally, in section three, I 
analyse the Mexican case. The democratic history of Mexico, similar to other Latin American 
cases, can be seen as the struggle for an institutional structure that helps to conciliate the 
interests of incumbents and challengers for capturing and keeping the presidential post.  
                                                          
28
 An equilibrium is self-enforcing when all political players find in their own interest to follow the rules that 
lead to that equilibrium. See Przeworski (1991) and Weingast (1997). 
29
 About institutional arrangements that can be considered just or fair, see John Rawls (1971). 
24 
 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to propose the conditions that increase political players' 
acceptance of zero-sum electoral outcomes, including their own defeat. Also, the paper tries 
to uncover the factors that may help to engage opposition leaders in democratic elections. 
Thus, the study contributes to the identification of institutional structures that encourage the 
participation of opposition candidates in democratic elections characterized by majoritarian 
elements. The paper concludes that as zero-sum institutions cannot become more pluralistic 
without changing their core nature, the only way to minimize the impact of losing under these 
type of electoral arrangements is by meeting two conditions: 1) giving challengers as many 
opportunities as possible of competing in elections; and 2) reducing the game's entry barriers, 
that is, making sure that the electoral competition unfolds under fair conditions for opposition 
leaders. This leads toward a Rawlsian equilibrium where the game and its outcomes are more 
likely to be accepted by all actors in comparison with zero-sum arrangements that do not 
comply with those conditions. The main independent variable of the study is presidential term 
limits provisions and the dependent variable is democratic governability. 
 
II. Literature review 
The problem: 'winner-take-all' tendencies of presidential democracies 
According to Przeworski, one important indicator of democratic consolidation is when all 
relevant political players, including those who have just lost an electoral contest, have 
incentives to keep participating in the 'democratic game' instead of trying to subvert the 
democratic system (Przeworski, 1991, pp. 26-31). For this to happen, it is important that the 
democratic institutions give "all the relevant political forces a chance to win from time to 
time in the competition of interests and values" (Ibid., p. 33). In this regard, according to 
Przeworski, to keep participating in the democratic game, political players must have some 
minimum probability "of winning within the democratic institutions" (Ibid., p. 30). Yet 
25 
 
democracy cannot assure anyone that he will win one day; it cannot promise even a small 
chance of success. In fact, the very essence of democracy, the election of officials by 
universal vote, can prevent this from happening. A loser can continue losing every single 
democratic election if voters wish so. Likewise, voters can keep a winner winning elections 
for life. In absence of institutional limits, democracy -- even a consolidated one-- can produce 
an enduring set of winners and losers.  
Hence, the problem of how to ensure that all relevant forces keep participating in the 
'democratic game' cannot be resolved by the main democratic instrument alone -- that is, by 
free, fair and competitive elections. Institutional solutions that are beyond the basic 
procedures of an electoral democracy are necessary. According to Anderson, et.al. (2005), 
democracy is at great risk when it produces permanent losers, as these players may consider 
stopping to participate in the 'democratic game,' causing a legitimacy crisis for the regime. 
For this reason, it is important that 'constitutional engineers' develop institutional designs that 
help to "minimize the impact of losing" (Ibid.); particularly, it is important that these 
institutions include pluralistic elements. The authors explain that, "[l]osers express less 
negative views about the political system than winners when electoral rules are more 
proportional, when the political system has a greater number of veto players, and when power 
is shared within the political system. Thus, the size of the winner-loser gap depends on 
whether institutions are exclusive or inclusive... Put simply, then, having a say and sharing 
power, even when in the opposition at the national level, enhances losers' consent." 
(Anderson, et.al., 2005, p. 139). Colomer (2001) made a similar analysis, concluding that 
institutions that are proportional and plural are more stable than exclusive institutions as they 
are more satisfactory for all political forces and thus they become a self-enforced equilibrium. 
Colomer describes the rules that promote inclusion of all actors as institutions that are 
socially "efficient" (Colomer, 2001, pp. 227-241). 
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This is why presidential democracies have an important disadvantage. The presidential 
institution is probably the most exclusive official post of democratic systems, so the impact 
of losing is severe. As Linz (1994) wrote in his famous criticism of presidential systems, 
different from parliamentary democracies where the defeated candidate can become the 
leader of opposition, in presidential democracies the control of the executive is a zero-sum 
game where the 'winner takes all' and the "defeated candidate loses all." (Linz, 1994, pp. 14- 
15). All in all, Linz (1994) sustains, "[t]he zero-sum game raises the stakes in a presidential 
election for winners and losers, and inevitably increases the tension and the polarization." 
(Linz, 1994, p. 19). Lijphart (2000) made a similar statement about the presidential 
democracy, which he describes as a political system with "majoritarian" elements that 
promote the "concentration of power in the hands of the majority" (Lijphart, 2000, p. 229).  
According to Lijphart, the U.S. type of democracy has elements of a majoritarian democracy 
such as the "concentration of executive power in the hands of not just one party, but one 
person...and the inherent disproportionality of presidential elections in which the winning 
candidate wins 'all of the seats' -- that is, the one seat at stake -- and the loser loses 
completely" (Lijphart, 2000, p. 240). Shugart and Carey (1992, p. 31) sum up Linz's criticism 
in this way: 
Because of the exclusive nature of the unitary executive, the importance of capturing 
the presidency becomes paramount, dwarfing all other electoral goals for parties in 
presidential systems. This is what Linz [1987, pp. 13-15] describes as the 'winner-
take-all' nature of presidentialism. The high stakes, and the certainty that control of 
the executive will not be open to question again for a set period, raise the tension of 
electoral politics. In the wake of presidential elections, moreover, the winners have 
no reason to try to make amends with the losers. (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p 31). 
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Additionally, in presidential systems, "winners and losers are defined for the period of the 
presidential mandate" (Linz, 1994, p.19), which worsens the zero-sum electoral outcomes. In 
effect, different from parliamentary systems, in presidential democracies the chief executive 
is elected for a fixed period and "cannot be removed for political reasons" (Shugart and 
Carey, 1992, p. 29). Thus, the tension and polarization created by presidential elections last 
for the entire set term, without any mechanism to compensate losers during this time, all 
which, combined with other presidential rigidities, may ultimately cause a democratic 
breakdown (Linz, 1994).  
The variable 
Defenders of presidential systems replied to Linz's (1994) criticisms by saying that 
presidential democracies are not all the same; they display important variation that affects its 
performance, stability and survival. In the last decades there has been plenty of comparative 
research studying this variation. Presidential systems differ in the constitutional powers of 
presidents vis-à-vis assemblies, such as veto power, presidential legislative initiative and 
budget powers (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997); in the electoral 
laws for electing legislators -- proportional versus majority/plurality formulas which, in turn, 
may affect the chances of the president of having support from congress (Mark Jones, 
1995a); in the rules for electing presidents -- plurality, majority runoff, and electoral college 
systems (Op. cit, p. 90); in the nature of the party systems -- two-party systems versus multi-
party systems (Mainwaring, 1993; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995); in the relationship between 
presidents and their parties (Weldon, 1997; Figueiredo, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000); and in 
its policy-making procedures (Haggard and McCubbins, 2001).  
Less explored in this comparative line were the effects of the duration and renewability of the 
presidential tenure on the functioning of this type of democracy. Yet this is one element in 
which presidential democracies show clear variation, and, most importantly, it is the 
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institution that more clearly can affect the zero-sum outcomes of presidential races. Even 
though the presidential term is fixed, there are important variations regarding its length and 
renewability. In Latin America, for instance, the presidential term may last from four to six 
years; some constitutions forbid presidential reelection while others allow it; there are also 
constitutions that permit consecutive reelection while others state that the president needs to 
step out at least one term before running again for reelection (see Jones, 1995b; Carey, 2003). 
And these differences, so I will argue in the next section, may be the key for dealing with the 
zero-sum outcomes of presidential races. Provisions limiting reelections have become 
popular in presidential regimes. According to Maltz, with the only exception of France, all 
mature presidential and semipresidential democracies have at some point implemented term 
limits (Maltz, 2007). Admittedly, the study of term limits variation in democracies is not new 
(see for example, Keech, 1986; Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 29; Jones, 1995b, p.8; 
Przeworski, 1999 , p. 50) but recent academic work (Colomer, 2001, p. 169; Carey, 2003; 
Maltz, 2007) suggests that its effects on the functioning of presidential democracies may be 
deeper than previously thought.  
Term limits provisions are formal institutions, that is, they are rules that constrain individuals' 
behaviour. From a rational choice perspective, formal institutions "are an intervening variable 
capable of affecting an individual's choices and actions but not determining them" (Koelble, 
1995, p. 232). Although they may be long-lasting institutions, difficult to adopt and also 
difficult to reform or eliminate, there has been a slow but steady trend seeking to reform or 
eliminate these provisions in the last decades (see Maltz, 2007). Because of the significant 
impact of term limits on politicians' ambitions, these provisions have become a favourite 
target for reformers, with a special tendency in the recent years to eliminate provisions that 
forbid consecutive reelection. 
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Its impact 
Scholars have identified several important variables affected by term limits provisions; for 
example, democratic representation and political accountability (Carey, 1996; Elhauge, 1997; 
Sarbaugh-Thompson, et. al., 2004), executive-legislative relationships (Colomer, 2001), and 
economic policy choices (Besley and Case, 1995; Johnson, and Crain, 2004; Alt, et. al., 
2011). In terms of minimizing the impact of losing in presidential races, there are two 
important variables that are also affected by term limits provisions: electoral competition and 
political turnover; both variables linked in some extent.  
a) Electoral competition. One line of research has investigated how term limits provisions 
may help to reduce the electoral inequities created by what is known as the 'incumbency 
advantage.' I have identified at least three types of incumbency advantage described by this 
literature. The first one is the 'natural advantage' of incumbents that comes from the office 
holder's responsibilities (see Elhauge, 1997; Caselli et.al. 2013; Sarbaugh-Thompson, et. al., 
2004 ). Because this advantage is simply linked to the fact of 'occupying' the office, I believe 
it cannot be eliminated unless the president is banned from running for reelection. A second 
one is a type of 'institutional advantage’, created by current rules and practices that benefit 
incumbents more than challengers. This advantage can manifest in rules that, for example, 
give incumbents greater access to media, legal resources, and financing than to challengers 
(Levitsky and Way, 2010; see also Greene, 2008). This type of advantage, I believe, can be 
corrected by an institutional reform trying to find ways to level the playing field. And, there 
is a third one that is in a way an 'antidemocratic' incumbency advantage, where incumbents 
actively use the state's resources to, on the one hand, making sure they can stay in power, 
and, on the other, to hamper challengers' opportunities to grab the post (see Przeworski, 1999; 
Carey, 2003; Maltz, 2007). At the end of the road, all these type of advantages create what is 
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known as 'barriers to entry' that make it difficult for challengers to participate in the 'political 
market' (see Elhauge, 1997). 
Everything else being equal, incumbents always have a natural advantage over challengers, 
even if we keep electoral campaign conditions as equal as possible. This is because 
incumbents are in the spotlight during at least one term while challengers are sometimes 
totally unknown to voters, so they have to make a greater effort for convincing voters to vote 
for them. Furthermore, incumbents have at their disposition resources allowing them to 
cultivate links with voters through the administrative work and deliverance of public goods 
(see Elhauge, 1997; Greene, 2008). When electoral campaigns begin, contesters are starting 
the race from different distances – the incumbent has already been in office for some years, 
during which they have had many opportunities to establish links with voters and promote 
themselves. This way, modern democratic elections can never be completely fair. 
There are also advantages that come from the current institutional arrangements and informal 
practices. As Levitsky and Way (2010) put it, nowadays democracy is more affected by all 
the conditions that ‘skew’ the democratic competition than by practices of fraudulent 
elections. Among these elements, Levitsky and Way (2010) mention incumbents’ access to 
public financing and major media outlets as one of the main elements creating disparities. 
These inequalities, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue, go beyond the 'natural' advantage of 
incumbents and may severely affect the fairness of the electoral contest.  
In the worst case scenario, presidential reelection is the first step in a series of reforms in 
which incumbents use all the resources of the presidential post to perpetuate themselves in 
power (Carey, 2003), ultimately damaging democracy. Thus, in a more radical take on this 
argument, scholars argue that presidents actively use resources of the presidential post to 
secure their reelection and to hamper the electoral chances of opposition candidates (Carey, 
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2003; see also Przeworski, 1991, p.25). In this regard, term limits provisions have proven to 
be one of the most effective institutions for levelling the playing field, as it forces the 
competition between new candidates rather than between an incumbent and a challenger 
(Elhauge, 1997; Sarbaugh-Thompson, et. al., 2004; Maltz, 2007).  
Term limits have the immediate effect of eliminating the incumbency advantage. Once the 
incumbent has been termed out, challengers have to compete against a new candidate who 
doesn't have all the advantages of the former incumbent; this keeps competition conditions 
fairer (Maltz, 2007 and Elhauge, et al., 1997). This also means that challengers have greater 
opportunities for capturing the presidency. Sarbaugh-Thompson, et. al., (2004) have studied 
local legislative contests in the US, finding that challengers acknowledge very clearly the 
opportunities that elections with open seats create, that is, elections in which the incumbent is 
not participating. They adapt their strategies accordingly, spending more resources on these 
competitions rather than the ones where they have to compete against incumbents. As 
Elhauge, et al. (1997) argue, by removing the incumbency advantage, term limits provisions 
reduce "barriers to entry in political markets" (2007, p. 59), which in turn keeps a more 
competitive and fair electoral contest. In this regard, Przeworski (1999) sustains that the 
incumbency advantage is more stressed -- and thus more pernicious -- in presidential than 
parliamentary democracies: "The most likely reason presidential democracies are more 
fragile than parliamentary ones is that presidents rarely change because they are defeated in 
elections. Most of them leave office because they are obligated to do so by constitutionally 
imposed term limits. In turn, whenever incumbent presidents can run and do, two out of three 
win re-election [Cheibub and Przeworski, 1996]. Presidentialism thus appears to give an 
excessive advantage to incumbents when they are legally permitted to run for re-election and, 
in turn, to prevent the incumbents from exploiting this advantage, it obligates them to leave 
office whether or not voters want them to stay" (Przeworski ,1999, p. 50). 
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b) Political turnover. There is an academic consensus that the most affected variable by term 
limits is political turnover (see Chen and Niou, 2005). Long incumbencies and difficulties  
terminating them by popular elections inspired the invention of term limits (Linz, 1994). In a 
sense, it is a modern liberal institution that constrains the rule of the majorities. This topic has 
been particularly important in Latin America.  John M. Carey (2001) was one of the first 
scholars who explored the main dilemma of presidential reelection in Latin America: 
“Arguments in favour contend that the possibility of immediate reelection increases 
politicians’ responsiveness to citizen demands and allows voters the freedom to retain 
popular incumbents” (Carey, 2001, p. 119), and, on the other hand, “[t]he argument against 
presidential reelection… is simply that presidents will abuse the powers of the executive 
branch to ensure their own perpetuation in office” (Carey, 2001, p.120).  In effect, one of the 
well-documented trends in politics is the high rate of reelection of incumbents. The 
probability that an incumbent loses to a challenger is rather small, whether in presidential 
races or in legislative races or even in local races (see Maltz, 2007; Chen and Niou, 2005). In 
Latin America, the high rate of reelection of incumbents has received the name of 
'continuismo’ (see Linz, 1994, p.16; Carey, 2003), a term derived from the Spanish word 
‘continuidad’ (continuity) but modified with the ‘ism’ of political trends like ‘socialism’ or 
‘populism.’  
By term limiting incumbents, challengers have more real chances of capturing electoral posts 
(see Elhauge, 1997) which in turn has translated into more alternation in power (Maltz, 2007; 
see also Chen and Niou, 2005). And while implementing term limits does not guarantee party 
alternation in power, it helps in the process, according to Maltz (2007). Figures show that 
term limits increase the victory of challengers in authoritarian regimes; for example, "(i)n 32 
elections held in electoral authoritarian regimes in the former communist bloc, incumbents 
won 88 percent of the time while successors won only 29 percent of the contests. In 35 such 
33 
 
elections in sub-Saharan Africa, incumbents won 96 percent of the time, while successors 
won only 60 percent" (Maltz, 2007, p. 134). Additionally, regular political turnover has 
important benefits for governability -- it may enhance the legitimacy of a democratic regime 
by giving to opposition leaders a kind of 'proof' that genuine, peaceful change in power is 
possible (Moehler and Lindberg, 2009). These alternations in power give electoral losers the 
hope that one day they may also win, encouraging them to stay in the 'democratic game' 
(Ibid.). In their study about  what makes democracies to endure, Przeworski, et. al, (1996) 
have found empirical evidence showing that turnovers in power help democracy to last. In 
this regard, this author sustains that "democracies are most stable when the heads of 
governments change not too infrequently, more often than once every five years... Thus, 
democracy is more likely to survive when no single force dominates politics completely and 
permanently" (Przeworski, 1999, p. 50).  
Thus, to sum up, the literature shows that term limits provisions may help to minimize the 
impact of losing by 1) eliminating the barriers to entry created by the incumbency advantage 
and 2) by giving challengers more real opportunities to compete for office. This makes it 
easier for challengers to participate in elections which, in turn, encourages them to keep 
participating in the 'democratic game.' However, it is important for democratic governability 
that these provisions also take into account the interests and ambitions of the winners. 
According to Linz (1994), limiting the presidential tenure can make it difficult for an 
ambitious president to implement a significant project, which in turn may cause frustration 
and a temptation to extend their tenure by all means: 
A turnover in power can also have dysfunctional consequences, because no 
government can be assured the time to implement promises, to carry through 
between the two elections major programs of social change, to achieve irreversible 
34 
 
changes in the society. This is even more true when there is term limitation, as in 
many presidential systems. 
The concentration of power in a president has led in most presidential regimes to 
attempts to limit the presidency to one or at most two terms. Those provisions have 
been frustrating for ambitious leaders, who have been tempted to assure continuismo 
legally (Linz, 1994, p. 17). 
 
In this sense, term limits provisions that are too strict from the point of view of the 
incumbent, may also cause governability problems. Building on Przeworski's arguments 
(1991), Barry Weingast sustains that "democracies typically fail in one or two ways: those in 
power fail to abide by the rules, such as ignoring an electoral defeat or abusing the rights of 
the opposition, and those out of power use force to take power" (Weingast, 2006, p. 343). He 
adds that the stability of democracy depends of the incentives in place, hence, in a 
consolidated democracy "political officials must have incentives to honor the rules, including 
electoral defeats, and those out of power must have incentives to refrain from using force to 
take power. If either of these conditions fail, democracy is clearly unstable" (Ibid.). Thus, in 
order to be stable and survive, democracy must take into consideration both sides of the 
equation: the interests of those in power and of those out of power. In this regard, as we will 
see in the next section, PTL provisions should be designed taking into consideration the 
interests of both incumbents and opposition candidates. 
In the next section of this paper, I will argue that term limits provisions are key institutions 
for reducing the impact of losing in presidential races, as it may give losers fairer chances to 
compete for the presidential post.  However, I also sustain that, overall, institutions must 
contain a balanced set of incentives that encourage the participation of all players, both 
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incumbents and challengers. In the following pages I will review how different presidential 
term limits provisions affect the incentives of incumbents and challengers to keep 
participating in the democratic game. The analysis will stress that in democracy, the winner, 
who becomes 'the incumbent,' is only a temporary winner; likewise, I will talk about 
challengers instead of losers so as to emphasize that they are not permanent losers but players 
seeking to capture the presidential post. In this regard, I believe, while elections produce 
winners and losers, democratic institutions must produce incumbents and challengers. On the 
other hand, to the extent that term limits provisions approach an arrangement that produces 
permanent winners and losers, I will argue, it sets the basis for long-term democratic 
instability and governability problems. 
 
 
III. Presidential Term Limits as a Game 
Political institutions are commonly defined as 'the rules of the game,' (see Orren and 
Skowronek, 1994). However, very often, political arrangements that are also known as 
'institutions,' such as electoral laws, are in fact a collection of rules. Presidential term limits 
provisions determine, for instance, how long the winner will be president and how many 
times the winner can 'play the game.' Consequently, they also establish how often the 
challenger is able to contend for the post and whether or not he will face the incumbent. In 
this regard, it makes sense to consider electoral laws as 'games' instead of just rules (Shepsle, 
1989, p. 143). According to Shepsle, "characterizing an institution as a game makes 
transparent the concept of institutional equilibrium -- it is an equilibrium of a game." (1989, 
p. 143). Also, conceiving institutions as games facilitates the understanding of change and 
maintenance of these institutions. In Shepsle's words: "institutions undergo transformation. In 
principle, these transformations may be modeled as 'games within games'. At any node in the 
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game form, the option of changing the rules of the game is a possibility" (Shepsle, 1989, p. 
141).  
In the case of PTL rules, after each electoral competition, winners and losers have to take 
several decisions. Those who lost have to decide whether they will accept this result, whether 
they will come back for the next election and whether they will continue supporting the 
democratic regime. Those who won have to decide whether, once in power, they will respect 
the electoral arrangement in place or whether they will change the rules for trying to extend 
their mandate. Thus, PTL rules change the incentives that all political players have to 
participate in elections and to respect the rules and outcomes of the games. It is important that 
winners and losers -- or those in power and those out of power -- have the incentives to keep 
supporting democratic elections and PTL rules may help to insert those incentives. 
In particular it is important to find an institutional arrangement that takes into account the 
interests of incumbents and challengers, although it may not be an easy task. Incumbents and 
challengers have different preferences regarding term limits provisions. The incumbent wants 
rules that allow him to keep the presidential post; while the challenger wants rules that 
minimize the incumbency advantage so he has real chances of capturing the presidential post. 
He also wants as many opportunities as possible for becoming the winner. One important 
objection to this proposition is that, in the long run, both incumbents and challengers could 
benefit from rules allowing unlimited reelection. After all, if the challenger is a rational 
individual he knows that in case he captures the presidential post he would be better off with 
a rule allowing him to keep running for office. Why then would he oppose a rule that 
eventually could be beneficial for him? In this regard, the challenger's opposition to eliminate 
term limits may appear short-sighted (see Carey, 1996), a miscalculation of the results of the 
reform (see Elster, 1995) or plainly irrational for he is not fully considering the long-term 
scenario. 
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In this sense, irrationality, short-sighted preferences, or strategic miscalculation offer an 
explanation for term limits provisions. But there are also rational arguments for explaining 
these different choices of term limits. The key element to understand this difference is what is 
known as the 'incumbency advantage'. As mentioned in the literature review section, the 
incumbency advantage consists of all those elements that may increase the chances of an 
incumbent of being reelected, from the time he has been under the spotlight to the resources 
he can administrate to create links with voters. Because of this advantage, the challenger 
prefers that the incumbent’s term is limited and he also prefers to compete in elections where 
the incumbent is not running. In other words, challengers find it easier to defeat a non-
incumbent candidate (see Sarbaugh-Thompson, et. al., 2004). Thus, as a rational strategy, one 
would expect challengers to promote reelection only once they find themselves in power and 
thus the 'incumbency advantage' is theirs. So, even if at first glance any politician would be 
better off with a rule that allows unlimited reelection, in practice the 'incumbency advantage' 
changes the opportunities for accessing power and thus the preferences regarding reelection 
depend on whether you are the incumbent or not.  
There could be several factors affecting challengers’ preferences regarding reelection rules, 
for example, the likelihood they think they have to defeat the incumbent. However, the above 
statement must be considered under a ceteris paribus condition: everything else being equal, 
the challenger prefers to compete against another non-incumbent candidate. We can regard 
this inequality as an additive problem – if the president is reelected for a second term, the 
challenger has to face inequalities created during the first term plus the ones created during 
the second term. Thus, the longer an incumbent is in power, the greater his accumulation of 
political resources and, therefore, the harder it is for the challenger to compete against him as 
the entry barriers become more difficult to overcome (everything else being equal). More 
examples of incumbency advantage in Appendix 1.   
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Thus, in the case of PTL provisions we can take into account the Przeworskian concept of 
governability that explains how presidential term limits provisions affect incumbents’ and 
challengers’ incentives to stay in the 'democratic game.' The departing point is that term 
limits provisions need to establish a balanced set of political incentives, that is, they must 
adequately balance participation incentives for incumbents and challengers. In the case of the 
incumbents, participation incentives are balanced when they have enough time to implement 
a meaningful political project. Especially, ambitious and popular presidents should feel they 
have enough time to implement their political agenda. From the point of view of the 
incumbent, the best institutional choice would be an electoral arrangement allowing him to 
keep power as long as possible. This means long terms and unlimited renewability of the 
term. Supporters of the incumbent also want those provisions, as they will be able to keep 
voting for the popular president. In the case of the challengers, incentives are balanced when 
they have several chances and real opportunities to capture the presidential post. From their 
point of view, they would like to compete in a political market where barriers to entry are as 
low as possible and where they have as many chances as possible to capture the presidential 
post. Thus, their preferred institutional choice is a system where incumbents are term-limited 
and where the incumbent's tenure is short.   
Equilibrating those preferences is not easy, though, for there is an inherent trade-off: any rule 
that makes the incumbent better off, makes the challenger worst-off and vice versa. 
Institutions that produce zero-sum outcomes cannot be changed as to become more inclusive 
and proportional without changing its basic nature, therefore, it is important to find other 
solutions to deal with the winner-take-all outcomes they produce. Term limits provisions are 
Pareto efficient -- it is not possible to improve the situation of the challenger without 
worsening the situation of the incumbent and vice versa, and therefore all possible solutions 
must entail a compromise. Thus, the only way of minimizing the impact of losing within 
39 
 
zero-sum institutions is by establishing a 'Rawlsian' equilibrium
30
, in which incumbents and 
challengers preferences are met more or less in the middle, creating a fair institution where 
everyone has enough opportunities for capturing and keeping the presidential post. If players 
are under the Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' and no one knows if they will be the incumbent or 
the challenger, they would chose an institution with a balanced set of participation incentives.  
Shepsle (1989) has noted that the Rawlsian equilibrium is, however, a 'vulnerable' one 
because once players find their real position in the world, "the dissatisfied players may be in a 
position to force a renegotiation" (Shepsle, 1989, p. 142). In this regard, Rawls' 'fair' 
equilibrium may be acceptable under the 'veil of ignorance' but this does not necessarily 
make it a self-enforcing equilibrium in the real world. There is a probability that the lesser 
beneficiated players consider to change the rules. However, the Rawlsian solution may at 
least make actors indifferent between the payoffs they receive for playing the game with the 
rules in place and the transaction costs of changing the rules (see Hardin, 1989). On the 
contrary, an institutional equilibrium where the impact of losing is severe and the loser has 
few opportunities to change that outcome may create a situation in which the cost of losing is 
greater than the transactions costs of changing the rules. Thus, although fair institutions are 
not necessarily self-enforcing institutions, they may at least increase the likelihood of 
acceptance among political players.  
The balance in participation incentives must go both ways: for incumbents and challengers. 
On the one hand, rules that make it too hard for incumbents to keep power may encourage 
incumbents to promote constitutional reforms to extend their tenure. Even more, when 
presidents find it difficult to reform term limits by legal means, they can try to extend their 
tenure in semi-legal or illegal ways (see Maltz, 2007). Setting realistic presidential terms in a 
way that ambitious, popular incumbents are able to implement a significant political project is 
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also important for the well-functioning of presidential democracies. Historically, the search 
for an adequate equilibrium has lead to some constitutional experimentation. Thus, we can 
find cycles of reform, in which sometimes the incumbent has been the one who benefits the 
most and sometimes it is the challenger. As Anderson, et. al. (2005) have argued, when 
political actors lose repeatedly within certain institutional arrangement, they may stop giving 
their consent to the whole political system, and may also refuse to keep participating in it. 
This is somehow a theoretic follow up to Przeworski's assertion that democracy, in order to 
become a self-enforced equilibrium, must give all relevant forces at least some minimal 
probability of winning within its institutional arrangements (Przeworski, 1999).  
Due to the relevance of the presidency compared to other official posts, the impact of losing 
in a presidential race is severe. Losers can opt for refusing to concede defeat, boycott future 
elections, lead post-electoral demonstrations or even mobilize their supporters for 
overthrowing the democratically elected president. And because of the centrality and 
visibility of presidential elections, losers can be successful in mobilizing significant segments 
of society to protest against electoral outcomes. In the case of incumbents, if they believe 
they are popular among citizens and that their political project is unfinished, they may start a 
campaign for extending their tenure. Ideally for them, lawmakers will pass a constitutional 
reform to remove term limits. However, presidents that are unsuccessful in removing term 
limits lawfully may be tempted to extend their tenure using semi-legal methods (see Maltz, 
2007).  
A practical implication of the above theoretical ideas is that incumbents will try to change 
rules that are too restrictive, for example, the rule that completely forbids reelection. They 
will try to change the rules using democratic mechanisms and procedures (endogenous 
institutional change). The problem is far more complex for challengers as they may have 
fewer options to initiate an electoral reform. If they consider it too difficult to defeat a long-
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serving incumbent they may opt to stop participating in elections or may try to oust the 
incumbent by non-democratic means.  
Figure A presents utility functions for both the incumbent and the challengers [f(u) = 
incumbent and f(u) = challenger 1] showing how satisfactory are different electoral 
arrangements for them and thus how probable is that they will stop accepting the current 
electoral arrangement. The figure shows what I call the 'protesting' period or the 'challenger's 
defiant zone' -- the period during which challengers ponder whether waiting for another term 
for competing again for the presidential post or mobilizing citizens to oust the incumbent. As 
we can see, this period occurs in the middle of the utility function curve, during the first 
terms in which he didn't win any election but he would prefer to wait for the next election, 
then he ponders the question of whether it is worth to keep waiting for the next election or 
find other ways of accessing to office. On the other hand, when the incumbent has been in 
power for too long, let’s say, more than 12 years in office, the challenger may think that his 
chances for accessing to office are again good as the public may be tired of the same politics  
--among other factors-- and a turnover has more chances of occurring; this period is shown 
on the graph as 'the turnover zone'. 
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Figure A. Challenger's defiance zone 
 
 
 Number of allowed terms 
 
Figure A depicts another curve, this one for any candidate  [f(u) = challenger i]. This curve 
represents the wining chances for the challengers that enter the competition at each one of the 
elections. That is, the challenger for election 1 is different from the challenger in election 2, 3 
and so on. This curve shows that the longest the incumbent has been in office, the highest the 
chances of any challenger of being elected. There is a different outcome for the challenger 
that starts in election 1 and the challenger that enters in election 5, for example. So, while the 
first curve [f(u) = challenger 1] represents the preference of the same challenger over time, 
the second curve represents the preference of any challenger (challenger 'i', that can be, 
challenger 2, 3 and the challenger 'N') at each of the elections held. 
The utility function of the incumbent is subject to decreasing returns. So the incumbent may 
be tempted to reform the rules when his gains are the highest, that is, when initial reelection 
Turnover risk zone Challenger's defiance zone 
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rules are very restricted, allowing him to stay in office only a couple of terms. Thus, one 
popular president who can only stay in office for one term has a lot of incentives for trying to 
implement a reform that allows him to run for another term. In this sense, a single term may 
be too little for an ambitious popular politician. 
These incentives for staying in the democratic game or trying to capture the presidency by 
non-democratic means are crucial at the presidential level. Sure, politicians at the local level 
have similar incentives, but political turmoil after a presidential race can have very disruptive 
consequences for the whole political system. Firstly, because of the unitary and exclusive 
nature of the post: there can only be one president (M = 1). Secondly, because of the 
relevance of the post: the kind of policies that can be implemented at national level have far 
more impact than local policies, therefore, the stakes are higher. And thirdly, because it is the 
end of the road for a political carer; in effect, a local legislator still can aspire to become a 
governor in case he has been termed out as legislator, also, after being a local executive he 
can aspire to become a national lawmaker and so on. The presidency, however, is the final 
stop for any politician, there is little after it.  So, the governability implications of term limit 
rules at presidential level are important because all of this -- for an ambitious politician, a seat 
at a local legislature may be not worth a national revolution but the presidential seat might be. 
Taking into account these theoretical arguments, I propose six testable hypotheses for 
empirically investigating the relationship between presidential term limits provisions (PTL) 
and democratic governability. I will be using the przeworskian notion of democratic 
governability, which means that all relevant political players must have incentives to 
participate in the democratic game. Here, we must remember that term limits provisions are 
an intervening variable: they constrain players' options and decisions but they do not 
determine them. Thus, the effects of these provisions may be more significant when in 
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interaction with other factors. So, we must consider the following propositions (hypotheses) 
under the ceteris paribus condition: 
H:1: Challengers are less willing to concede defeat when PTL provisions allow incumbents 
to stay in office for long terms and also allow incumbents to run for reelection. 
H:2: Challengers are more likely to stop participating in elections when PTL provisions 
allow incumbents to stay in office for long terms and also allow incumbents to run for 
reelection several times. 
H:3: Challengers are more likely to mobilize citizens for protesting after losing elections 
when PTL provisions allow incumbents to stay in office for long terms and also allow 
incumbents to run for reelection several times. 
H:4: After losing a presidential election, challengers are more likely to mobilize citizens for 
overthrowing the incumbent when PTL provisions allow incumbents to stay in office for long 
terms and also allow incumbents to run for reelection an unlimited number of times. 
H:5: Popular incumbents are more likely to initiate a constitutional reform to extend their 
tenure when PTL provisions indicate that the presidential term is short and when they aren't 
allowed to run for reelection.  
H:6: Popular incumbents who are unable to extend their tenure by using legal, democratic 
procedures, are likely to try to remove term limits by semi-legal channels. 
We can use as a proxy of democratic governability problems, post-election conflict. The main 
hypothesis to be tested is whether the probability of accepting defeat is related to the 
possibilities of accessing power. However,  as we can see from the hypotheses, not all 
electoral conflicts will necessarily end with the incumbent being overthrown, there can be 
different levels of post-electoral conflict and thus different effects for democratic 
45 
 
governability. I propose four indicators that may help to measure electoral conflict and which 
can be used for testing the above theoretical propositions: 1) legal challenge of elections, 2) 
mobilization of citizens for protesting electoral results, 3) electoral boycott, and finally 4) 
mobilization  of citizens for ending a long incumbency, i.e., illegally ousting an incumbent by 
a coup. The more problematic arrangement for democratic governability is the rule in which 
incumbents can run for reelection an unlimited number of times and where the term is long. 
But, what is a too short or too long incumbency? This is basically an empirical question. 
Revising historical cases, it sometimes seems that some term limit rules have been 
implemented as an experiment guided by trial and error. Some rules have been stable over 
time whereas others have been radically changed and others have caused political conflict but 
not necessarily led to the incumbent being overthrown.  
Political parties and limits to the presidential tenure 
In previous sections, I have analyzed the impact of PTL provisions on politicians' ambitions 
and how this, in turn, may affect the democratic governability. What happens when we 
include political parties into the picture? The existence -- or absence -- of a strong, stable 
party system in presidential democracies adds important factors to consider. There seems to 
be an almost inverse relationship between eliminating term-limits and a sound party system. 
In recent years, presidents who have successfully extended their mandate after having 
reformed the reelection rules, have done so in countries with a fragile party system, like Evo 
Morales in Bolivia (2009) and Rafel Correa in Ecuador (2008). Somehow, leadership in the 
figure of a strong president or a ‘caudillo’ filled the vacuum left by a lack of relevant parties. 
These presidents portray themselves as the element that brings about some stability to their 
countries, and their supporters may see them in this way too. Also, in countries where the 
traditional parties went through a period of crisis, some because of economic hardships, 
others because of social conflicts, individuals who did not belong to the establishment, the so-
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called "outsiders," have in some cases changed reelection rules once elected to office. These 
outsiders saw in the crisis affecting the traditional parties an opportunity to capture the 
presidency and in some cases they succeeded in portraying themselves as an alternative to the 
system. Fujimori in Peru (1992), Uribe in Colombia (2004), and Chávez in Venezuela (1999), 
are among the recent examples of outsiders who changed term limits rules to increase the 
number of reelections allowed. 
There is also a complex relationship between presidents and their parties that may have 
important effects on the incumbency advantage previously discussed. During elections not 
only presidents in power are being held accountable but also the parties in power. If the 
incumbent president did a great job, it is possible that voters will reward his party in the next 
election regardless of who the party's new nominee is. Somehow the ruling party “inherits” 
the incumbency advantage whenever presidents face a term limit. Some authors talk about the 
"party incumbency advantage," which can be considered as a substitute for the "president 
incumbency advantage" (see Greene, 2008). Thus, the new candidate from the ruling party 
may get elected as a reward for the good work of the former president. From this point of 
view, the importance of PTL provisions may decrease, after all, even when presidents are 
term-limited, the incumbent party can keep competing for office.  
Ruling parties may have an advantage in elections. I sustain that this advantage, however, is 
smaller than that of a candidate who is also the incumbent president. General data supports 
this claim: the rate of reelection of incumbents is pretty impressive in all presidential systems. 
Whenever the president can run for reelection and he does it, the probability that he actually 
will get reelected is high. The counterpart to this trend is that opposition parties have been 
more successful to grasp the presidency whenever they compete against a non-incumbent 
establishment candidate; in other words, party alternations in power are more likely whenever 
the incumbent is not running for reelection (Maltz, 2007). Take for instance the case of the 
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U.S., a well-established presidential democracy. How many U.S. presidents have lost a 
reelection bid? The minority. One-term presidents in U.S. are more the exception than the 
rule, with the only cases of Gerald Ford (1974-1977), Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) and George 
Bush (1989-1993) since the 1950's. On the contrary, every eight years, after the incumbent 
has been termed out, there has been usually a change of ruling party. Same trend in Latin 
America -- it has been a rarity that a challenger defeats a president who is able to run for 
reelection. This happens mainly when consecutive reelection is allowed but there are also 
cases of presidents who have been able to win the presidency after being out of office one or 
two terms, like Michelle Bachelet who served as president of Chile from 2006 to 2010 and 
then after a term out from office she ran again for office in 2014 and won a second term. 
The high rate of reelection of incumbents is a well-documented trend, not only at the 
presidential level, but also at legislative and governorship levels (see Chen, et.al., 2005). 
Furthermore, there is also some evidence that challengers acknowledge this trend: they prefer 
to invest more economic resources in electoral campaigns when there is an "open seat" 
available than when they have to compete against an incumbent (Sarbaugh-Thompson, et. al., 
2004). Thus, party incumbency matters but it is not as strong as or a perfect substitute of the 
individual-type of incumbency. This may be due to many factors. One reason could be that 
personal success or failures are not easily transferred to another individual. The ruling party's 
candidate may promise to voters that he will follow the policies of the incumbent president, 
but he cannot say that the achievements of the administration in place are of his own making. 
While the ruling party can try to help its new candidate, this help cannot replace the weight 
that a good record as president has in electoral contests. This logic may also apply in semi-
democratic environments albeit with some additional nuances. I will come back to this 
question when addressing the case of the dominant parties. 
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Other ways to deal with zero-sum outcomes: regressive ambition and power-sharing in 
lower office.  
No doubt politics in Latin America is sometimes fiercely focused on the president. But the 
presidency is not the only office: there are lawmakers, there are governors and other local 
posts. So, would this help to alleviate the polarization of presidential politics? Federalism and 
other governmental levels can be a way to decrease the importance of the presidency. In this 
regard, if losers have other options for their political career, even in cases in which they have 
lost a presidential election, they still may consider that they are better-off participating in the 
democratic game than outside it. Thus, if there are other available posts for them to keep 
participating in the democratic institutions, this too may help to deal with the zero-sum 
outcomes of presidential elections. Presidential candidates who lost the race may, for 
example, take a legislative seat in a national assembly. This often happens in Argentina 
where former presidents and candidates who lost the presidential election may compete for a 
legislative seat. They too may try to compete for a governorship and thus wait for the next 
presidential election, meanwhile, a governorship may provide them a platform to keep 
campaigning for the presidency. For example, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, presidential candidate 
in Mexico in 1988 and 1994, followed that route. He lost in those two races. Then, in 1997 he 
competed for the post of Mexico City Mayor and won. This allowed him to keep 
campaigning for the presidency and in 1999, one year before his term as mayor expired, he 
resigned from the post to run again for the presidency. This possibility is often called 
"regressive ambition" in which candidates instead of aspiring for an office of higher 
hierarchy try to seek a post at lower level (see Tothero, 2003). In this regard, one way to deal 
with zero-sum outcomes at the presidency level is creating a structure of mobility that allows 
defeated candidates to keep participating in the government. 
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Furthermore, political environments in which politicians belonging to one political movement 
have access to some of the available elective posts may also help to deal with the impact of 
losing the presidency. Hence, it is possible that the leader of the main opposition party, for 
instance, did not win the presidency but other members of that opposition party did get 
elected into the national and local congresses or to governorships. Thus, those who won an 
elective post may try to convince the defeated presidential candidate to accept defeat rather 
than help him to try to subvert the whole democratic system. Or, maybe, they just refuse to 
follow the defeated presidential candidate in any electoral conflict. In conclusion, when not 
all the members of a political movement are excluded from participating in government 
offices, it is less likely that they will follow defeated candidates in the organization of protest 
against the regime. 
Dominant parties and fraudulent elections 
The existence of an institutional structure that encourages both incumbents and challengers to 
respect and follow the electoral via is critical for democratic governability. In previous 
sections, I have argued that PTL provisions offer more opportunities for challengers to 
capture the presidency and, because of this, they provide greater incentives for them to keep 
playing the democratic game. Thus, PTL provisions can contribute to democratic stability 
since they encourage challengers to keep participating in elections instead of trying to take 
power by force. In a context where democracy is still fragile, the existence of these 
institutional incentives may be a key for the consolidation of democracy.  
Some authoritarian institutions and practices, however, could undermine the efficacy of PTL 
provisions as a tool for governability. The existence of authoritarian-dominant parties and 
electoral fraud are two factors that could undermine the positive effects of PTL. In the 
presence of such factors, can PTL provisions still be an effective tool for limiting power and 
promoting democratic governability? Both the rule of an authoritarian dominant-party and 
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widespread electoral fraud can turn electoral competition into a meaningless exercise. If there 
is an authoritarian ruling party that keeps winning elections despite that presidents are term-
limited, it would seem like PTL are ineffective to facilitate political change -- presidents 
change but the party-regime remains in power. Likewise, in the case of fraudulent elections, 
even when challengers have more opportunities for winning elections thanks to PTL 
provisions, the fact that those elections are not free and fair would mean that those 
opportunities brought by PTL are pointless. Thus, we may think that in those contexts PTL 
provisions would be less effective to limit power and to encourage opposition parties to 
compete in elections. Although these semi-democratic contexts pose major challenges for 
opposition candidates, I sustain that PTL provisions can still make a difference, as they are 
one of the few institutional instruments that opposition parties can exploit to successfully 
promote peaceful political change, which in turn may support a broader democratization 
process. 
To see why PTL can still make a difference, we can take a look at the way in which the 
electoral competition unfolds in dominant-party regimes. According to Greene (2008), 
dominant party regimes encourage electoral competition that is centered on issues related to 
the regime itself, with opposition candidates campaigning with democratization agendas. 
Opposition candidates will try to portray the dominant party regime as undemocratic, 
presenting themselves as the option that will lead the country toward a genuine democratic 
change (Greene, 2008). Also, according to Greene, the existence of dominant-party regimes 
encourages opposition candidates to form coalitions that have as its main purpose the 
promotion of alternation in power. In Greene's words, "Once in play, this cross-cutting 
cleavage allows opposition parties to criticize the incumbent as authoritarian and corrupt 
against their more democratic credentials. It also supplies a basis for opposition coordination 
behind a single party or coalition (Greene, 2008, p.16)". 
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Due to strategic reasons, Greene sustains, dominant parties stick to the center of the 
ideological spectrum, causing what he calls a "Rikerian attack": dividing opponent parties to 
the left and the right, thus, preventing them from building an ideological coalition against the 
regime. In turn, opposition parties, continues Greene's argument, due to the fact that they are 
"outsiders" most of the time, prefer to distance themselves from the ideology of the regime, 
thus effectively leaving the ideological centre to the dominant party. However, opposition 
parties will still try to form a coalition by using another line of confrontation, framing the 
electoral contest not between ideologies but between democratization versus 
authoritarianism. The regime in turn may deploy new strategies to respond to this strategy 
from opposition parties. Hence, it becomes a tactical game between the regime and 
opposition parties (Greene, op.cit).  
In this tactical battle, PTL can be an institutional tool for opposition parties, and, if fully 
exploited by opposition candidates, these provisions can facilitate party alternation and 
democratic change. There are important ways in which opposition parties can compete and 
make the most of PTL provisions. As Greene says, opposition candidates can use the 
democratic card in their favor to form an anti-regime coalition, at the same time the fact that 
the regime has to nominate a new candidate who doesn't have a record as president helps 
opposition parties to portray the new candidate as an extension of the regime, effectively 
framing the election as the continuity of an authoritarian regime versus democratic change. In 
those cases, voters may know little about the new candidate except that he represents the 
regime, thus facilitating this crosscutting cleavage of authoritarianism versus democracy. 
Furthermore, a presidential succession -- which is forced by the existence of PTL -- often 
creates a wave of disruption for the regime (see Maltz, 2007). If opposition candidates 
assemble a strategy that takes advantage of this period of disruption along with the above-
mentioned possibility of playing the democratic card, they have a significant opportunity to 
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bring about political change. In fact, Gates, et. al., sustain, the very problem for authoritarian 
regimes is always the problem of succession (Gates, et.al, 2006, p. 895). Whenever there is a 
succession, a window of risk and uncertainty opens up in authoritarian regimes, including 
party-dominant regimes. Some regimes may try to reduce this uncertainty by appointing 
relatives of the president as the new candidates, like brothers, husbands, wives and the like, 
or try to find someone who pledges to preserve the regime. But the uncertainty and risks will 
be there nonetheless (see Gates, et.al., 2006; Maltz, 2007).  
The party-dominant regime cannot be completely sure how the new president will relate to 
the prevailing structures of power. The ruling party may try to appoint a puppet candidate but 
it may happen that this candidate has his own agenda, choosing instead to push for a slow 
reforming program that increases the liberalization of the regime. They also do not know the 
willingness and ability of the new president to cover up any wrongdoings by the previous 
administration. Furthermore, the capacity of the new president to keep the whole regime 
together, avoiding internal ruptures, is unknown. All of this forces the regime to try to seek a 
certain degree of institutionalization as a way to cope with these periods of disruption (Maltz, 
2007), which may in the long run lead to a democratic solution as the best strategy to respond 
to all this uncertainty. This means that the likelihood that a party-regime would be respecting 
the democratic institutions is higher in this environment of term-limited presidents than if 
there were no such limits. So, the regime may actively try to support its new candidate, 
maybe by supplying him with economic and legal resources. But it may also allow certain 
legality to operate as a safeguard in case their candidate actually ends up losing to the 
opposition. This doesn't mean that opposition candidates can easily defeat a candidate backed 
by a dominant party when there are limits to the presidential tenure. Actually they face a lot 
of obstacles. It only means that if they make the most of these opportunity windows, one of 
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them being competing in an electoral landscape of term-limited presidents, they can increase 
their chances of winning.  
Electoral fraud 
The presence of widespread electoral fraud may also decrease the effectiveness of PTL 
provisions as instruments to facilitate political change. After all, if elections are meaningless 
so too the fact that PLT provide more opportunities for opposition parties. I would like to 
start this discussion by differentiating between two notions of electoral fraud. The first one is 
what we could call a "strict" concept of electoral fraud, which means that the regime does not 
accept the victory of an opposition candidate at the ballot box and election results are 
changed to get the establishment candidate into power. This would be a plain authoritarian 
regime, it couldn't be considered even a semi-democratic one. In this context, some of the 
previous logic may still apply: the mere organization of elections and presidential succession 
opens up an opportunity window for opposition candidates to press for political change. 
Opposition candidates may grasp the moment and mobilize voters to demand the respect of 
electoral results or to demand electoral reform (see Schedler, 2002).  Maybe this opportunity 
is not big enough to effect party alternation but it is enough for pressing the regime for a 
political reform that allows the organization of genuine electoral competition in the future.  
Regarding the effectiveness of PTL for facilitating party-alternation in particular, it is likely 
that the benefits of having a term-limited president do decrease in cases of this type of 'strict' 
fraud. In a regime in which elections do not matter, competing against a non-incumbent 
candidate becomes a rather unimportant difference because at the end victory of the 
opposition would not be respected. Here, again, the above arguments about the problem of 
succession for the regime still apply. But we can also say with certain confidence that 
nowadays this type of raw electoral fraud is rare in Latin America. Most of the region's 
countries have been consistently considered as "electoral democracies" by international 
54 
 
organizations that measure how free and genuine elections are around the world (see 
Freedom House Reports 2000-2010).
31
 Even when Latin American democracies are still far 
from being considered fully liberal democracies, that is, democracies in which the rule of law 
and human rights are completely respected, elections, as a tool for electing political leaders, 
remain relevant.  
There is a second notion of electoral fraud, one which more or less means that elections are 
relevant but somehow unfair. In other words, there is an uneven playing field in elections. 
Here opposition candidates have to compete against official candidates under challenging 
conditions (see Levitsky and Way, 2010). Elections are meaningful but competition is not 
easy for opposition candidates; they have to overcome a lot of disadvantages. But this 
difference is important. While the "strict" type of fraud prevents any victory form the 
opposition, in the second notion, that is, under an uneven playing field, the victory of 
opposition candidates may be difficult but not impossible: even though they face challenging 
conditions, they still might surprise the regime with a victory. 
And this is precisely the type of context in which PTL provisions matter the most, as they 
become a significant tool for leveling the playing field. They do so by reducing the 
incumbency advantage of the regime. In well-established democracies, PTL rules have the 
positive effect of keeping the electoral market competitive but in semi-democratic contexts 
they may also help to advance democracy due to its role as a tool for facilitating political 
turnover. In these semi-democratic contexts, PTL become one of the most effective 
institutional instruments for opposition to try to capture power. Thus, if there are contexts in 
which PTL matters it is here, in this semi-democratic environment, where they can make a 
difference by helping opposition parties to reduce disparities in electoral contests.  
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 The reports can be consulted on https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world. 
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Fraud or lack of opportunities?  
There are several challenges to empirically analyzing the relationship between PTL 
provisions and democratic governability. This study has suggested that countries with PTL 
provisions will exhibit lesser post-electoral conflict than countries in which such limits on the 
presidential tenure do not exist or are less restrictive. One important question to answer is 
about identification - how do we know that post-electoral conflict is related to PTL rules 
rather than to, let’s say, the presence of electoral fraud?  In the case of electoral fraud, there 
are two scenarios that should be considered. The first possibility is that there is indeed 
electoral fraud carried out by the regime. Opposition parties know this and have evidence to 
prove it. Therefore, after the election they organize protests to denounce this fraud. So, in this 
case, protests are effectively more related to electoral fraud than to the electoral rules in place 
(the institutional-incentives alternative hypothesis). The researcher can investigate these 
elements so as to rule out other possible explanations. It is possible for example to analyze 
testimonies, documents and the evidence offered to determine if electoral fraud was indeed 
the main cause of protest. There is a second possibility in which opposition candidates 
genuinely 'believe' a fraud has been committed although they don't have all the necessary 
evidence to prove it. They may decide anyway to organize demonstrations to protest for what 
they believe was a fraudulent election. This second possibility is more intricate to study, as it 
may be difficult to prove whether protesters actually believe there was fraud or their 
accusations are a strategy to discredit the regime and to keep their political movement alive. 
In other words, it is difficult to prove whether their believe of electoral fraud is a genuine one 
or is a political strategy or is a mix of both.  
It is not always easy to prove the existence of causality between individual notions or 
believes and political outcomes. We can, however, try to find out statistical associations 
between the presence of certain electoral rules and political outcomes. Then we can also 
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conduct case-studies to cross information and to try to polish explanations. The main 
assumption to be tested is that PTL will be associated with several positive factors for 
democratic governability. Among those factors are lesser incidence of post-electoral conflict, 
higher participation of opposition candidates in elections and a higher rate of losers return, 
that is, those who have lost elections feel encouraged to come back for the next election. All 
these indicators tell us that at least in some degree opposition candidates have incentives to 
engage in the democratic process, which is key for the Pzeworskian democratic governability. 
Thus, PTL provisions can be part of an institutional structure that increases the incentives for 
opposition parties to keep participating in elections, which in turn is key for consolidating 
democracy in the long run.  
PTL is a variable that can affect the calculus that challengers make about their chances of 
capturing the presidency and the cost-benefit equation of keep participating in elections. We 
could still have unfair electoral conditions but at least there is some indication that opposition 
parties have enough incentives to engage in the electoral process. Not surprisingly when 
opposition candidates want to discredit the regime they often call to boycott elections, with 
the argument that participating in elections somewhat validates the regime and grants it some 
legitimacy. To some extent, it is true. Nothing seems more delegitimizing for a regime than 
the organization of elections in which there is only one candidate -- the regime candidate -- 
winning 90 per cent of the vote or a higher percentage. There may be other variables 
affecting electoral protest but, in general, studies using large samples of units should permit 
us to control for these factors. 
The following section analyses the Mexican case under the light of the preceding theoretical 
arguments. The Mexican case is a difficult one in terms of demonstrating the effects of term 
limits provisions on democratic governability and that is why I have chosen this case. In the 
last decades, and since the country has been considered as a full democracy (see Smith and 
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Ziegler, 2008), elections have been held regularly and incumbents have finished their legal 
terms without interruptions. At the same time, the six-year term rule has been in place for 
years, therefore, it may appear as if there has been no variation. Thus, it is a case in which it 
may seem that term limits provisions cannot explain democratic governability.  
I will contend that in order to analyse the impact of rules for keeping and accessing power, 
we must take into consideration a larger span of years and analyse the case since the country 
adopted the presidential system; this means we need to have a look to the years in which the 
country was considered semi-democratic as well as the democratic era. In this sense, I will 
argue, by limiting their research to the democratic period, students of Mexican politics have 
overlooked the most import crisis of the presidential system in Mexico: the revolution of 
1910, which has been the only truly breakdown of the Mexican presidential regime since its 
adoption. I sustain that the analysis of this episode may help us to understand the relevance of 
term limits provisions for the stability and survival of presidential democracies. 
IV. Mexico's democracy: the road toward limiting the presidential tenure 
In this section, I review Mexico's democratic history to illustrate how the country has 
addressed the problem of conciliating challengers' demands for opportunities to access power 
with the incumbents' ambitions to stay in power. Traditionally, scholars have revised 
Mexico's history by chapters, analysing the years before the Mexican Revolution of 1910; or 
the 70-year rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime (PRI) that was formed in the 
aftermath or the Revolution, from 1929 to 2000; or the post-alternation years, from 2000 to 
date.
32
 I propose here a simple question that can help us to understand the evolution of 
Mexico's democracy in a larger span of years: Have the Mexican democratic institutions 
managed to conciliate incumbents and challengers' different preferences regarding the 
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 Literature about Mexico's history is wide. Some selected books are the following: Mark Wasserman (2012); 
Krauze (1994); Córdova (1973), Knight (1990). 
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presidential tenure? The problem any presidential democracy faces is how to give challengers 
more opportunities for capturing the presidential post while giving incumbents enough time 
for accomplishing a meaningful political project. Mexico's democratic history can give us 
some insight into the evolution of presidential term limits and the difficult road to equilibrate 
both the demands for keeping a popular political leader with the ambitions of other politicians 
who want to occupy the presidential seat. We can see that, in fact, a great part of political 
developments in Mexico can be understood once we answer this guiding question. 
While Mexico's democratic history in the aftermath of the independence war of 1810 has 
traditionally been told in terms of conflicts between liberal and conservative factions and 
conflicts between national, 'centralist' activists versus local, 'federalist' politicians, the 
conflicts derived from troubled presidential successions also have had an important role in 
shaping the politics of the country. The politics of the country has usually been depicted as an 
ideological conflict between two factions -- liberals versus conservatives factions-- with 
different views regarding the role of the church and the role of the state in the public life. In 
addition, it has been depicted as the battle between politicians trying to consolidate a nation-
state and to unify politics by concentrating political power in a centralist government versus 
local factions trying to keep their share of power in their communities and avoiding to 
surrender to the central politics -- the centralist against the federalist factions.
33
 Finally, 
politics have been linked to social problems due to persistent harsh living conditions for the 
working class and peasants.
34
 However, major events shaking the public life in Mexico have 
been related to the problem of power succession. Peaceful changes in power were rather the 
exception and were surrounded by moments of civil unrest. Indeed, the main political 
development in Mexico after the independence war was the revolution of 1910, which was 
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 See the well-researched work of Perry (1978) about the different political factions in the Mexico during the 
presidency of Benito Juarez. 
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 See the work of Cordova (1973) about the social roots of the 1910 revolution as well as its ideological 
background.  
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fuelled by a growing opposition to Porfirio Díaz's 30-years rule. The political unrest started in 
1910, an election year, and slowly evolved into a widespread social movement that ended up 
in the toppling of Díaz and with the prohibition of presidential reelection. 
The Mexican Revolution: the breakdown of Mexico's presidential democracy 
After Mexico achieved independence from Spain in 1810, it struggled to consolidate a nation-
state as the country faced difficulties in establishing a stable government. Besieged by inner 
conflicts between the main political factions of the time -- liberals and conservatives--, and 
by conflicts with foreign powers of the time -- US and France invasions--, many presidencies 
emerged and collapsed in Mexico during its first years as an independent nation (see Perry, 
1978).  But as soon as one political leader achieved to lead the country in a more or less 
stable fashion, he would try to stay as long as possible in power. Benito Juarez, considered 
one of the founders of the country -- because of his implementation of important reforms in 
Mexico such as public education and the separation of the state and the Church, and because 
of his leadership through tough times when Mexico was invaded by foreign powers--, found 
it difficult to let go of the presidency and only avoided to be remembered as a dictator by the 
fact that an illness put an end to his life while he was still in power. He was president of 
Mexico for five terms, from 1858 to 1872. After him, presidential successions kept being a 
source of political conflict, with some presidents lasting less than one year in office (see 
Cosío Villegas, 1983).  
The next politician to bring a prolonged period of political stability and relative economic 
development -- albeit with a repressive hand -- was the long administration of Porfirio Díaz, 
which lasted more than 30 years, from 1877 to 1911. It has been noted that Porfirio Díaz, 
ironically, campaigned strongly against Benito Juarez’ long incumbency, vowing to prohibit 
presidential reelection if successfully elected to replace him. He lead a revolt that, 
unsuccessfully, tried to overthrow Juarez' administration. About this revolt, he said - "Let no 
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citizen impose and perpetuate himself in the exercise of power, and this will be the last 
revolution."
35
 Years later, another politician, Francisco I. Madero, will use this same Díaz' 
statement to justify a revolution that eventually would topple Díaz' 30-year dictatorship (see 
Madero, El Plan de San Luis Potosi, 1910). The administration of Porfirio Díaz became a 
clear tipping point regarding long incumbencies, with his government terminated by a violent 
revolution that started in 1910, an election year.  
There is a vast literature that tries to define the Mexican revolution of 1910. Different from 
other contemporary revolutionary movements around the world, the Mexican revolution 
wasn't an ideological or socioeconomic revolution in its origins. Some argue it was a social 
revolution because it included demands for improving the living conditions of the working 
class and peasants
36
, pointing out that the constitution that came out of it granted new social 
rights such as free public education and universal healthcare. To be sure, the revolutionary 
movement for toppling Díaz feed from social problems, such as harsh living conditions for 
the working class and the peasantry. However, the subsequent embracement of social 
demands was a by-product of the aftermath developments in which the revolutionary 
movement had to evolve in its goals to accommodate the multiple demands that inevitability 
were to accumulate after years of conflict, reflecting the diversity of the groups that at some 
point joined the revolt. Yet in its origins, it was clearly a politico-electoral revolution as the 
main demands from revolutionaries were to end the Díaz's dictatorship and the restraining of 
the presidential power.
37
 Respect for the will of voters at the ballot box and banning re-
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 See Cordova (1973) for an analysis of the social roots of the 1910 Mexican Revolution. Also,  Knight (1990) 
provides a lengthy revision of the Mexican historiography about the Mexican Revolution, dwelling on the 
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 Even when some scholars have highlighted the importance of the social conditions for the starting of the 
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election were the main demands of the movement, which brought together different 
revolutionary groups. In this sense, no modern revolution so far had been more clear in 
making its primary objective to limit the length of the presidential term. Indeed, the 
revolution's main motto was: 'Effective suffrage, no reelection! And, after a lengthy and 
violent revolution, constitution-makers made sure that this demand was met (see Cosío 
Villegas, 1983).  
During the revolt the revolutionaries claimed that the perpetuation of Porfirio Díaz’s power 
was mainly due to fraudulent elections, hence, the demand for making citizens' votes truly 
count or, as the revolutionary motto put it, making suffrage 'effective' (see Wasserman, 
2012). They thereby implied that by respecting the will of the people at the ballot box Díaz 
would have been voted out. However, the additional demand of banning re-election -- the 'no-
reelection' part of the revolutionary motto --, makes also clear that revolutionaries were aware 
that vote-fraud was not the only -- possible-- cause of Díaz long incumbency. They implicitly 
recognized that the incumbent, as the 'official candidate' of the state, had an advantage to 
keep being re-elected even if votes were effectively and fairly counted. The institutional 
answer for long incumbencies was not implementing mechanisms to prevent vote-fraud but 
establishing a clause to overall banning re-election. In this sense, the movement clearly had 
one specific goal: preventing long incumbencies. One prominent leader of the movement and 
the creator of the revolutionary motto of "Effective suffrage, no reelection!," Gustavo 
Madero, clearly had the long-incumbency problem in mind when he proposed the no-
reelection provision as one can read in his political writings (see Madero, El Plan de San Luis 
Potosi, 1910). After the conflict, which was very disruptive and violent, no one really 
protested against the banning of presidential re-election. The resulting constitutional chart, 
the Constitution of 1917, made clear that the main revolutionary demand was met by 
forbidding re-election completely, which notoriously changed the organization of the politics 
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in the country. Article 83 of the brand new Constitution of 1917 established that, no matter 
what, the president had to go after four years.
38
 
Other revolutionaries had a more radical view, aiming at the dismantling of the whole regime 
and proposing a total renovation of the political elites as the only solution to Mexico's social 
problems (see Córdova, 1973). Here, again, the problem was the lack of renovation in the 
political establishment; although for this more radical faction the problem was not only one 
person --the president-- who needed to be removed but the whole political circle that was 
accompanying him. The old political elite had to be replaced by a new one that embraced 
social justice if there was going to be a real change. Here it is important to notice that the 
whole political circle that accompanied Díaz got old with him, they were labelled as 'the 
scientists' and had been working in the government almost since Díaz took power.  
This more radical view was embraced by revolutionaries like Emiliano Zapata and Pancho 
Villa (see Córdova, 1973), but their ideals did not fully materialize due in part to a lack of a 
clear alternative to the Díaz' regime -- they only proposed to remove the current political elite 
but didn't propose any type of new regime. The idea was that replacing the 'bad' guys with 
'good' guys –i.e. themselves -- would be enough to meet the demands of social justice. Once 
again, we can see that even on this more radical view, there was a problem with long 
administrations and with the lack of elite mobility. This revolutionary faction also embraced 
social demands, as reflected in their main petition for "Land and Freedom". They demanded 
land redistribution for the peasantry and an end of the abuses committed by landlords. The 
demand for freedom was a way to criticize the oppressive character of the regime. In the end, 
the demands of this revolutionary faction were mostly translated into demands for social 
rights. These demands were picked up again by the constitutionalists, resulting in social 
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rights established in the Constitution of 1917 along with the banning of presidential 
reelection. Since then, presidents were allowed to stay in office for only a term of four years 
and in 1920 the no-reelection rule became the official slogan of the government (Weldon, 
1994, p. 1).  
The first years that followed the Revolution were still a little bit chaotic on the political front. 
Álvaro Obregón was the first post-revolution president who successfully completed his 
presidential term of four years, which lasted from 1920 to 1924. Medina Peña (2003) argues 
that Obregón started to organize his reelection since the very ending of his first term in 1924, 
however, his ambitions were obstructed by the newly approved Constitution of 1917 which 
prohibited the presidential reelection (Medina Peña, 2003, p. 46). Obregón then helped 
Plutarco Elías Calles to become the next president and, from afar, Obregón kept working 
behind the scenes in the politics of the country, trying to come back to the presidency (Ibid). 
In 1927, during the presidency of Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928), the Constitution was 
changed to allow the non-consecutive reelection of presidents. The idea was to allow 
Obregón to run again for reelection after Calles completed his tenure (Weldon, 1997, p. 232; 
Medina Peña, 2003, p. 46). The reform implemented by Calles established that presidents 
could run for reelection after stepping out of office for at least one term and then they only 
could run for another term (see Márquez Rábago, 2003, p.138). The first politician who 
would benefit from the reform was former president Álvaro Obregón, who won a second 
presidential term in 1928 but then he was assassinated before his new term had begun. 
The assassination of Obregón created a political crisis for the regime, and Calles then 
proposed to reform the constitution again to eliminate any type of reelection of presidents as 
a way to recuperate political stability for the country (Medina Peña, op. cit., see also Weldon, 
1994). After the death of Obregón, Calles became the main political leader of the nation, and 
once his official tenure was over, he kept ruling the country from afar despite that he was not 
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any more the official president. This period in which Calles ruled de facto is known as the 
Maximato (see Meyer, 1977; Weldon, 1997).  In 1928 the constitution was changed again to 
forbid any type of presidential reelection
39
 but, taking into account the dissatisfaction of 
Obregón and Calles with the short tenure of four years, the term was extended to six years.  
And since the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) all presidents have completed their 
six-year term and there has not been any reform to this provision as of today. 
 The six-year presidential tenure 
Since the establishment of the six-year term with no-reelection in 1928, 13 individuals have 
occupied the presidency. Astonishingly, the rule has achieved, so far, a number of seemingly 
incompatible goals: it has provided a sense of stability in power but also it has allowed elite 
mobility and party-alteration. After the revolution, one political party, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), brought together in its structure the different revolutionary 
factions (see Meyer, 1977). The country was ruled by this party for more than 70 years. Yet, 
every six years there was a new president. It became a winning formula for the ruling party: 
they were able to keep power for years without tiring voters, bringing both a sense of change 
and permanence. It allowed individual renovation in the presidency while the regime as a 
whole remained unchanged. Back then, Mario Vargas Llosa, the acclaimed Peruvian Nobel-
prize writer, famously labelled Mexico as 'the perfect dictatorship' for the surviving capacity 
that the PRI-regime showed through the years.
40
 While other dictatorships in the region and 
around the world were falling apart, the PRI rule showed stubborn resilience.
41
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The fact that it was a one-party regime doesn't mean that there was no competition for the 
presidential post. There was competition, but it was inside the party --challengers would 
compete for being nominated by the PRI to the presidential post (see Jorge Castañeda, 1999; 
Langston, 2002). The incentives produced by the six-year term were the same it would have 
been produced if the competition were among parties instead of an intra-party competition. In 
this regard, challenges inside the party had to answer the same question that challengers 
outside the party had to address: is it worth to wait another six years for my turn to be 
president or would it be better to defy the system to have a real chance to become president? 
Although, in this case, challengers inside the regime had even more incentives to stay inside 
the party as they knew that if they eventually managed to be nominated by the PRI as their 
candidate to compete for the presidency their chances of actually being elected presidents 
were pretty high. At that point, the party-incumbent return rate was 100 per cent as the PRI 
had never been defeated since it took power. No wonder political bickering at the time was 
not directed at electoral laws but at the nomination process of the PRI. In this sense, no one 
questioned the six-year rule but the PRI undemocratic methods to nominate their presidential 
candidate. The appointing procedure was obscure and informal. Basically the president in 
turn was informally entitled to nominate his successor, a method that was known as 'el 
dedazo' or 'the pointing finger rule' (see Castañeda, 1999). There were of course other 
unspoken rules such as being loyal to the 'regime' and not trying to steal the spotlight from 
the incumbent president (see Castañeda, op. cit.).  
Taking into account that the PRI's nominee had a high possibility of wining the presidential 
post, the decision of the incumbent president about who will be the next PRI candidate was 
crucial as it almost decided who would be the next president. It doesn't come as a surprise 
then that major cataclysms inside the regime were due to this arbitrary nomination procedure. 
Again, even in this case, we can see how the six-year rule could have prevented further 
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conflicts inside PRI's as most of the potential contestants would have pondered that it was 
better to wait the six years for another chance to compete rather than defy the regime. The 
obscurity of the nomination process though, stirred the most important upheavals inside the 
system and, in 1988, it produced a major split from the party, marking the most important 
dispute the PRI regime had to face since its inception. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the son of a 
well-regarded former PRI president, Lázaro Cárdenas, broke up with the party after losing the 
PRI-nomination to Carlos Salinas de Gortari.  
Cuauhtémoc Cardenas left the party and founded his own electoral coalition with other 
members of the PRI and some politicians from opposition parties and competed against the 
PRI's candidate in the 1988 elections. He lost but achieved an unprecedented margin of votes 
for an opposition candidate. Later on, he founded the most important leftist party of Mexico, 
the  Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), which has since then become more competitive in 
elections. In this regard, a shorter term would have probably prevented this split, the most 
important so far within the party. A four-year term, for example, wouldn't have been worth to 
take the risk to defy the main party from outside. In this sense, since its debut, the six-year 
term have put challengers at a crossroad: some may feel that losing, for instance, twice in a 
row -- that is, waiting for the post for 12 years -- is too long to wait; however, campaigning 
for a short term is not a good option either because in case they were in fact elected as 
presidents it would be a too short administration as to leave their mark in the political terrain. 
So what about incumbents then? Was the six-year no-reelection rule enough time for 
ambitious presidents? With the exception of the presidency of Plutarco Elías Calles, when he 
ruled from afar while others were the 'official' president, the aforementioned episode of the  
Maximato (1928-1934), most of the presidents respected the no-reelection rule and didn't 
showed any intensions to change it. At the end of the revolution, the presidential term was 
limited to four years. After the Maximato episode, the presidential term was extended though 
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to six years in 1928 (see Márquez Rábago, 2003, p. 138) and, since then, no incumbent has 
ever challenged the six-year term rule, nor from inside or outside the system. Major tensions 
regarding changes in power where not focused on the length of the presidential term but on 
the nomination process of the ruling party (see Langston, 2002).  
Opposition outside the PRI-system didn't really exist until the 80's, with an important boost in 
1988 when Cuauhtémoc Cardenas split from the PRI.
42
 Up to then, challenges to the system 
were more internal than external. After the 1988 split, opposition parties started to gain real 
power,
43
 gradually becoming more competitive in elections. For once, the possibility of 
facing a new candidate, even if this candidate was from the PRI, always opened up an 
window of opportunity for the opposition to capture the presidency. Looking in retrospective, 
it is now clear that there was nothing per se in the institutional structure of the PRI regime 
that would have averted an eventual party alternation, mainly after the electoral reforms of 
the 90's. In this sense, and as it was recognized by Vargas Llosa later on, the PRI-dictatorship 
was 'not so perfect' after all. One institutional feature in particular was very important: the no-
reelection provision would mean that opposition candidates would compete every time 
against a new, relatively unknown, PRI-candidate. Thus, despite the PRI candidate receiving 
support from the party-government (Green, 2007) he and opposition candidates had one thing 
in common: they couldn't claim having an important record as presidents. In this regard, 
individual incumbency advantage plays no role in a system with the no reelection provision. 
This element, coupled with mounting disappointment with the PRI-regime as a whole, 
opened several opportunity windows, which opposition capitalized, making, little by little, 
political gains, first at local level and then at national politics. 
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First party alternation and transition to democracy 
Although with some setbacks each six years, the PRI-rule provided a certain degree of 
political stability and economic development over almost seven decades. This made voters 
wary of supporting other political parties with no experience in government and which often 
endorsed non-centrist political views (see Buendía, 1997, 2000; Moreno, 2003). The end of 
the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), however, saw an unprecedented 
mix of political and economical crisis that extended to the first years of the next 
administration, the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). Zedillo would be the last 
president of the PRI-seven decade era. Even though the country was no foreign to political 
and economic troubles, the end of the administration of Salinas de Gortari was the last straw 
that broke the camel's back. A deep financial crisis started in 1994 with very severe effects on 
the living conditions.  
Even after years went by, voters still couldn't forget the appalling economic hardships 
unleashed by the 1994 financial crisis, -- not even when there was a clear economic recovery 
in the last years of the Zedillo's administration. 1994, on the other hand, was also a year 
marked by political turmoil. On 1
st
 of January a guerrilla -- the National Liberation Zapatista 
Army or EZLN -- made an appearance, shaking the national politics (see Medina Peña, 2003, 
pp. 276-299 ). The guerrilla declared war against the Mexican state and vowed to install a 
Marxist-Leninist regime, although later on, the objectives of the EZLN changed. On the top 
of that, Luis Donaldo Colossio, the PRI's candidate for the 1994 elections, was murdered at 
the beginning of the presidential campaign, unleashing enormous political uncertainty and the 
feeling that things were out of control for the regime (Medina Peña, op. cit).  
Those developments made it difficult for the PRI regime to keep presenting itself as the only 
provider of political stability. The ability of the regime to supply both economic and political 
stability were questioned. Voters kept supporting the PRI during past crises, but all those 
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crises together were just too much. That reality, coupled with increasing electoral gains from 
opposition parties at the local level, reduced people's wariness about these parties capturing 
the presidential post (see Buendía, 1994 and 2000), and convinced many voters that the time 
had come for a deep political change. Voters supported the underdog candidate, National 
Action Party's Vicente Fox, marking the first party alternation since the end of the revolution. 
Opposition candidate, Vicente Fox, capitalized from all of this, from the catastrophic 1994 
memories to the population desire of change. On top of that, he had the advantage to compete 
against a relatively unknown PRI-candidate, Labastida, instead of competing against the 
incumbent Ernesto Zedillo who finished his term with a positive outlook -- at least far better 
than that of his predecessor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. At the end of the Zedillo 
administration there was a clear economic recovery and he had good approval ratings among 
the population (for presidential approval ratings, see Moreno, 2003, pp. 27, 92, y 182). 
Clearly, had Fox to compete against Zedillo, things would have been more difficult. Instead, 
Fox competed against Labastida who made mistakes in his campaign (see Moreno, op. cit., p. 
214-15) and who was relatively unknown to voters, making the competition less uneven 
(although the regime tried to support the official candidate with illegal founding -- episode 
known as the Pemexgate--). All of this was perfectly capitalized by Vicente Fox who went to 
win the 2000 elections with a comfortable margin of victory. With that, Mexico officially was 
recognized as democratic (see Smith and Ziegler, 2008). As Maltz (2007) suggest, term limits 
do not necessarily cause party alternation in power but may help it. The PRI's acceptance of 
defeat was, no doubt, critical for democratic consolidation as well, even more taking into 
account that it was the governing party.   
All in all, the six-year term rule has been doing well in providing opportunities for 
presidential party-alternation. After the party system stabilized in three major parties, mostly 
since the 1988 elections, opposition parties have became more competitive and have kept 
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participating in presidential elections. Even when defeated candidates denounced that the 
regime had unfairly won the elections, labelling those elections as fraudulent and non-free, 
they would come back to compete in the next election. Thus, this rule, at least, has provided 
enough incentives to challengers to keep participating in the 'democratic game,' which is of 
critical importance for democratic governability. To be sure, opposition candidates knew that 
the PRI candidate, the 'official candidate' would have a certain advantage (see Green, 2007), 
but the fact that there was a term-limited incumbent coupled with their increasing ability to 
compete in elections gave them enough opportunities and incentives to keep taking their 
chances in the next election. In a way, this alternation shows the limits of the support the 
government can provide to any specific candidate or what Green calls 'party- incumbency 
advantages' (Green, 2007) versus individual incumbency advantages. Although the regime 
may help the official candidate, the fact that this candidate cannot claim any success as 
president helps to level the playing field for other candidates. 
So far, the electoral framework in Mexico has allowed two party-alternations in power. No 
opposition candidate has proposed changes to the presidential term and reforms have rather 
focused on other institutions for making the competing conditions fairer. One of those 
reforms saw the creation of an independent organization for preparing and administering 
elections, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) in 1994, and, later on, reforms were extended 
to other type of demands such as public funding for their campaigns and administrative work, 
access to media and other prerogatives for levelling the playing field. As for incumbents, the 
term has proved enough time for implementing their programs. No one has even flirted with 
the idea of extending the presidential term. However, there is a hint for caution: no president 
has been popular enough as to dare initiating a debate about it.  
I sustain that the rule opened the door for alternation in power and, with that, a smooth, non-
violent transition to democracy. Not once presidential elections were sabotaged or boycotted 
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and opposition -- in particular, the leftist party PRD-- would protest only when they came 
second in the race. None of the post-electoral conflicts has had as objective the overthrow of 
the democratic rule or the toppling of the elected president but they were means to express 
dissatisfaction with the conditions of competence and claims of voting fraud practices. Up to 
date, all post-election tensions have resulted in reforms for levelling the playing field rather 
than changes to the presidential term  (see Marván Laborde, 2000). Post-election conflicts 
have always yielded reforms to improve the election system and to make it less vulnerable to 
fraud. These reforms focused on guarantees to count votes fairly and to more equal 
conditions for competing. Having said that, it is also important to notice that changes in 
power have not been totally conflict-free. There have been conflicts but they have translated 
into guarantees for fair and free elections.  
The change of individuals in the presidency eventually led to change of ruling party. To date, 
party-alternation has happened twice. The first alternation was in 2000 when the PAN won 
the presidency, putting an end to a 70-year rule of the PRI, and the other happened twelve 
years later, in 2012, when the PRI returned to power.  The first one has been linked to a 
change of regime; after this alternation, Mexico status was updated from 'semi-democratic' to 
'democratic.'
44
  In a sense, if limiting the presidential term didn't produce the change in 
power, it definitely helped it to happen. Thanks in great part to this peaceful alternation of 
power that saw the end of a 70-year rule of one party --the PRI--, the Mexican transition to 
democracy was one of the smoothest of the recent democratic history around the world, 
taking many by surprise, inside and outside the country.  
There could have been three alternations in power though. Had the leftist party, the PRD, 
won the 2006 elections, the country would have experimented with governments from the 
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right, center, and left of the political spectrum. In that case, all major parties in Mexico could 
have been at least once in power. In 2006, PRD's candidate Andres Manuel López Obrador 
came really close to win the presidency, with a very slim margin of difference between the 
two top contenders.
45
 Elections were legally contested and massive public demonstrations 
were carried out for months. Tensions were high and they put acute strain on Mexico's 
democracy in 2006. Even when years later we know that the then wining candidate, Felipe 
Calderon, finished his mandate, by the time of the 2006 elections there was an edgy political 
environment and the inauguration of the Calderon's presidency felt at odds at times. It was to 
date the heaviest pressure the Mexican democracy had to endure since the 1988 post-election 
conflict. Recounts of news of those days show that tensions were high and animosity between 
the rival parties severe (see Ugalde, 2008).   
Realizing how tight the results of the 2006 elections were, López Obrador didn't concede 
defeat, instead, he called for massive demonstrations to demand a full recount of the votes. 
Later on, his legal team asked the federal electoral court to declare the elections invalid. The 
idea was that the elections were annulled and thus repeated so that the next time he could 
defeat Calderon. The electoral court only allowed a partial recount of votes which confirmed 
the initial voting results (see Ugalde, 2008). After the partial recount was done and after 
considering the validity of the arguments of López Obrador's legal team, the court determined 
that the election was not perfect but still valid. López Obrador didn't accept the verdict of the 
court and called for 'pacific' civil disobedience. He named himself 'the legitimate president of 
Mexico' in a massive ceremony on the main square of Mexico City and engaged in a long 
public campaign to cast the elected president, Felipe Calderon, as a 'spurious president'.
46
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Reading the newspapers of those days one can see that a coup-d'état atmosphere was felt, 
with López Obrador's supporters closing the National Congress for days and trying to prevent 
Calderon being sworn as president (see La Jornada, 2006). The possibility of the overthrow 
of a democratic elected president may now seem less serious -- and some may claim that it is 
an exaggeration --, but only because we now know it didn't happen. Felipe Calderon 
completed his mandate and democratic institutions kept working with normality. It was to 
date, nonetheless, the biggest challenge the modern Mexican democracy had to face. 
However, even after this algid episode, and for all the claims made by López Obrador about 
he having his election victory stolen, it is important to say that the same candidate, López 
Obrador, returned to participate for the next elections in 2012.
47
 He lost again the presidency; 
and, once again, he refused to concede defeat. There was one important difference in López 
Obrador's defeats in 2006 and 2012, though. In the 2006 election the difference of votes 
between the two top contenders was very close while in 2012 the margin of victory for the 
winning candidate was wider. In 2012, López Obrador challenged again the outcome on the 
legal front but demonstrations against the electoral outcome were of smaller scale.  
In conclusion, while it is not yet a framework that rules out post-election conflicts, we can see 
that conflicts have remained centred on electoral matters and have not translated into the 
toppling of the incumbent or into a democratic breakdown or, even more worrying, into a 
regression to authoritarian rule. And, most importantly, although the six-year rule has not 
been perfect it has at least kept defeated candidates participating in the 'democratic game'. 
Table A reports some important figures regarding rates of loser's acceptance and, very 
important, what I call the 'loser's return rate' which shows if the defeated candidate returns to 
participate in the next election. Here I present the parties and candidates' rate of acceptance 
and also I have established three levels of defiance of electoral outcomes. So, first we see 
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when the challenger accepts defeat and there is no post-electoral conflict; the next one is 
when defeat is not conceded and elections are contested on legal level and there may be some 
minor public demonstrations; finally, when the defeated candidate calls to boycott the next 
elections and stops participating, there may also be calls for annulling the election or to 
overthrow the newly elected president. These numbers can give us an idea of how much the 
rules encourage players to stay in the 'democratic game'. 
 
TABLE A. Winners and Losers in Mexican Presidential Elections (1988 - 2012)  
 
Election 
(1) 
 
Winner 
(party) 
 
Losers 
(candidate) 
 
 
Loser's 
consent 
(candidate) 
 
Loser's rate of 
return 
(candidate) 
 
Loser's rate of 
return 
(party ) 
 
Legal 
challenge of 
election (3) 
 
Demonstrations 
(citizen 
mobilization) 
 
Electoral 
boycott (4)  
(party) 
1988 PRI PRD (2) X     -   X 
1988 PRI PAN   -   - X X 
1994 PRI PAN   X     X X 
1994 PRI PRD         X X 
2000 PAN PRI   X     X X 
2000 PAN PRD   X     X X 
2006 PAN PRD X         X 
2006 PAN PRI   X     X X 
2012 PRI PRD X - -     - 
2012 PRI PAN   - -   X - 
Symbols: x (no),  √  (yes),  - (it doesn't apply). (1) The table shows the losers belonging to the second and third places, that is 
why the year of the election appears twice. (2) It refers to a coalition of parties that later on will become the Democratic 
Revolution Party (PRD). (3) Legal complains before the electoral commission and the electoral court on the organization of 
the election. (4) Not participating in the next presidential elections. Sources: elaborated by the author with information from 
La Jornada, El Universal, and Excélsior (1988-2012). 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has explored the effects of different presidential term limits provisions on 
democratic governability. Particularly, it has revised how these provisions affect the political 
ambitions of incumbents and challengers. I have argued that because presidential elections 
produce zero-sum outcomes, the only way to reduce the impact of losing is to give 
challengers enough real chances of capturing the presidential post. In effect, the presidency 
cannot become a more inclusive, proportional institution -- features that have proven to 
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reduce the impact of losing -- without changing its basic nature. Thus, players have to think 
about what type of electoral arrangement is fair and acceptable for both the incumbent and 
the challenger. Under a veil of ignorance, it is probably that extreme cases will be abandoned, 
that is, provisions implementing very short terms and unrestricted reelection are likely to be 
rejected. However, in the middle of these extremes there are several electoral combinations 
and they may have different probabilities of becoming stable rules. However, even if some 
arrangements are considered fair, they do not necessarily become a self-enforced equilibrium, 
players still may have incentives to change the rules. Thus, it is possible that there could be 
some cycles of conflict and reform before a fair, satisfactory arrangement for all relevant 
political forces is established. 
In order to understand these cycles and the effects of term limits provisions, I have revised 
the Mexican case. The Mexican Revolution has been studied in the context of other social 
revolutions of the XX century. In this sense, it has been analysed under the comparative line 
that seeks to explain why political regimes are toppled down by massive popular movements. 
However, one important point missed by the students of Mexican politics, is that this event 
was also a breakdown of a very specific type of democracy: the presidential democracy. In 
this sense, the Mexican Revolution of 1910 has been less studied from the point of view of 
institutional variations in democracies and the literature about breakdowns of democratic 
regimes. Although at the time Mexico was far from being a modern liberal democracy, its 
political regime had the basic structure of presidential democracies, sharing its two defining 
features: 1) separate origin and survival of the assembly and the president and 2) fixed term 
limits for the assembly and the president. In this regard, I have argued in this paper that the 
rules about the presidential tenure made difficult for ambitious challengers to accessing 
power, which contributed to the ultimate breakdown of the Díaz's regime. Then, there was the 
historical period known as the Maximato, where a popular leader, Plutarco Elías Calles, 
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refused to give away the political power after his presidency of a four-year term ended. It is 
possible that the four-year, no reelection provision was too limited for an ambitious 
incumbent. The aftermath of the Maximato was the extension of the tenure from four to six 
years.  
All in all, the six-year term, no reelection rule has proven to be enough time for presidents to 
accomplish a meaningful political project and thus for the realization of political ambitions. 
Also, in terms of democratic governability, it has helped to achieved important goals: the 
transition from a semi-democracy to an electoral democracy, two party-alternations in the 
presidency and, more importantly, all relevant politicians coming back for the next election 
after an electoral defeat. Thus, we can say that the six-year term has been doing reasonably 
well. It allowed the change of individuals that, eventually, lead to change of parties; yet, it 
conveyed a sense of political stability by allowing presidents of the same party to govern 
consecutive terms. The six-year term, though, may be a little bit trying for impatient 
politicians. This has lead, in part, to post-electoral conflicts. However, even when the rule has 
not always produced conflict-free elections, no one has suggested to changed it, not even the 
challengers. In the case of challengers, a further reduction of the term would reduce the value 
of competing for a post they know they have chances to capture (see Sarbaugh-Thompson, et. 
al., 2004). In the case of incumbents, they know that it is a thorny topic and that if they ever 
dare to propose the implementation of presidential reelection, they at least need to be hugely 
popular.  
Both incumbents and challengers may feel not completely happy with the rule, thinking that 
they could be better off with other arrangements. The problem is, both players are somewhat 
stuck on the six-years rule: challengers, on the one hand, may think that losing an election 
and waiting six years for the next one is long time and if they are impatient individuals, 
losing two elections in a row is definitively a long time to wait; however, demanding that the 
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term is shortened to, let’s say, four years is not an option either, because if they actually win 
the presidency they would be reducing their own time in office. Another option could be the 
four-years, two-reelections rule but here they run the risk that the incumbent --who has an 
inherent advantage-- actually wins his reelection and instead of waiting six years they will 
end up waiting eight years. On the other hand, incumbents may be tempted to eliminate the 
ban on reelection but they know that there will be a serious opposition due to the history in 
Mexico. So, although they may be frustrated with the rule, to reform it may prove a risky or 
difficult task. Things could change in the future, though, as younger generations see party-
alternations at the local and federal levels as the new norm. The 1910 revolution is now a 
historical chapter in Mexico's life. And, taking into consideration that politicians have 
incentives to keep modifying the presidential term, reforms in Mexico to eliminate the ban on 
reelection are not unthinkable. The litmus test for the six-year rule will be when a hugely 
popular president is in power.  
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Appendix 1. 
Consider the following scenarios shown in Table C. Here we start with three presidential 
candidates, C1, C2 and C(N), respectively. Each column of the table shows the benefits those 
candidates receive from different term limits provisions, starting with a rule allowing 
presidents to stay just one term in office. In this example, C1 is the winner of the first election 
(Election 1). He obtains a gain from office for one year which is denoted as 'a' in the column. 
This gain comes from the benefits of being in office, which in turn may come from the mere 
satisfaction of being in power to all material benefits of occupying the presidential post. For 
the case in which the presidential term is 4 years, these gains become '4a' for the complete 
term. He also obtains a positive gain denoted by 'x', which represents the incumbency 
advantage. X in this case is a positive number that increases the chances of winning a second 
term.   
Table C. Incumbents and challengers preferences regarding term limits provisions  
Election 1 
One term 
(t1) 
Election 2 
Two-terms 
(t2) 
Election 3 
Three-terms 
(t3) 
Election N 
N terms of N years 
(tn) 
 
Incumbent 
 
C1(u) = 4a+x 
 
a= gains from office during 
one year. 
x=incumbency advantage in 
election 1 
 
X= 0 if there are term limits; 
after term limits removal 
 
Incumbent 
 
C1(u)=4a+(x+b) 
 
b  =additional 
incumbency advantage in 
election for election 3 
 
X+b=0 if there are term 
limits; after term limits 
removal x+b>0; x>b. 
 
Incumbent 
 
C1(u)= 0 
 
Incumbent termed out  
 
Incumbent's function 
 
C1(u)= f(a) + f(x) 
 
f(a) → 0 
f(x) → 0 
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x>0  
 
Challenger 
 
C2(u) = - e - x 
 
X=0 if there are term limits; 
after term limits removal 
x>0 
 
e= cost of losing (waiting 
time cost or investment lost) 
- for the loser . 
 
 
Challenger 
 
C2(u)= -2e- (x+b) 
 
X+b=0 if there are term 
limits; after term limits 
removal x+b>0; x>b. 
 
 
Incumbent 
 
C2(u) = 4a+x 
 
X=0 if there are term 
limits; after term limits 
removal x>0 
 
Accumulated 
Challenger's function 
 
C2(u)= - f(ne) - f(x) 
 
f(e)>  0  
f(x) → 0 
 
n= number of times losing 
CNi 
 
CNi(u) = - e - x 
 
X=0 if there are term limits; 
after term limits removal 
x>0 
CNii 
 
CNi1(u) = - e - (x+b) 
 
X+b=0 if there are term 
limits; after term limits 
removal x+b>0; x>b. 
 
 
CNiii 
 
CNiii(u) = - e - x 
 
X=0 if there are term 
limits; after term limits 
removal x>0 
 
 
Challenger's function 
in any election 
 
CNin(u)= - f(e) - f(x) 
 
f(e)>  0  
f(x) → 0 
 
If there is no reelection, this gain is lost (x=0 if there are term limits) but in case that he is 
allowed to run for office again, this is a positive number (x>0). If C1 is allowed to compete 
again (let's say there is a two-consecutive term limits provision) and he is reelected for a 
second term, i.e, wins Election 2, he obtains an additional incumbency advantage denoted by 
'b'. 
In this way, if C1 -- the incumbent-- could compete for another term, for Election 3, his 
chances of obtaining an additional 4a (the gains of the new term) will be increased by a 
positive number denoted by 'x+b'. In democratic societies, that 'x+b' could be sometimes 
something near to 1 (or 100%) but it should never be exactly 1 as this would mean this 
candidate can be assured he will be the winner of the election, violating the principle that in 
democracies there should be a minimal degree of 'uncertainty' about electoral results in order 
to consider elections fair and free (see Przeworski, 1991). As stated before, the incumbency 
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advantage consists of all those elements that increase the chances of the incumbent of being 
reelected so it can be measured in terms of different resources at the disposal of the president 
but it also can be measured in terms of reelection rates. In this sense, another form of 
measuring the 'incumbency advantage' is as reelection rate of incumbents. That is, for a 
specific term limits provision, the ratio at which incumbents have been reelected over 
challengers. This means that 'x' may take on one if for a certain rule, let's say, for a two-
consecutive terms provision, the incumbent always gets reelected.  Thus, a large 'x' -- one that 
approaches one-- means high reelection rates. However, if we use this measure, and in order 
to reflect the fact that there is always a degree of uncertainty, we can add a negative term 
representing the possibility of losing. So, by subtracting this term from the original 'x' we can 
assure that the final value never takes on exactly 1.  
As we can see, from the point of view of C1(w), there are incentives to remove term limits 
and run for another term as he may be motivated by the knowledge that if this reform occurs, 
he will continue having an 'x' advantage of winning. The challenger, in this case C2, knows 
this, so he will prefer to run in Election number 2 against a new candidate that doesn't have 
the 'x' advantage; that is, he would prefer not to compete against the incumbent. In this 
example, C1 is termed out in Election 3 and the C2 wins the election and we can see that 
now he has the potential incumbency advantage; if there are term limits, this advantage is lost 
(x=0), so here he can be tempted to eliminated term limits in order to use that advantage. So 
the challenger may propose removing term limits but only once he has become the 
incumbent, for example, in Election 3 where, in this example, he is the winner of that 
election.  
Each new election won by the incumbent increases the value of 'x'. So, for election number 
three --with the incumbent being in power in the last two terms, the challenger would have to 
compete against (x+b) advantage, as the incumbency advantage keeps growing with each 
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additional term that the incumbent is in power. Thus, for the challenger the value of 'x' should 
be into his strategic calculations when considering entering an electoral contest. We can see 
that any rule allowing the incumbent to keep running for office is a rule causing a 
disadvantage for the challenger. In the same logic, it would be better for the challenger to 
compete against an incumbent that has been in office two terms than one that has been three 
or more. So, for the challenger, it would be better a two-terms rule than a three-terms rule -- 
in the case that he lost in election number two he at least knows that his chances are better in 
election number three in which the incumbent will have been termed out. 
In conclusion, the 'incumbency advantage' is the element that can explain why challengers do 
wait until they are in office to start campaigning for eliminating term limits and not before. 
There is also for the candidates that lose elections a cost 'e' which represents all the 
investment they put in for getting elected plus the cost of waiting certain number of years for 
competing again. In this regard, for a candidate who has to wait 6 years for the next election, 
the term 'e' is greater than for a candidate that has to wait only 4 years. Also, the cost of 
losing increments for each election that was not won; for example, a candidate who has been 
defeated in four elections, the cost will be 4e. 
Although the incumbency advantage keeps mounting with each additional presidential 
period, these increments get smaller over time. In other words, the benefits of being in power 
follows the diminishing returns' law stating that the utility or benefits that one individual 
receives from almost every human activity increases over time -- or by obtaining an 
additional unity of any good which is the product of that activity-- but it does so at decreasing 
rates. Likewise, the incumbency advantage may increase over time but with each added term 
it increases less than the previous term. This means that (x+b) < x but x>b. The final column 
of the Table C shows the general utility functions regarding reelection rules for incumbents 
and challengers. Challenger N is a challenger that participates only in one election and does 
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not return to the next one. In this case, CNi is a new challenger and CNii is a different 
candidate. C2 is the same candidate in all the elections, and therefore, the cost of losing 
elections is shown in accumulated form, being the total cost of losing is 'e' multiplied by the 
number of elections he has not won.  
Another form of seeing the term 'e', the cost of losing an election, is in terms of the 
candidate's impatience measured by the candidate's age. The benefits/cost from each different 
term limit rule is a function that depends on time, meaning that the older you are, the more 
you prefer limits on the presidential term if you are the challenger; on the other hand, the 
older you are, as time goes by, the less interested you are in winning another term if you are 
the incumbent. 
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II 
Enforcing a limited government in presidential semidemocracies: 
Ratification of presidential term limits in Peru (1992) and Colombia (2004) 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper proposes theoretical foundations for explaining the enforcement of constitutional 
provisions that constrain presidential power. This framework situates democracies' own 
internal mechanisms as the key element for the upholding of these provisions. In particular, 
confrontation between the players that are part of democracies' checks and balances systems 
is essential in this task. These players have to solve collective action dilemmas in order to 
enforce constraints on presidential power. 'Risk-acceptant actors' who benefit from 
confrontation with the president play an important role in initiating such collective action. If 
the majority of democratic players uphold these constraints, the probability that the president 
does not abide to this result is low. To illustrate this theoretical framework, the paper uses the 
enforcement of presidential term limits in Peru (1992) and Colombia (2004). The paper 
presents a game-theoretic model, which I call the "belling-the-cat-model," depicting the 
dilemmas that political players face when enforcing a limited tenure as well as the path for 
solving the puzzles of the game. Different from other approaches, this theoretical framework 
does not abstract from actual institutional arrangements or from the level of democracy we 
find in the world today; quite the contrary -- it departs from a basic democratic structure that 
has yet to consolidate, so it helps to trace the road from a partial democracy towards a 
consolidated, liberal one.   
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I. Introduction: 
 
Constraining the presidential power 
 
The objective of this paper is to clarify which political conditions help to enforce a limited 
presidential tenure. There is a general lack of theoretical work on the political factors that 
help to preserve the constitutional provisions that limit and constrain democratic 
governments. Following a similar statement by Przeworski (1991), Barry Weingast (1997) 
stated that "students of democracy have given too little attention to the issue of how 
democracy's limits are enforced." (Weingast, 1997, p. 245). This gap is even wider in the case 
of presidential systems that are in the process of democratic consolidation. We know little 
about the political factors that allow enforcing the constitutional provisions that constrain 
presidential power. In part, I will argue in the literature review section of this paper, this 
theoretical gap is due to the fact that for decades students of presidential democracies have 
been concerned with a different matter -- the efficacy of the presidential power, which, to 
some extent, is the opposite concern. Especially, plenty has been written about the 
relationship between presidents and assemblies and the conditions that make it easier for the 
president to get his legislative agenda approved by national legislatures (see Mainwaring and 
Shugart, 1997). In other words, academics have been more worried about presidential 
effectiveness than about the more traditional, liberal concern of how to limit the government. 
One of the few exceptions in this academic trend is the work of Barry Weingast (1997). In his 
paper "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," Weingast stated that 
the enforcement of a limited government is a collective action dilemma for the citizenry. His 
theoretical model does not take into consideration any particular political system, it is an 
abstract model analysing only the strategic behaviour of a sovereign and the citizenry. 
Citizens should coordinate to decide what are the limits that the sovereign must respect. Once 
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citizens coordinate around a specific constitutional government limit, this provision becomes 
a self-enforced rule that will be respected by the sovereign (Weingast, 1997).  
 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the literature about limited government. The 
paper focuses on the enforcement of government constraints in a particular array of political 
systems: democracies that are presidential regimes and that are still in the process of 
consolidation. Most states cannot be classed straightforwardly as either fully fledged 
democracies or authoritarian regimes but instead are to be found somewhere fall amongst a 
wide array of regimes that are in the middle of these two type of systems -- competitive 
authoritarianisms, electoral authoritarianisms, semidemocracies, delegative democracies, 
hyperpresidentialisms and illiberal democracies (see O'Donnell, 1994; Zakaria, 1997; 
Schedler, 2006; Smith and Ziegler, 2008; Brownlee, 2009). Therefore, it is important to 
understand how a liberal government can emerge from these hybrid regimes. We want to 
know how countries that are part of these regimes could transition toward an electoral 
democracy in which there are "free and fair elections -- no more and no less" (Smith and 
Ziegler, 2008, p. 32, see also Przeworski, 1999) and to, eventually, a liberal democracy in 
which elections are not only free and fair but also constitutional limits on the state power are 
respected by rulers (see Zakaria, 1997, and Smith and Ziegler, 2008). 
 
To do so, the paper considers the enforcement of presidential term limits provisions in Peru 
(1992) and Colombia (2004). Several authors have noticed that presidential term limits 
provisions are one of the most effective institutional devises for constraining the presidential 
power (O'Donnell, 1994, p. 59; Przeworski, 1999, p. 50; Colomer, 2001, p.170; Maltz, 2007). 
However, there is a practical problem -- because these provisions are so effective in 
constraining the presidential power, presidents also have strong incentives to try to eliminate 
90 
 
these constraints. Hence, finding out how to successfully enforce term limits is a challenging 
theoretical puzzle. In order to tackle this theoretical problem, I propose a general theoretical 
framework to analyse under what conditions presidential power constraints are enforced. To 
illustrate the logic behind this theoretical framework, I have developed a simultaneous 
cooperation game for showing the collective action dilemmas faced by democratic players in 
the enforcement of a limited presidential tenure. I call this game the 'belling-the-cat-dilemma' 
(BTCD)
48
 and is a variant of the well-known prisoners' dilemma game, but different from the 
classical payoff structure of the prisoners' dilemma, the payoffs for players in the BTCD are 
asymmetrical. Then, I present the game in a sequential form, showing a path to solve the 
collective action dilemmas in the enforcement of term limits provisions.  
 
The model predicts that to solve the collective action dilemmas in the enforcement of these 
provisions, there should be politicians (leaders) that benefit from confrontation with the 
president; these players can expect payoffs similar to those of the gamblers in a risky bet -- 
the cost of losing is high, they can become political prisoners or facing continuous reprisals 
from the president in case they fail to enforce term limits provisions, so they are eaten by the 
Cat; but if they succeed, they will be highly rewarded for taking chances and may even 
become the next president. In order to succeed, the leader must initiate opposition that is 
followed by the majority of democratic players. For the rest of the paper, I will refer to all 
democratic players other than the president --congresses, constitutional courts, electoral 
commissions, opposition parties, local governors and legislators -- as 'democratic control 
                                                          
48
 I have chosen this name from the 'Belling the Cat' fable: "Long ago, the mice had a general council to 
consider what measures they could take to outwit their common enemy, the Cat. At last a young mouse said he 
had a proposal to make. 'You will all agree,' said he, 'that our chief danger consists in the sly and treacherous 
manner in which the enemy approaches us. Now, if we could receive some signal of her approach, we could 
easily escape from her. I venture, therefore, to propose that a small bell be procured, and attached by a ribbon 
round the neck of the Cat. By this means we should always know when she was about, and could easily retire 
while she was in the neighbourhood.' This proposal met with general applause, until an old mouse got up and 
said: 'That is all very well, but who is to bell the Cat?"' (Aesop fables, 1909-14, The Harvard Classics, 
http://www.bartleby.com/17/1/67.html.) This fable is widely used in political analysis and as an example of 
collective action problems (see Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, pp. 16-19). 
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players,' DC players or simply DCPs. In this way, the game includes the traditional branches 
of the government that act as a check on the president as well as new actors that also help to 
keep the president accountable (see O'Donnell, 1994). 
 
Different from previous proposals, my model focuses on the role of democracy's own 
mechanisms in the enforcement of these constrains (Cf. Weingast, 1997; and Maltz, 2007); 
especially, it assigns a significant role to the checks and balances system of democracies. 
This proposed model shows that not only can these constrains be enforced after confrontation 
amongst the branches of government occurs, but that the checks and balances system gets 
more solid as a result of these confrontations. In other words, these confrontations unleash a 
virtuous cycle in which for each battle that DCPs win in the enforcement of these constraints, 
these actors become stronger.  
 
My proposal follows Weingast's model suggestion that the enforcement of a limited 
government is essentially a collective action problem, but it differs from Weingast's model in 
four key elements. First, the outcome of the game does not depend on the existence of liberal 
democratic values about limited government ingrained in the citizenry or in the political 
elites. Second, although citizen support may modify the expected payoffs received by 
democratic actors, the ultimate solution of the game is in the hands of democratic players that 
have constitutional prerogatives to keep the president accountable -- players that are part of 
the checks and balances system. Thus, the collective action dilemmas to enforce a limited 
tenure have to be solved by these actors rather than the citizenry. Third, in my model, 
democratic constraints, and particularly term limits provisions, are not a self-enforced 
institution but rather they need to be upheld by democratic players in charge of keeping the 
president accountable. And, more importantly, different from Weingast's model, my 
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theoretical framework does not abstract from institutional arrangements or from the level of 
democracy that we actually find on the ground; quite the contrary -- it departs from a basic 
democratic structure that has yet to consolidate, so it helps to trace the road from a partial 
democracy toward a more solid, liberal one.  
 
The paper seeks to make contributions on four topics of democratic theory: strengthening of 
democracies' checks and balances systems; enforcement of a limited government in new 
democracies; efficacy of the institutions that limit the presidential power, and collective 
action dilemmas for preserving democratic institutions. The proposed framework may be 
useful for scholars investigating electoral-authoritarian presidential systems, semi-democratic 
hegemonic-party systems and other type of regimes that are undergoing a process of 
democratic consolidation and transitions to electoral democracies and liberal democracies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section of the paper revises the literature about 
the role of term limits provisions in constraining the presidential power. In the second section 
I present a theoretical framework for the enforcement of a limited government in presidential 
democracies that are also unconsolidated. Then, I develop a game-theoretic model to review 
the case of the enforcement of term limits provisions. Finally, the third section revises the 
case of term limits enforcement in Peru and Colombia. These cases show that the 
enforcement of these provisions is challenging for democratic players, but if democratic 
players succeed in solving their collective action dilemmas and ratify term limits, the 
probability that the president doesn't abide to this outcome is very low. 
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II. Literature review 
Term Limits: A Key Institution for Constraining Presidential Power. 
Term limits provisions have multiple effects on presidential democracies, but the most 
important one is their role in restraining and controlling the executive power (see O'Donnell, 
1994; Przeworski, 1999; Colomer, 2001; Carey, 2003; Maltz, 2007). Guillermo O'Donnell 
(1994) was one of the first authors to stress the importance of constitutionally imposed term 
limits for constraining the presidential power (O'Donnell, 1994, p. 59) but it was Maltz 
(2007) who further developed this idea. According to Maltz (2007), term limits provisions are 
a check or control on political power. He suggests that, just as division of powers and 
elections, term limits are an institutional devise that can stop abuse of power by the executive 
branch over other political players, mainly politicians that are part of the opposition.  
We can go further and suggest that, in fact, term limits provisions are the ultimate devise for 
the protection not only of political leaders in the opposition but also of citizens belonging to 
minority groups. This is so because under these provisions it does not matter how popular a 
president is or how he manages to win the vote of the majority of citizens, a president that has 
abused a minority's rights will eventually be replaced, even if the majority of voters would 
prefer to keep voting for him. In other words, term limits provisions try to prevent the 
maintenance of popular tyrants -- those presidents who are kept in power for the majority of 
voters regardless of their abuse of minority groups. As Linz (1994) pointed out, "[t]he 
maximum time limit for any government between elections is probably the greatest guarantee 
against omnipotence and abuse of power, the last hope for those in the minority position." 
(Linz, 1994, p.17; see also Elhauge, et. al, 1997). 
Term limits are especially important for presidential democracies. Different from 
parliamentary democracies, the chief executive in presidential democracies does not depend 
on other powers for its survival (see Linz, 1994). This means that presidents are less 
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constrained than prime ministers and therefore may find easier to abuse their power (Maltz, 
2007). In this sense, Maltz sustains that "prime ministers do not need to be term-limited, as 
they are not guaranteed a set term in office, often rule for only a few years before facing 
reelection, and have substantially less power than full-fledged presidents since tenure in the 
premiership depends entirely on the will of members of parliament and a premier is usually 
subordinate to a head of state with an independent mandate." (Maltz, 2007, p. 139). 
Long serving incumbents can become the centre of power and political networks, gradually 
concentrating power at the expense of other state organs. Maltz (2007) further argues that 
term limits create uncertainty about the future and for this reason political players become 
cautious not to unconditionally follow the incumbent. Political players think about what the 
future might bring and consider the time when the incumbent is no longer in power. Under 
such uncertainty, rules become the focal point of interaction of political players (Maltz, 
2007). In a system with term limits political players know they cannot count on an individual 
to stay forever in power. Players tend to play by the rules, which have a lasting nature. Thus, 
term limits help to cement the rule of institutions rather than the rule of individuals. 
Term limits provisions also constraint the power of the president vis-à-vis other branches of 
government. These constraints may transform the president into a 'lameduck' incumbent as 
the president's power decreases when his last term approaches (see Elhauge, 1997). In this 
line of reasoning, Josep Colomer (2000) has argued that, given the dominance of presidents 
over assemblies during periods of unified government -- that is, when the president's party 
controls the majority of the assembly's seats--  term limits provisions help to maintain a more 
balanced equilibrium between the state powers by assuring legislators that the president will 
eventually be replaced, thus, giving them more confidence to confront him (Colomer, 2000, 
pp. 169-171 ). In this regard, a limited tenure weakens the presidential power, which in turn 
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has a positive effect to counterbalance the concentration of power at the hands of the 
executives during unified governments.  
Colomer considers that in the absence of these 'asymmetrical' limits on the executive power, 
presidents will resist to share the state power with the assembly during periods of unified 
government (2000, p. 169). Colomer (2000) has also stressed how, in presidential systems, 
the combination of unlimited reelection and an unified government evolved in some cases 
into semi authoritarian regimes of personalistic rule (Ibid). For the very same reason -- the 
weakening of the presidency vis-à-vis the assembly --, Alexander Hamilton argued strongly 
during the Federalists debates against term limiting presidents (Hamilton, Federalist no.71 
and 72).
49
 However, during the Federalists time the consequences of unified government for 
power equilibrium had not been fully foreseen. And it wasn't until the arrival of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, a Democrat who won the U.S. presidency four times  (1932, 1936, 
1940, and 1944), that the U.S. constitutionalists started to consider that the possibilities of a 
presidential 'dictatorship' were real, and thus that concern derived in Republicans formally 
establishing presidential term limits on the U.S. Constitution in 1947 (Colomer, p.172; see 
also Elhauge, 1997).  
Maltz (2007) observes that despite the wide use of presidential term limits, and despite all its 
benefits for democracies, there are also incentives to eliminate this institution. Noticing that 
in the last years of the period covered by his study there was a worrisome trend to abolish 
                                                          
49 Hamilton sustained that it was important to assure the president that he could be in office for an unlimited 
period as this would keep his mandate strong:  "Duration in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to 
the energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two objects: to the personal firmness of the executive 
magistrate, in the employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability of the system of administration 
which may have been adopted under his auspices." (Alexander Hamilton, The Duration in Office of the 
Executive, Federalist No. 71, The Federalist Papers, 1788.). 
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term limits provisions, Maltz concludes that "the challenge for term limits is not adoption but 
enforcement",  adding that "the trend toward contravention must be addressed." (2007, 
p.130). To Maltz, what makes it difficult to enforce this political institution is the "eagerness 
of incumbents to stay in office" (2007, p. 129). Maltz suggests to include presidential term 
limits in the global 'democratization agenda,' proposing different ways in which the 
international community may help to enforce this institution.  
 
Could there also be a way in which democracies' own institutions and internal mechanisms 
enforce term limits? The general question of how to constrain and limit the presidential 
power, and the particular topic of the enforcement of term limits, have been largely 
overlooked by the comparative research on presidential democracies. In the last decades the 
study of presidential democracies, and in particular Latin American ones, followed two 
general routes, neither of which addressed the topic of how to enforce the rules that constrain 
the presidential power. The first route of research was inspired by the work of Guillermo 
O'Donnell (1994), who characterized Latin American countries as 'delegative democracies' in 
which the presidential power was unchecked and excessive. This unbalance of power was 
considered as one of the reasons Latin American countries were unable to consolidate their 
democratic systems; at the same time, the weakness of other players that were supposed to 
keep the president accountable lead O'Donnell to conclude that this situation was helpless.  
This line of research failed to address the question of how to limit the presidential power 
because it considered a weak system of checks and balances as an invariable state, instead of 
seeing it as an element that can change across countries and over time. According to 
Guillermo O'Donnell, when the system of checks and balances is properly working we find 
'horizontal accountability' between the branches of government (O’Donnell, 1994). This 
means that the three branches of government hold each other accountable. It is ‘horizontal’ 
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because each branch has the same status; they are ‘equals’ and should share political power 
on equal terms. How well does this mechanism of checks and balances work in new 
democracies? According to Guillermo O’Donnell, “(...) the horizontal accountability 
characteristic of representative democracy is extremely weak or non-existent in delegative 
democracies. Furthermore, since the institutions that make horizontal accountability effective 
are seen by delegative presidents as unnecessary encumbrances to their 'mission,' they make 
strenuous efforts to hamper the development of such institutions.” (1994, p. 62).50  
Hence, the problem of the strengthening of the checks and balances system almost falls into a 
tautological conceptual trap -- the president is powerful because the checks and balances 
system that is supposed to keep him accountable is non-existent but the same system cannot 
get stronger because the president is too powerful as to permit this. Although O'Donnell was 
one of the first authors to suggest that presidential term limits are one of the few institutions 
effectively constraining the presidential power (O'Donnell, 1994, p. 59), his analysis 
presented a paradox. On the one hand, term limits provisions have shown effective in 
constraining the executive branch, but, on the other hand, their very preservation relies on 
what is a distinctive weakness of 'delegative democracies' -- a very weak system of checks 
and balances. 
The second line of research studying presidential democracies focused more on topics of 
governability and effective government than on the more traditional, liberal concerns of 
limited government. Juan Linz (1994) brought to attention the important role that the fixed 
nature of presidential terms plays for the functioning and survival of this type of democracy. 
While in parliamentary systems the prime minister can be removed from power by parliament 
before the next general election, in presidential systems the chief executive remains in office 
                                                          
50
 Here it is important to notice that when talking about ‘political institutions’ O'Donnell includes both ‘the rules 
of the game’ and formal state organizations in charge of enforcing those rules such as congresses and courts. 
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for a set term. According to Linz, fixed tenures make presidential democracies prone to 
breakdown as there is no institutional mechanism for terminating a presidency that is in 
conflict with the congress, mainly in cases of divided government. In this view, the fixed 
nature of the presidential term was seen as an institutional feature causing governability 
problems and, in the worst cases, the breakdown of democracies. Therefore, there was not too 
much interest in understanding the role of this institution in limiting the presidential power. 
The agenda that followed tried to understand what circumstances could minimize the 
structural rigidities of the institutional design of presidential democracies. Scholars were 
investigating how presidents could be more effective in having their legislative agenda 
approved by national assemblies; thus, they investigated variations in their constitutional 
powers and congressional coalition-building possibilities. These scholars asked what are the 
conditions that increase cooperation between the president and the congress. Political 
gridlock was an important problem that needed to be solved. In other words, they tried to 
identify what conditions would minimize presidential democracies 'structural' problems (see 
Linz, 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Jones, 1995). General concerns about how to 
strengthen the checks and balances system and the enforcement of mechanisms for limiting 
the presidential power were not addressed in this comparative line.  
This vacuum is not only in the literature about presidential democracies, though. There is a 
significant lack of research about the political factors that facilitate the enforcement of 
government limits in all types of democracies. One of the few exceptions in this academic 
trend, is the work of Weingast (1997). Weingast developed a game-theoretic model "of the 
stability of limited government" (Weingast, 1997, p. 245). In his theoretical approach, the 
stability of the rules that constrain the government depend on a "self-enforcing equilibrium: It 
must be in the interests of political officials to respect democracy's limits on their behavior." 
(Weingast, 1997, p. 245). According to this author, such equilibrium emerges when citizens 
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solve their "coordination dilemmas about the appropriate limits on the state." (p. 246). Once 
these coordination dilemmas have been resolved, the sovereign will respect this consensus 
because "(t)o remain in power, the sovereign must retain sufficient citizen support" (p. 246). 
Weingast's model "abstracts from the institutions of representative government by focusing 
on the relationship between a single political official, called the sovereign, and the citizenry." 
(p. 246).  
By presenting the enforcement of a limited government as a collective action dilemma, 
Weingast's model provided an important departure point. However, because his model does 
not take into account democratic institutions, we do not know which role internal 
mechanisms play in limiting the government. In this regard, in his theoretical approach there 
is no difference between democratic and non-democratic systems. Yet one important feature 
of democracy is precisely its supposed capacity to constrain governments more effectively 
than other type of systems. Weingast's model, thus, let pass the opportunity to explore how 
these democratic mechanisms for limiting governments get activated or how they can become 
stronger in performing this task. Another shortcoming of Weingast's model is its reliance on 
the existence of a society that not only has an ingrained liberal culture that prefers a limited 
government, but one that also knows what exactly those limits should be. Unless there are 
significant chances of counting with such a society, this model gives little hope to countries 
where there is not a clear consensus about what limits governments should not contravene.  
 
Another problem not foreseen in Weingast's (1997) model is what happens when politicians 
do have, in fact, incentives to eliminate government constraints, even when those constraints 
are constitutionally imposed.  Contrary to Weingast's view of constitutional government 
constraints as 'self-enforcing equilibriums,' Hardin (1989) considers that often there are 
conflicting interest around those constraints, but the reasons those constraints survive is not 
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necessarily because people solve those conflicts but because there are transaction cost that 
make it difficult to change those constitutional provisions. Thus, they survive because of the 
"difficulty of recoordinating on an alternative arrangement" (Hardin, 1989, p.102). In this 
regard, Hardin (1989) sustains that "constitutions have a far less significant element of 
agreement behind than do contracts" (Hardin, 1989, p. 101). Sometimes, the objective of 
creating a constitution is precisely to establish criteria to deal with conflicting interests and 
opposite views. In Hardin words, "the point of establishing a constitution and of creating 
particular institutions is to put obstacles in our way in order to force us to move along certain 
paths and not others." (1989, p. 116). Sometimes actors would prefer a different arrangement, 
but in order to adopt this new arrangement they have to solve collective action dilemmas as 
well. For this reason, Hardin concludes that "[a] constitution, to come into being or to be 
effective, does not require universal or even widespread agreement." (Hardin, 1989, p. 108).  
However, change does happen as well, so we can say that sometimes actors not only do have 
incentives to change those provisions but actually find ways to solve their collective action 
dilemmas and organize around a new rule. In the same way, I will try to explain in the next 
section, collective action can also be achieved for enforcing those constraints. In the next 
section I develop a model for explaining the enforcement of constitutional provisions that 
constrain and limit the presidential power. The model focuses on the enforcement of 
presidential term limits provisions. The model revises the conditions under which the checks 
and balances system activates to enforce these rules before attempts by the president to 
eliminate these constraints. This approach is based on the assumption that very often 
politicians have interests in evade or eliminate these constrains and extend their power. 
Precisely because of this, the system of checks and balances was created: power is confronted 
with power as a means to counterbalance those actors that want to concentrate all the state 
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power in their hands. However, sometimes this system is weak and confrontation between 
players has to occur in order to strengthen this system. 
 
Models of institutional change: Why starting with Weingast's model? 
 
For decades scholars have studied the factors and dynamics behind institutional change; that 
is, the reform of rules in political systems. Research has especially focused on political actors 
who have an interest in institutional change and who also have the power to initiate it. One of 
such actors in democracies is the chief executive. Plenty has been written about the 
willingness and ability of presidents and prime ministers to change laws. For instance, in the 
1990s political scientists were often interested in finding out under what conditions Latin 
American presidents would support the agenda of the so-called economic 'structural reforms.' 
This agenda sought to implement reforms in favor of free markets, reduction of government's 
deficits, reduction of the inflation, among others (see Stokes, 2001). One theoretical approach 
focused on the preferences and constitutional prerogatives of the presidents. There could be 
the case of presidents who may want to implement those reforms but they lacked the 
constitutional powers to push through such economic proposals (see Shugart and Carey, 
1992). Scholars focused on presidents, as they governed at the time in an environment of 
weak or non-existent checks and balances systems (O'Donnell, 1994). There was therefore no 
need to understand problems of cooperation, coordination, or any other collective action 
problem among political players, to studying the process of institutional change. This 
theoretical framework was straightforward and elite-centered, and the answers offered by 
these studies were simple: institutional change happens when presidents advocate reform and 
when they have the constitutional prerogatives to do so. Actors' preferences and their legal 
powers were the main explanations of institutional change. 
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One decade later, the next generation of studies found that although presidents are key 
players in institutional reform, other players, mainly national assemblies, had a critical role as 
well. This progress in research was in tune with a slow but steady development in the region, 
which was that opposition parties started to win more legislative seats than ever before, 
which resulted in national congresses becoming more active players in the region (see 
Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). Thus, while in the past legislators were mostly there to 
support the legislative agendas of presidents, now assemblies were becoming more relevant, 
exercising their role as a check on the president. The increasing occurrence of divided 
governments across the region made it necessary to disentangle all the important elements of 
the relationship between presidents and assemblies in order to understand the process of 
institutional change. Those analyses were still centered on political elites but more political 
factors were included as relevant variables for explaining institutional change.  
Interestingly, actors such as congresses and supreme courts were not always seen as actors 
willing to participate in institutional change but rather as players with interest in vetoing 
change. They often were depicted more as 'reactive' actors, trying to stop or obstruct 
institutional change in contrast to presidents, who were often seen as the initiators of reforms. 
The emphasis of this literature was to studying not only those actors interested and capable of 
implementing institutional reform, but also those actors who had the power to stop it. Many 
of these studies were influenced by George Tsebelis' 'veto players' theory (1995). Tsebelis' 
theoretical contribution added an important conceptual layer to the problem of institutional 
change. According to his theory, veto players are those actors who have the power to stop 
reforms and therefore their consent is a necessary condition for institutional change. Thus, in 
order to understand when institutional change was more likely to occur they had to find out 
how many veto players were in the political system. 
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The concept of veto players helped to understand how divided governments affect 
institutional change. In a country with a bipartisan national assembly, for instance, if the 
opposition party has more seats than the president's party, then that opposition party can be 
seen as a "veto player": no legislation can be passed without its consent. On the other hand, if 
the majority of legislators pass a bill but the president has the power to veto that bill and also 
has the support of enough legislators to sustain his veto, then this president is also a veto 
player. Here again, change is seen as the combination of players' preferences and players' 
constitutional prerogatives. The main question is who has the legal power to pass bill X or to 
stop bill Y. Because all this is only about the formal rules, in some cases there is no need to 
solve any collective action problem, all it takes is players' willingness and capability to start 
or to stop reforms. 
This approach gave practical answers to the problem of institutional change. The theory about 
collective action offered some answers too. But still these answers fell short of explaining the 
entire picture. In particular, from the point of view of collective action theory, it was easier to 
explain failure at forming congressional coalitions for approving reform than explain cases of 
success. There was one important problem to overcome in forming coalitions: the problem of 
cycles of preferences (see Ordeshook, 1992; Shepsle, 1998; Colomer, 2001). For instance, in 
a simple world, let’s say, one with three political parties holding each 33 percent of the seats, 
the formation of a majority winning coalition may get complicated. For once, party A may 
join party B and form a winning coalition but party C and party B can also form a winning 
coalition, and also party A and party C can form a winning coalition. As we can see there are 
three possibilities which can cause 'cycles' of coalition-building processes. More players only 
add more complexity to these problems. From this perspective, achieving institutional change 
becomes more complicated and tangled than it was in the real world. The problem of forming 
winning coalitions to approve institutional change was usually somehow solved in the real 
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world. Thus, the theory of collective action and basic theories about the formation of 
legislative coalitions were more successful in explaining why actors may fail to cooperate 
than to explain why actors sometimes succeed in cooperating to achieve collective goals.  
The 'new' institutionalism tried to solve this question. According to the proponents of this 
approach, institutional change doesn't occur in a vacuum. There are established procedures to 
produce new rules or to change the old ones or even to reform these procedures themselves. 
This 'institutional' structure allows and sometimes shapes these reforming processes. Scholars 
who proposed this approach named the outcomes of these processes 'institutional-induced 
equilibrium' to emphasize that the cooperation solutions emerged from these institutional 
structures (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). 
The 'new institutional' approach generated vast academic research. In the case of 
democracies, scholars started studying how different institutional arrangements could allow 
and structure the bargaining of political reforms. Also, it was recognized that actors' 
preferences may have an important role as well in creating cooperation among political 
players and, therefore, in the negotiation of institutional reforms. In this way, ideological 
preferences also added a useful element to deal with the previously chaotic, cyclical world of 
collective action problems and coalition-building processes. In particular, taking into 
consideration actors' ideologies and preferences could reduce the number of potential 
collaborators and therefore the number of possible winning coalitions. Hence, in a three-party 
world, for instance, leftist parties are more likely to join a centrist party in forming a coalition 
than to cooperate with a rightist party; so, now we have two possible winning coalitions 
instead of the three possible coalitions as we had in the first example (see Tsebelis, 1995). 
And so, in the last decades a picture has emerged connecting these dots. In this regard, we 
can see the new institutional approach as a to-do list of, more or less, four points: 1) fist, 
identify actors, 2) find out the preferences and ideology of those actors, and 3) map out the 
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institutions in place --i.e., the rules of the game, and 4) find out the cooperation games that 
emerge as a result of this institutional structure and the possible solutions to these games. In 
the rules of the game referred to under 3) include: rules that define which actors have the 
power to initiate political reform, rules that determine the formal powers of the actors, rules 
about procedures, and the rules for changing all those rules (see Moe, 1990; Calvert,1995; 
Knight and Sened, 1995; Koelble, 1995) . 
This approach is very handy as it is usually possible to identify all these elements in different 
political contexts. Usually, information about the formal powers of presidents and assemblies 
can be found in formal constitutions and other legal documents. There is also plenty of 
information that could be used for figuring out the preferences and ideology of political 
actors. So, the strength of this framework is that it facilitates the comparison of different 
political contexts, also, it allows and gives order to the analysis of different collective action 
dilemmas by reducing the number of possible cooperating solutions. 
One issue less tackled by the institutional approach is the maintenance or preservation of 
institutions, in particular, the preservation of democratic institutions. Usually, the 
preservation of institutions is seen as the default solution: institutions are preserved if no one 
is trying to change them or if those who want to preserve them have enough power to resist 
the collective action of those who want to reform these institutions. Again, the matter of 
institutional maintenance was explained by the presence of veto players: if there is one or 
more veto players in the bargaining process, those institutions will be preserved. I would 
qualify, however, that sometimes the maintenance of institutions also requires some form of 
collective action. Those actors who want to preserve the status quo also need to organize in 
order to defend it. The organization of collective action for the preservation of institutions, 
thus, is the other side of the coin. 
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In this paper, I use the Weingast's model (1997) because it presents a macro view about how 
democratic institutions can be preserved. In addition to taking into consideration all those 
elements of the ‘new institutionalism’ described above, Weingast presents an ‘ultimate 
cooperation game’ that unfolds to maintain democratic institutions. In Weingast's model, the 
end game for reforming or maintaining institutions is popular support. People taking to the 
streets to demand institutional change or to protect certain institutions are seen as the ultimate 
force in this process. Sometimes, even the mere possibility of public mobilization is enough 
to encourage or to dissuade politicians of approving laws or policies. Does the public 
supports the president's proposal for reducing social benefits, for instance? Or does the public 
will protest against this reform? And may this lead to governability problems? In this regard, 
although institutional change, and all political reforms in general, may be initiated by 
politicians and be negotiated by the political elites, the end game of these reforms is about 
public support for those reforms. In fact, in the democratic world, there is a clear link 
between public support and the rest of the reform chain: elections. Angry public 
demonstrations of course may exert some deterrence force on its own, but mostly, they may 
herald an electoral cost at the ballot box. But at the very end, what is at stake is the 'sovereign' 
survival, whether it is a hereditary monarchy, a dictatorship or a democracy, the survival of 
the ruler relies on having some legitimacy coming from the people. 
In this regard, I consider that Weingast's model shows this "end game" of institutional 
reform: if you have the support of the majority of the public, then, you will have a certain 
legitimacy that will allow you to perform all the tasks involved in governing a country, 
including the possibility of implementing your political agenda or changing the rules about 
accessing and keeping power. In semi-democratic contexts, this model for studying 
institutional change is extremely important mainly because these countries are sometimes 
swinging between democratic consolidation and authoritarian regression. Thus, 
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implementation of unpopular measures by the government may sometimes lead to a political 
conflict that can easily escalate into a major governability crisis, such as forcing the 
resignation of presidents. This happened, for instance, in Argentina in 2001, when people 
took to the streets to protest against economic austerity measures issued by the then president 
De la Rúa, which in turn led to the premature end of his administration. So, understanding 
this possibility, this final game, is important in semi-democratic environments, in which a 
legitimacy crisis not always ends in a party losing elections but sometimes it may lead to the 
breakdown of the democratic regime itself.  
However, whenever we talk about citizen's mobilization, we need to talk about collective 
action dilemmas as well. In Weingast's model, citizens' believes about which limits the ruler 
should not transgress are key to understand these dilemmas. Hence, when people agree on 
which democratic institutions must be preserved, they will organize to defend them. I will 
explain in more detail in the following sections that people's believes are an important focal 
point for organizing but, in order to protect democratic institutions, some type of leadership is 
needed. Otherwise, I will argue, some collective action dilemmas will continue to prevail. In 
particular, I show that Weingast's model doesn't address this question: how does the general 
public solve their collective action problems to protest against the ruler? What is lacking in 
Weingast’s model are leaders, agency, actors that organize citizens' collective action to 
protect democratic institutions. In other words, what is lacking are politicians, those 
individuals whose daily business is to organizing the people -- thereby solving collective 
action dilemmas-- for political ends. 
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III. Enforcing a Limited Government in New Democracies:  
 
A Theoretical Framework Proposal 
 
This section aims to set theoretical foundations for the enforcement of a limited government 
in new democracies. Particularly, it revises constitutional provisions constraining the 
presidential power. Rather than looking for external enforcement
51
 to these constrains, this 
theoretical framework situates democracies' own internal mechanisms as the key element for 
the upholding of these provisions. Also, this theoretical framework sustains that both 
elements, a strong checks and balances system and the enforcement of a limited government, 
are linked: the reinforcement of the checks and balances system is achieved by the regular 
confrontation of the different democratic players. Democratic players have to counterbalance 
players that seek to extend their formal power and also eliminate constraints imposed upon 
them. 
This theoretical framework only requires a partial level of democracy, which means that it is 
not too strict in its requirements. This allows us to include not only consolidated democracies 
but also political systems that do not present yet the conditions of the 'minimalistic' version of 
democracy which requires elections to be free, fair, and contested.
52
  For this reason, it can be 
applied to electoral-authoritarian systems, semi-democracies ("delegative democracies"), 
illiberal democracies, and to countries returning to democracy after periods of authoritarian 
                                                          
51
 A proposal for external enforcement was suggested by Maltz (2007), who argued that the international 
community may consider term limits provisions in its democratic agenda, and thus, find ways to preserve this 
institution.  
52
 About the 'minimal' conditions for a political system to be considered as an 'electoral democracy' see 
Schumpeter (1942), Huntington (1991), and "A minimalist Concept of Democracy: A Defense" by Przeworski 
(1999). Those authors state that, at least, free, fair and contested elections are needed for a political system to be 
considered an electoral democracy. In this paper, I will deal with electoral authoritarianisms where elections are 
partially free and fair (see Schedler, 2006 ), and systems where elections are little contested -- there is a lack of 
political plurality, like in systems with hegemonic party governments, etc.   
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rule.
53
 The model neither requires citizens to have a strong democratic culture or having clear 
preferences for a limited, liberal government;
54
 nor is it required that there is consensus on 
democratic values among the political elites, they only need to be rational actors acting in 
self-interest. To be sure, a citizenry embracing democratic values and a liberal political elite 
would help a lot but they are not a necessary condition in this model.  
This framework does require the following four conditions: 1) Basic 'formal' democratic 
procedures. This means that regular elections must be held. There can be a very uneven 
playing field
55
 for contestants and therefore the competition may not be perfectly free and 
fair, but elections still need to have some weight in the selection of representatives. 2) 
Official law must indicate that the state power is shared and divided amongst different state 
organs. There can be, however, asymmetries in the power of those organs; this asymmetry 
may come from constitutional norms but mostly it comes from informal practices.
56
 The 
model in particular considers those political contexts where the president concentrates 
significant power vis-à-vis the rest of the democratic players. 3) Confrontation between 
democratic players has to happen. For the checks and balances system to be strengthened, 
there have to be critical moments of conflict between the branches of government, -- 
democratic players have to confront other players whenever they try to avoid or eliminate 
                                                          
53
 The basic nature of this framework means that its implications can also hold for consolidated democracies. A 
more demanding model would exclude all these mixed regimes -- like electoral authoritarianisms and 
hegemonic regimes-- and all democracies in the process of consolidation. 
54
 Cf. Weingast (1997). 
55
 Levitsky and Way (2010) define an 'uneven playing field' "as one in which incumbent abuse of the state 
generates such disparities in access to resources, media, or state institutions that opposition parties' ability to 
organize and compete for national office is seriously imparted" (p. 57). According to these authors, in many 
countries "democratic competition is undermined less by electoral fraud or repression than by unequal access to 
state institutions, resources, and the media." (p. 57). 
56 As O'Donnell suggest, in this type of political context, democratic practices are mixed with undemocratic, 
informal arrangements: "(a) noninstitutionalized democracy is characterized by the restricted scope, the 
weakness, and the low density of whatever political institutions exist. The place of well-functioning institutions 
is taken by other nonformalized but strongly operative practices –clientelism, patrimonialism, and corruption.” 
(1994, p. 59).  
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constrains imposed upon them. 4) The conflict between the branches of government occurs 
around provisions that are already written on constitutions or official law.  
The theoretical puzzle 
The basic premise of the checks and balances system of democracies is that a balance of 
power is created by distributing power among players and then confronting each other (see 
Dahl, 1971). The system is based upon the assumption that power is a zero-sum game: 
whenever the executive increases its power, the rest of the state organs become weaker and 
power becomes unbalanced. As we saw in the previous section, long incumbencies lead to a 
significant accumulation of power in the hands of the executive power at the expenses of 
other democratic players (Maltz, 2007). Term limits provisions have proved effective 
institutional devises for constraining the presidential power (O'Donnell, 1994, p. 59; 
Przeworski, 1999, p. 50; Colomer, 2001, p.170; Maltz, 2007) but, because of this, presidents 
have incentives to eliminate this constraint and, in this way, increase their power. So the 
question is how DCPs should counteract the president to maintain this institution.  
When the president announces his intentions of extending his tenure, democratic control 
players (DCPs) have to be strategic in the way they respond to the president's reform 
campaign. A failure to stop the president's reform will weaken their power further; therefore, 
they need to be strategic during the inter-branch confrontation. Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz 
(1998) suggest that the authority of any judge -- which is one of the DC players of 
democracies -- , depends on how much his decisions are respected by other players. This is 
why they have to strategically determine in which cases it is worth to enforce some rules and 
in which cases it is preferable to deal with the changes by adjusting their criteria and verdicts. 
In cases where the most likely outcome is that their verdict will be defied, judges prefer to 
change their criterion in order to avoid having their decision challenged (See Garrett, 
Kelemen and Schulz, 1998). In the case of term limits enforcement, the authority of DCPs 
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also depends on how much their decisions are respected by the president; however, a cautious 
approach in which they avoid confrontations may cause to have their power eventually 
reduced as it may lead the president to believe that these players agree with his political 
agenda and therefore that he has their consent to keep extending his power. Therefore, there 
is no choice to DCPs but to confront the executive if they want to keep their share of power. 
These confrontations, thought, entail a lot of risk for democratic players involved. 
We can start examining these risks by considering the different available choices for political 
actors. The following game-theoretic model can help us in this analysis. The entire analysis is 
based on four assumptions. First, suppose that we depart from a constitutional arrangement in 
which the presidential tenure is limited; for the sake of simplicity in this model the 
presidential term only lasts one period, i.e., the reelection of presidents is not allowed. 
Second, the model assumes that the president wants to advance a constitutional reform to 
remove this provision so he can run for reelection. Third, DC players have legal prerogatives 
allowing them to reject the president's reform and have a political interest to do so. And, 
finally, the model is not considering consolidated democracies but only delegative 
democracies. Let's remember that, as suggested by O'Donnell (1994), the main characteristics 
of these democracies -- that is, delegative democracies -- is a significant concentration of 
power at the hands of the president and a weak system of checks and balances. So, the 
challenge here for DC players is preventing a further enhance of the presidential power by 
upholding term limits provisions.  
In the case of the DC players, the riskier outcome would be that in which the president 
achieves being reelected for another term while they had previously showed opposition to his 
reform. This could be similar to a failed coup d'état, in which the dictator survives and then 
starts taking reprisals against those who tried to overthrow him. In this regard, each 
individual player asks himself what would happen if he tries to stop the president's reelection 
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reform but the rest of the DC players approve it and then the president is indeed reelected. 
The following cooperation game shows these dilemmas. I call this game the 'Belling the Cat' 
game (BTC). This name comes from a children's fable with the same name. In their game-
theory book Thinking Strategically, Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) mention the story as an 
example of the well-known prisoners' dilemma game but with more than two players. 
According to those authors, the BTC story illustrates "the superiority of punishment over 
reward" (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, p.17) and it is similar to a "hostages' dilemma" in which a 
group of individuals have a common enemy and "a simultaneous move by the masses stands 
a very good chances of success," however, when the moment to  take action has come, "the 
question arises, Who is going to be first? Such a leader will pay a very high cost -- possibly 
his life." (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, p.17).  
Different from other collective action dilemmas that have become very well-known games, 
with a common accepted payoff structure -- games like the 'battle of the sexes,' 'chicken,' 
'matching pennies', and the 'prisoners' dilemma' itself -- the BTC dilemma has not a standard 
accepted form. Some consider it an example of a prisoners' dilemma for the mice, while 
others rather use it for explaining what strategies the Cat could follow to dissuade collective 
action against him (see Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, pp.16 - 19). Here I propose a specific 
payoff structure for showing the type of dilemmas facing the mice.   
Figure A proposes the following formal structure (specification) for the BTC dilemma. We 
have two players, the leader and the follower. They both have two choices: to confront the 
Cat or do not confront it. Here, as in the fable, both players would be better off under the 
cooperation solution (8, 2), than in their current situation (-1, -1) where they live scared by 
the Cat. As we can see, this game is a variation of the prisoners' dilemma but their payoff 
structures differ a little bit. Figure B shows an example of the classical payoff structure of 
the prisoners' dilemma. As we know, the prisoners' dilemma is a noncooperative game in 
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which players have incentives to deviate from the outcome that would improve their 
collective well-being. The payoffs of the players are symmetrical and both players have as 
their dominant strategy to not cooperate as the reward for deviate (10 each) is bigger than the 
payoff they get for cooperating (5 each). In contrast, in the BTC game, the individual reward 
for cooperating (8 each) is bigger than the one for deviate (0 each ) and the payoffs are 
asymmetrical as the leader gets a higher payoff. 
Figure A 
Belling-the-cat dilemma 
                          
                       Leader 
 
   A B 
 
 
 
 
    Follower 
  
  A           
 
  (8,     2)  
 
  (0,     -4 ) 
 
  B 
 
  (- 4,   0)  
 
  ( -1 ,  -1)* 
Source: payoffs structure developed by the author. 
A= confront; B= do not confront. 
 
 
Figure B 
Prisoners' dilemma (example) 
  Player 2 
 
  S 1 S 2 
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
S 1 
 
(5,     5) 
 
(-10,     10) 
 
S 2 
 
(10,   -10) 
 
( -5 ,  -5)* 
Source: example of "Prisoners' dilemma" payoffs given by Morrow (1994, p. 78). 
s1 = no confession; s2= confession. 
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Prisoners' dilemma (formal payoff structure) 
  Player 2 
 
  S 1 S 2 
 
 
 
 
Player 1 
 
S 1 
 
(a,     a) 
 
(c,     d) 
 
S 2 
 
(d,   c) 
 
( b ,  b)* 
Formal payoff structure of the "Prisoners' dilemma," see Morrow (1994). 
s1 = no confession; s2= confession. 
d>a>b>c 
 
 
 
In the BTC game there are no strong incentives to not cooperate; instead, their highest payoff 
comes from the cooperative solution. However, the noncooperative solution becomes the 
outcome of the game due to players wanting to avoid their worst payoff (-4). In effect, under 
uncertainty, your best response to other players' strategies has to minimize the losses (see 
Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2010, p. 77). So, unless players are assured that everybody will 
cooperate, players may rather choose a risk-averse strategy that at least avoids their worst 
payoff. I do believe that this payoff structure captures better the essence of the fable and also 
the choices faced by players in the enforcement of term limits. Players do not have high 
incentives to betray one another -- as in the prisoners' dilemma -- but they do have fear of 
confronting the Cat alone and fail. There is also a little bit of a free-rider incentive here, as 
the follower improves his situation even if he lets the leader confront the Cat alone and the 
same is true for the leader (he gets 0, which is an improvement from -1). These payoffs from 
deviation, however, are smaller than the reward they would get from cooperating, especially 
in the case of the leader. Figure C shows the general formal structure of the game. 
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Figure C 
Belling-the-cat dilemma (formal payoff structure proposal) 
                          
                       Leader 
 
   A B 
 
 
 
 
    Follower 
  
  A           
 
  (a,     b)  
 
  (c,    d) 
 
  B 
 
  (d,   c)  
 
  ( f ,  f)* 
Source: payoffs structure developed by the author. 
A= confront; B= do not confront. 
a > b > c > f > d 
 
But this variant of the prisoner's dilemma with different payoffs for the players leads to some 
possible solutions. If we assume that the leader and the follower have identical preferences 
regarding risk, the equilibrium of the game is the no-cooperation solution, in which both get 
(1,-1), and they will have to live frightened by the cat. However, results are different if we 
assume that the leader and the follower have different utility functions.  
Two nested games 
We can reconsider these collective action dilemmas by using a sequential game. The next 
sequential game consists of two nested games. The model is based on the game-theory 
contributions of George Tsebelis (1990); in particular his idea that sometimes political 
players engage in conflicts that take place in different arenas or scenarios at the same time. 
These conflicts involve strategic interaction between players in different contexts, with more 
than one game being played concurrently. Tsebelis describes these strategic interactions as 
'nested games,' with one central, main game and several secondary games. According to 
Tsebelis, these games are somehow connected or 'nested', with small or secondary games 
affecting the outcome of a larger, central one. Players know this; they are continuously 
updating their expectations and strategies in the main game taking into consideration the 
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outcomes or developments in secondary games. In this sense, the payoffs, and therefore the 
outcomes of the games, are intrinsically linked.  
It is important not to mistake these games with what is commonly known in game theory as a 
'simultaneous game' in which players' actions are displayed jointly rather than in a sequential 
form. Tsebelis' 'nested games' are games occurring at the same time but in different political 
contexts. For example, it can be the case of a political leader negotiating a policy bill – let’s 
say, a bill about minimum wage -- with members of congress, on the one hand, and with 
members of labour unions, on the other. In this example we can see how these negotiations 
are linked and how the results of one game may affect the other, however, each negotiation 
process may reacquire different strategies. It is also important to notice that for these nested 
games sometimes the players of the games aren't exactly the same.  
The first game -- which is the main game in the model -- shows strategic interaction between 
the president and other democratic players such as congresses, constitutional courts, electoral 
commissions, opposition parties, and local opposition politicians (governors, local legislators 
and Mayors), which are grouped as DCPs. For the first game, which I call the 'consent game,' 
the president will try to win the support of DC players for eliminating term limits so he can 
run for reelection. The second game, which I call 'the popularity game,' is a secondary game 
in which the president will try to convince the general public that his reform is beneficial for 
the country. While the model is based upon the existence of certain institutional conditions, it 
is still abstract enough as to permit being applied to different levels of democratic rule. Also, 
the model is kept parsimonious as to achieve explanatory efficiency, that is, explain as much 
as possible with the fewest variables.  
The first game, the 'consent game,' starts with the president presenting his proposal. Then 
DCPs have to decide whether to support or reject the reform. If they reject it, then the 
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president has to decide whether to send signals of future repression to those who are not 
supporting or to accept their decision. In semi-democratic contexts, there has been a history 
of intimidation against lawmakers and judges when they reject the agenda of the president, as 
we will see in the case of Peru (1992). At the same time, the president may decide to start a 
public campaign in favour of his reform as to pressure other players to support him. Here we 
can see there is a nested game in which the president tries to convince the majority of the 
public that his proposal is lawful. It is important to notice that people who may consider the 
president's reform is legal would not necessarily reelect him as president but there may be a 
likely overlap between those who think the reform is legal and those who will vote for the 
president if he runs for reelection. 
The consent game 
Figure D displays the main decision tree. The president starts the game by proposing a 
reelection reform to eliminate term limits; then if the majority of the DCPs rejects his reform, 
he has to decide whether to accept their decision or exert pressure over DCPs for having his 
reform approved. In case the president's reelection reform is approved, voters have to decide 
whether or not to reelected the president; we can say that in this decision tree, voters are 
"Chance" or "Nature" which in game theory "is considered a player that makes random 
moves in a game tree with known probabilities" (Morrow, 1994, p. 350). The main factors 
that the incumbent president has to consider are: 1) the benefits of being in office ('a'); 2) the 
cost of running for reelection ('b'), and 3) the consent cost ('c'). All these factors together give 
us the president's utility function f(x), which in turn allow us to obtain the payoffs for each of 
the tree's outcomes. If we also multiply this utility function by the president's probability of 
being reelected ('β'), we obtain the president's expected utility function of being reelected 
upf(x), and the expected utility for each outcome of the tree becomes the 'expected payoff''. 
Ideally for the president, all other democratic players, willingly, would support his reform, 
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and then, after the reform has been approved, he gets reelected for another term. If his reform 
is not supported right away and he has to use repressive measures for having his reform 
approved, there will be a 'consent cost' derived from losing willing support from other 
political players ('b'). This cost b decreases the value of the future term, so the incumbent 
needs to take this into account. Thus, in order to determine whether or not to initiate a 
reelection reform process, a cost-benefit analysis must be considered in which f (x)= a-b-c> 
0; so the expected utility of being reelected is [upf(x)] > 0.  
 
Figure D: The consent game  
Majority of DC players ( MDCPs). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC 
The president 
is reelected (A) MDCPs 
 
Approve  
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reform. PUBLIC 
The president is not 
reelected. (B) 
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POPULARITY GAME 
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The president wants the majority --if not all-- of DC players to approve his reform because in 
case he is reelected he could claim that this was achieved lawfully and with the willing 
support of the whole political system, which helps him to discourage possible challengers 
from trying to overthrow him. He then has to assess what to do in case some players show 
opposition towards his reform. The president could send signals that there could be repressive 
measures for those who defy him in trying to implement his reform. So, the president has to 
be strategic in deciding whether it is worth to confront other players in order to get reelected 
or it is better to accept the status quo. However, if he achieves to implement his reform by 
using excessive repression this could also end up affecting the value of his future tenure. The 
president knows this, so, concurrently with his negotiation with DC players, he may engage 
in a public campaign to promote the benefits of his reform as to make it for any loss of 
consent derived of confronting other democratic players. Then, if he fails to convince the 
majority of the public that his proposal has some benefits he may choose not to proceed with 
his reelection ambitions or he can proceed but risk affecting the strength of his mandate, 
opening the door to be continuously challenged by other political players who may question 
his mandate.  
In order to enforce term limits provisions, a majority of DCPs has to oppose and reject the 
president's reform. In an environment where repression of dissenters comes from a highly 
popular president it is rather a challenge to enforce democratic constraints in general but 
especially those determining the duration of the presidential tenure. Different from other 
scenarios in which the president tries to increase his power, the enforcement of term limits 
leads to think about the future: players need to take into account that they will confront a 
president who, if he succeeds in changing the rules, may keep governing for a long time. 
Thus, if DCPs fail to stop the president's reform, they may face reprisals not only at present 
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but also for the coming years. The possibility of reelection brings with it uncertainty about 
the future. Coupled with the semi-authoritarian nature of the presidents in this game, 
uncertainty makes a confrontation with the president a challenging option for DCPs. Thus, 
when deciding their options, DC players have to assess the level of risk to decide whether to 
confront the president or not. Direct coordination between players to confront the president is 
not always possible, as the government branches should take independent decisions; 
however, the decisions of some DC players may encourage others to follow and oppose the 
president.  
Even a minority of DCPs can start this collective action. By making known their decision of 
opposing the president's reform, this minority may encourage the rest of DCPs to join in 
upholding term limit provisions. This minority of DCPs can be seen as political leaders. 
Calvert (1992) was one of the first authors to suggest that a political leader is someone who 
helps to solve problems of social coordination. After discussing the different collective 
problems in politics and its representation in game-theoretic models, Calvert argues that 
leaders can make a difference in those problems that need social coordination: "A 
coordination problem, roughly speaking, is one in which several individuals share a desire to 
achieve certain outcomes, but have difficulty doing so only because there are several such 
outcomes to choose from." (Calvert, 1992, p.9). Here, one of the tasks of the leader is to 
organize the rest of the players towards one specific outcome; sometimes this can be done 
just by suggesting to other players this specific outcome and what strategies are needed to 
obtain it (Calvert, 1992, p.17). In the BTC game that we previously revised, there is only one 
equilibrium that everyone would prefer, so, it is not a coordination problem but a cooperation 
problem. However, the leader can still help to solve the collective action dilemmas by going 
first in confronting the Cat with the hope that others will follow. In other words, he helps to 
solve the dilemmas by showing other players that he is willing to cooperate.  
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So, in order to solve the 'belling the cat' dilemma, DCP leaders need to announce that their 
strategy is to confront the president (A). Although Calvert highlighted the importance of 
leaders in solving social dilemmas and what they can do in order to help to solve such 
problems, he did not dwell on the motivations and preferences of those political leaders. Here 
I suggest seeing DCP leaders as 'risk-acceptant actors.' According to Morrow (1994), "[r]isk-
acceptant actors prefer risky gambles among a set with the same expectation. They also 
prefer some gambles with both greater risk and lower expectation than other gambles. Neither 
risk acceptance nor risk aversion implies that such actors always prefer gambles with greater 
or lower risks, respectively. An actor that is more risk acceptant than another accepts all the 
gambles that the latter will and some that the latter will not." (Morrow, 1994, p. 36). In the 
same vein, we can see the rest of the DCP as 'risk-averse actors': "risk-averse actors prefer 
some gambles that have both less risk and a lower expectation than other gambles" (Morrow, 
1994, p. 36).  
Thus, DCP leaders can be thought of as political self-interested gamblers, willing to take 
some risks (obtain their worst outcome) in order to achieve their best outcome; however, the 
expected utility of their best outcome needs to be greater than the expected utility of their 
worst outcome for them to take the risk (also known in game theory as a 'lottery' or 'gamble'); 
otherwise they would be indifferent or would not take the gamble. Let's remember that we 
obtain the expected utility by multiplying the utility of an outcome by the probability that that 
outcome takes place; this result then constitutes the expected 'payoff'’.  According to 
Morrow: "[w]e need preferences over all possible risky choices. Abstractly, we represent 
risky choices over the outcomes as lotteries, there one outcome is selected from a fixed set of 
consequences with known probabilities of selecting each outcome. If an individual can rank 
all possible lotteries over the consequences and those preferences over the lotteries observe 
certain regularity conditions, then a utility function can be calculated to reflect those 
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preferences." (Morrow, 1994, p.29). In the game, DCP leaders should be the ones willing to 
take greater risks but if they do and succeed, they also obtain the highest payoffs among DC 
players. This could be the case of an opposition leader -- maybe an opposition leader at the 
national congress -- who announces a focal point solution; that is, a strategy of confrontation 
and that term limits provisions will be enforced. There can be several DCPs leaders, they are 
risk-takers and will initiate the confrontation with the president; then, hopefully, others will 
follow, otherwise they risk acting on their own and face alone the consequences of 
confronting the president. 
The decision tree shows only the actions taken by the majority of DCP (MDCP) but in Table 
A we see the payoffs for the president, DCP leaders and the majority of DCPs (MDCP). The 
payments are for individual players, not for collective bodies, such as the whole congress or 
an entire electoral court but these individuals belong to those state organs (congresses, 
constitutional courts, electoral commissions and opposition parties). As we can see, DCP 
leaders have the highest positive and negative payoffs, which means, they are the ones who 
benefit the most from a successful defence of term limits provisions but also the ones who 
will bear the highest costs in case of failure. The second payoff is for the majority of the 
DCPs. The game shows that DC players calculate what could happen if they reject the 
president's proposal but other players support it and furthermore what could happen to them 
if the president is actually reelected for another term. Clearly this is the riskier scenario for 
them. If they reject the proposal, the president has to decide if he should accept this decision 
or challenge it.  
Then, if the president decides to challenge the decision of the DC players and signals some 
future repression, DC players have to assess if they still will uphold term limits provisions or 
will accept the president's reform. There could be several rounds of deliberation but we can 
see how the more the president has to pressure other DC players, the lesser will be his payoff 
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for being in office another term. This is because the loss of support from political players 
weakens his presidential mandate.  Most importantly, the DCPs also have to take into account 
the probability that, if the reelection reform is approved, the president will be indeed 
reelected. This scenario is difficult for them as the president may take retaliation against the 
players that did not support him in the first place. However, we can see that if the majority of 
DCPs decides to confirm their verdict, the probability that the president defies this decision is 
very low. And then, if successful, they all become stronger, so there is a collective payment 
for defending a limited presidential tenure and also another for the individual effort. 
The popularity game 
Along with the conflict with DC players, the president could initiate a campaign to convince 
the general public that his reform is beneficial. This secondary nested game shows the 
calculations DC players have to make when considering to reject the president's proposal; 
especially, they have to consider the possibility that the president may actually be reelected 
by the public, which clearly makes it more difficult for them to confront the president. In 
other words, confronting a popular president increases the risks of the payoffs of the DCPs. 
In the case of the president, a higher popularity increases β (the probability of being 
reelected.). In this game we also can consider 'the public' as a 'nature' player. 
It is easy to see why more often than not presidents get away with it -- they are strategic in 
the timing and conditions to start their reform campaign. However, if DCPs players achieve 
to coordinate to preserve term limits provisions, the probability that the president defies this 
outcome is low; and, as a result, the whole system of checks and balances gets more solid. 
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Figure E. The popularity game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.  Payoffs 
 
 
 
 
Table A shows players' payoffs for the consent game. As we can see, the best outcome for 
the president is A (15) , when he gets the consent from all relevant actors, and his worst 
outcome is F (-3), when after having taken repressive measures against other democratic 
players for having his reform approved he is not reelected. In the case of DC leaders, their 
best outcome is D (15) and their worst outcome is E (-5). And for the rest of the DC, their 
highest payoff is D (8) and their lowest is A, B and E. The table shows arbitrary numbers; 
however, taking all the payoffs together they present a payoff structure that reflects the trade-
offs and dilemmas for the players. This payoff structure can be formalized to find out a more 
general equilibrium. In this game, the payoffs for DCPs players are comprised of three 
Outcome 
 
A 
 
 
B 
 
 
C 
 
 
D 
 
 
E 
 
 
F 
 
DC Leaders -2 2 8 15 -5 2 
DC Majority -1 -1 6 8 -1 0 
President 15 -1 0 -2 3 -3 
PUBLIC 
 
Approves the 
reform. (G) 
 
PRESIDENT 
 
Initiates a 
campaign in 
favour of his 
reform. 
 
PRESIDENT 
 
Tries to 
implement his 
reform. (9) 
PUBLIC 
 
Disapproves 
the reform. 
(H) 
PRESIDENT 
 
Decides not to 
keep forward 
with his reform. 
(I) 
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factors. First, there is a collective payoff for stopping the president's reform 'e'; this means 
that the whole checks and balances system gets reinforced by this result -- and therefore all 
actors on an individual level-.  Second, there is an individual transaction cost for confronting 
the president 'f'. And third, there is a 'prize' 'g' for those who won the lottery after confronting 
the president first, that is, for the leaders. So, in the case of the DCP leaders, the expected 
utility is e-g+y> e-g, and for the rest of DCP (followers) the utility is e-g> 0. Here we must 
remember that often there cannot be direct coordination by DCPs for taking a joint decision 
as they can be a judge or a legislator and they are in different government bodies that must be 
independent from one another. However, they can from their respective pulpit lead an 
oppositional stance and thus, encourage others to follow. They can also announce in a public 
way the legal arguments against the president's proposal and the steps needed to enforce term 
limit provisions. Results from the second nested game showing that the president is popular 
(outcome G) will increase the cost 'g' of confronting him. 
With these proposed values, we can point out several important elements of the games. First, 
if the majority of DCPs rejects the president's reform there would be the major benefits for all 
of them; however, there are also incentives to be a free rider, that is, there may be players 
hoping that the majority of DCPs will take the risk of rejecting the reform while they choose 
not to confront the president, i.e. while they are playing it safe. The aggregate result of these 
individual decisions leads to an outcome in which all the DCPs are worst off. However, those 
who take a chance and decide to confront the president will have the highest payoff if the 
president is not reelected at the end, as there is public reward for those who took risks in 
facing the president during times of repression to dissent. However, these last players also 
may end up as political prisoners or face repression from the president in case he actually is 
reelected for another term.  
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Taking this into account, the model predicts the president having his way more often than 
not: he will most probably start a campaign for reelection at the height of his popularity and 
signal possible future retaliation against those who oppose him. Thus, he creates  enough -
negative- incentives for the DCP to support his reform. However, the model also shows a 
path for enforcing term limits provisions, which depends on DCPs leaders to come forward 
and initiate opposition towards the president's reelection campaign. If their gamble succeeds 
and others follow, the reward is high for them and the whole system of checks and balances. 
Once this occurs, the probability that the president defies their verdict is very low. In 
conclusion, we would expect the enforcement of term limits when there is a collective -- 
albeit uncoordinated -- rejection of the president's reform by DCPs.  
IV. Cases: Peru and Colombia 
 
Selection of cases and methodology  
 
In this section, I will compare the cases of Peru (1992) and Colombia (2004) where 
presidents started a campaign for reforming the presidential term limits provisions. These 
cases illustrate the strategic interaction between players in the enforcement of term limits. 
Specifically, I will review the reelection reform campaigns by presidents Alberto Fujimori 
(Peru, 1992) and Alvaro Uribe (Colombia, 2004) and the response to that campaign from 
other democratic players. The objective of comparing two cases with greater detail is to 
understand the causal mechanisms of reelection reform (Elster, 1991). This methodology has 
its advantages and disadvantages. As Landman (2008) suggests, "[b]y intentionally limiting 
the number of countries under comparison, the method sacrifices in some degree the broad 
generalizations made possible through the comparison of many countries, but gains a deeper 
understanding of the countries that feature in the analysis, as well as their similarities and 
differences" (p. 69). According to Landman (2008), when studying a few cases, and, in 
particular, few countries, one important starting point is to ask if we are comparing cases that 
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are very different but that we are expecting them to lead to a similar outcome or, on the 
contrary, comparing very similar countries that lead to different outcomes  (Ibid). For this 
study, we will go the second route, also known as the "most similar design" or MSSD (Ibid). 
In this sense, the "[m]ost similar design (MSSD) seeks to compare political systems that 
share a host of common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting 
others. " (Landman, 2008, p. 70). 
 
Turning now to an analysis we can ask in what respect we expect Peru and Colombia to be 
similar and in what respect they differ. First of all, these cases are presidential systems and 
unconsolidated democracies. There is substantial concentration of power at the hands of the 
president and the checks and balances systems and party systems were weak. Smith and 
Ziegler (2008) classify Peru as a moderate nondemocracy from 1978 to 1988; as a moderate 
democracy in 1989; as an illiberal semidemocracy from 1990 to 1992, and as an illiberal 
democracy from 1993 to 2004. In the case of Colombia, Smith and Ziegler (Ibid.) classify it 
as an illiberal democracy from 1978 to 2004. Second, both countries share a similar historical 
and cultural heritance, thus, we can also exclude these sociological variables as significant 
factors. Third, these cases are similar in that both presidents -- Fujimori and Uribe -- were 
very popular when they initiated reelection reform. This will allow us to control for 'level of 
popularity' as a variable that may affect the possibility of presidents being successful in 
eliminating term limits and imposing a reelection reform. Another variable that will be 
controlled is economic success -- that is, both presidents implemented successful economic 
policies that lead to a positive economic growth. This way, we can exclude the possibility 
that economic variables explain the outcomes of the reform.  
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In both cases, the reform timing was perfect: the two Latin American presidents started their 
administrations under an economic and politically troubled legacy from their predecessors; 
but after their economic and social policies delivered significant results, they started 
campaigning for reelection reforms, right on the peak of their popularity, having gained a 
strong mandate from the polls and when the public support was at its highest. Likewise, they 
both made the most of their ‘outsider’ status: Fujimori and Uribe presented themselves as a 
‘new departure’ from the political establishment, promising a new era in the politics of their 
countries, far from, according to their campaigns, the corruption and mismanagement of their 
predecessors and traditional party systems. Up to here those were similar stories: charismatic 
leaders who implemented successful policies, delivered good results and who subsequently 
initiated a reelection reform. 
 
So, in what aspects do I expect the cases to differ? Primarily, the role of democratic players 
other than the president -- mainly congresses, constitutional courts and electoral commissions 
-- and the decisions of the presidents in confronting the verdicts of those democratic players. 
Here, the purpose is to see the interaction of the checks and balances system in the 
enforcement of term limits, so it is important to see how democratic players reacted to the 
president's ambitions for being reelected and how the president reacted to the decisions of 
these actors: did the president accept their verdict or decide to defy it and confront other 
democratic players? How did his decisions affect his mandate? Those are the elements that I 
expect to be different. In other words, like in the theoretical model previously presented, I 
expect the role of democratic players to make the difference in the enforcement of term 
limits. When the democratic players successfully coordinate to oppose the president, term 
limits provisions are enforced. On the other hand, a failure to coordinate to oppose the 
president's ambitions should lead to failure to enforce term limits. Thus, according to the 
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proposed theoretical model, I expect the participation of democratic controls to be the real 
key in explaining term limits enforcement in Peru and Colombia rather than factors such as 
the president's popularity or economic factors.  In this way, if these cases show that DCPs are 
relevant actors in enforcing term limits provisions, the theoretical model presented above 
may be useful for understanding the basis of how to enforce constraints on the government.  
 
Peru: The Fujishock (1990) 
Peru started the wave of presidential term limits reform in Latin America in the 90's. 
Presidential reelection became a forbidden topic in the region after violent popular 
movements terminated long incumbencies. These historical episodes had a clear influence on 
the constitutional engineering of the 19
th 
century  -- the majority of Latin American countries 
implemented in their constitutional laws some form of limit to the presidential tenure; some 
constitutions restricted the number of times presidents could run for reelection, others 
prohibited reelection completely. Setting limits to the presidential tenure became the 
institutional answer to prevent long incumbencies in the region and, therefore, future political 
turmoil (Carey, 2003). However, after President Alberto Fujimori successfully changed the 
Peruvian Constitution for allowing reelection in his country, other countries in the region 
started to follow a similar path. In this regard, because of its novelty, the Peruvian case may 
serve as a benchmark to compare the rest of the reforming processes in the region. It will help 
us to find out if there is a formula or ‘similar recipe’ that incumbents were trying to follow in 
order to change reelection rules. Furthermore, it will illustrate how other democratic players 
responded to Fujimori's reelection campaign in a time in which these types of reforms were 
rare for a country with a certain degree of democratic rule. We could say that this process was 
developed under significant levels of historical uncertainty.   
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The constitutionalist tradition in Peru has a long history of prohibiting the consecutive 
reelection of presidents. Since Peru became an independent nation in 1821, twelve 
constitutions have been promulgated and all but two established a non-consecutive 
presidential reelection rule. The Constitution of 1823, Peru's first constitution as an 
independent nation, started this tradition by establishing that the president would be elected 
for a four-year term and then to be reelected he had to wait one term. The majority of the 
successive constitutions maintained this provision, with only some adjustments in the length 
of the term. The two exceptions were the constitutions of 1826 and 1828. Known as the 
'president-for-life-Constitution,' as it established that the elected president could stay in office 
for life, the Constitution of 1826 was short-lived; it was written by Simón Bolivar and for this 
reason it was also called the "Bolivarian Constitution". Written in the aftermath of the 
independence war, this constitution was meant to bring some order to the state-making 
process that the newly independent country was undergoing (see Political Handbook of the 
World, 2010, pp. 295-301). New political institutions were just emerging and it took a long 
while before elections were not only meaningful but also the most common route for 
accessing power.  
 
The next charter, the Constitution of 1828, was also born in that political context. This one 
saw the return of presidential term limits, which had been abandoned in the "Bolivarian 
Constitution". However, it was still less restrictive than the future constitutions as it permitted 
two consecutive presidential terms. This constitution was also short-lived and after six years 
it was replaced by the Constitution of 1834, which re-established the non-consecutive 
reelection. Since then this provision was kept in the following seven constitutions. As stated 
above, there were some adjustments to the rule, though, mostly in the length of the 
presidential term which was changed from four to six years and then to five years (see Table 
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B). It seems that the most stable combination of duration and renewal choices was the five-
year term, non-consecutive reelection provision. This combination was implemented in the 
Constitution of 1867 and was in place for 126 uninterrupted years until 1993, when President 
Alberto Fujimori changed this electoral arrangement.  
  
Since the 1930's, there were several military governments that seized power by coup d'état 
and, in between, a few moments of democratic rule by civilian governments. The last military 
government ruled from 1968 to 1980. By the time Fujimori appeared on the public scene 
there was certain democratic regularity. The Constitution of 1979 officially marked the return 
of democracy and civil governments (see Political Handbook of the World, 2010, pp. 295-
301). As the previous constitutions, consecutive reelection of presidents was prohibited by 
the Constitution of 1979. Article 205 stated that the presidential mandate was five-year long 
and that in order to be eligible for reelection, the incumbent president had to wait one 
presidential term.
57
 Since the promulgation of this constitution, there were two peaceful 
presidential elections. There was in place an emerging democratic normality; however there 
were also increasing economic problems which, coupled with political scandals of corruption 
and mismanagement, created public discontent with the political establishment. These 
circumstances paved the way for the Fujimori's constitutional reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57
 Political Constitution of Peru of 1979. Art. 205. Chapter V, On Executive Power. Title IV, On the structure of 
the State. 
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TABLE B. PERUVIAN CONSTITUTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS PROVISIONS. 
 Constitution  Article Duration of Term  Renewal of Term 
1 1823. Art. 74 Four-year term. Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office).  
2 1826. 
 
Art. 77 The presidential term last 
'a lifetime'. 
There are no term limits. 
3 1828. Art. 84 Four-year term. 
 
Two consecutive terms allowed, then 
after one term out. 
4 1834. Art. 77. Four-year term. Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office). 
5 1839. Art. 78 Six-year term.  Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office). 
6 1856. Art. 80. Four-year term. Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office). 
7 1860. Art. 85. Four-year term. Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office). 
8 1867 Art. 76. 
 
Five-year term. Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office). 
9 1920. Art. 133. Five-year term. Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office). 
10 1933. Arts. 139, 142 
and 143.  
Five-year term.  Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office). 
11 1979. Art. 205. Five-year term. 
 
Non-consecutive (after one term out 
of office). 
12 1993 Art. 112 Five-year term. 93-2000 -- Two consecutive terms 
allowed, then after one term out. 
2000- Non-consecutive (after one 
term out of office).* 
Source: data collected by the author from the original constitutions. Constitutions were consulted in the government website: 
"Congreso de la República de Perú. Archivo Digital de la Legislación del Perú.” 
[http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/constituciones.html]. Consulted on March 10th, 2015. 
* Art. 112 of the 1993 Constitution was modified on November 5th, 2000 by the law No. 27365 as to re-establish the non-
consecutive reelection provision (http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/constituciones.html). 
 
At the end of the presidency of Alan Garcia, the last president before Fujimori, Peru was hit 
by economic hardships. The GDP of Peru “…declined by a quarter between 1988 and 1990. 
Prices increased by around 6,500,000% between 1985 and 1990; inflation peaked in August 
1990 at a monthly rate of 396%. By then the central bank had run out of foreign-exchange 
reserves, and tax revenues for the year were just 3.6% of GDP—less than the government’s 
own payroll."
58
  During those chaotic years, Alberto Fujimori, an outsider of the political 
system, appeared “out of nowhere” to win the 1990 presidential elections.59  Fujimori ran a 
political campaign offering a “social democratic agenda" with a mix of liberal economic 
policies and programs in favour of the poor of the country. This was very appealing for the 
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 “Peru’s financial markets,” The Economist Historical Archive, 1993, p. 104. 
59
 "The man from nowhere,” The Economist Historical Archive, April 14, 1990, p. 79. 
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general public, but was particularly attractive for the poor, who were at the time about seven 
million -- or one-third of Peru’s population.60 This allowed him, in a second-round election, 
to defeat the famous writer Vargas Llosa --who was expected to be the winner at the 
beginning of the electoral contest-- by a wide margin.
61
 When it came to their respective 
economic agendas, newspapers reported: “Mr Fujimori said on polling day that his 
government would be market-oriented but not neo-liberal. Translated from Peruspeak, this 
means that he is a social democrat, somewhat to the right of Mr Alan Garcia’s party."62  
 
Observers of the process pointed out that both Vargas Llosa and Fujimori would have to 
implement drastic economic measures given the economic problems of Peru; however, at the 
beginning Fujimori did not mention that his reform agenda would contain painful economic 
measures, promoting instead a slow plan for stopping Peru’s inflation. Also, Fujimori tried to 
gain support from the poor by promising to “to make sure that the burden of any economic 
reforms should be evenly distributed”, which was very appealing to the voters in general.63 
The Economist magazine commented at the time that: 
  
Mr Vargas and his advisers think Peru needs a brutal economic shock. Mr Fujimori 
thinks a shock would starve a lot of people. He wants, first, an exchange rate that will 
encourage exports from the smaller mines, from fishing and from textiles; and a boost 
to farmers, by making imported food very expensive. That would produce foreign 
exchange and get the economy going without much new investment. Only then would 
he set other prices right, and close or privatise some loss-making state firms. (“The 
man from nowhere,” The Economist Historical Archive, 1990, p. 79). 
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61
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 "A script that went wrong,” The Economist Historical Archive, June 16, 1990, p. 94. 
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Ironically, it was Fujimori who would end up implementing aggressive market-oriented 
policy reforms. These economic reforms were known as the “Fujishock."64.  During his first 
term he made wide use of decree rulings --which allowed him to legislate without the 
congress approval--, implementing a series of reforms in favour of free trade and foreign 
investment; also, his administration carried out large privatizations of public firms that were 
causing losses to the state.
65
 Despite promising that the reforms would be accompanied with 
measures for supporting the poor, these measures were insufficient and the economic 
adjustment proved to be very painful for these sectors of the population. The main problem 
was that the programs designed to alleviate the effects of the economic measures only 
reached workers in the official sector, a minority of the working class of Peru at the time. On 
the other hand, Fujimori implemented reforms that negatively affected labour unions, 
facilitating the firing of workers. Overall, these reforms had very painful short-term effects 
on the working class in general.
66
    
Despite initially damaging the economy of the poor sectors, the Fujishock proved very 
successful in quickly re-establishing macroeconomic stability in Peru, with inflation 
drastically reduced, flows of foreign capital attracted and tax revenues and public reserves 
increased. The recovery of the economy was fast, going in a short period of time from an 
economic recession to significant growth. Peru’s rapid recovery impressed economic 
analysts, with organizations like the IMF praising the series of reforms implemented by 
                                                          
64
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Fujimori.
67
 After just two years of reforms, Fujimori successfully stabilized the economy, 
with the control of the hyperinflation being his most important achievement.
68
  
Another of the obstacles that Fujimori faced at the beginning of his administration was a 
divided congress, in which no party had a majority of seats to pass even ordinary legislation – 
let alone constitutional laws. This problem was spotted early on, even before Fujimori was 
elected president for the first time in 1990. Congressional elections were held before 
presidential elections, and they produced a congress in which no party obtained a majority of 
seats. During the presidential election campaign, observers warned that 
...The new president, whoever he is, will have to work with the divided Congress 
that was elected last April. In both houses Mr Vargas’s Democratic Front won more 
seats than any other group, but no party or alliance has an absolute majority. There 
will have to be compromises. The nearest thing to a workable combination would be 
a pact between the Democratic Front and Mr Fujimori’s Cambio 90.("Virgin voters,” 
The Economist Historical Archive, 1990; p. 70). 
As one opinion column rightly pointed out, after finding obstacles for implementing his 
economic reforms, Fujimori became increasingly “impatient with democracy."69 The 
Peruvian Congress more and more often tried to stop Fujimori’s agenda, blocking several of 
his reforms. Under this scenario, Fujimori reached the conclusion that the main problem were 
the democratic institutions and democratic procedures and that if any change was to be made 
it was necessary first to remove any opposition to his reforming agenda, starting with 
opposition parties in the congress.
70
  With 60% of support in the elections
71
 and an increasing 
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popularity after successfully stabilizing the economy of the country and stopping 
hyperinflation,  he took the decision to carry out an auto coup, closing the Peruvian Congress.  
Fujimori carefully crafted a strategy to carry out the coup, with a perfect timing and a 
formula that, it seems, was later copied by other presidents: 
“Mr Fujimori dissolved his country’s legislature in April 1992 and took on near-
dictatorial powers. He had excuses: the Shining Path terrorists, economic reforms to 
push ahead, uncooperative legislators…But now it turns out that Peru may have 
helped a much grander figure, and with more success: Boris Yeltsin. Months before 
Mr Yeltsin summarily dissolved Russia’s parliament in September, says a well-
placed Peruvian, one of his advisers, seeking a way for the Russian president to by-
pass parliamentary resistance, went to Mr Fujimori’s government for help. He 
wanted full details of how exactly Mr Fujimori went about his coup (whose success 
indeed lay in the details: for example, the Peruvian president ensured the support of 
television broadcasters before he sent troops into the streets). ("The Peruvians 
obliged.” The Economist Historical Archive, December 4, 1993, p. 76). 
As part of Fujimori's coup, state organizations like national congress, the constitutional court 
and the general attorney office were dramatically shaken. Thus, "[o]n April 5, 1992, after 
what appeared to have been extensive consultation with the military, Fujimori seized 
extraconstitutional power in a dramatic self-coup (autogolpe). Announcing the formation of 
an Emergency Government of National Reconstruction, the president dissolved Congress, 
launched a reorganization of the judicial and penal systems, and declared that he would take 
'drastic action' against both the Sendero Luminoso and drug traffickers."
72
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A former congressman, Raúl Ferrero, recalls that after the dissolution of Congress, the 
legislators "agreed to gather next day at the Lima Lawyers College headquarters but military 
forces prevented us from doing it; there was a tussling and scuffling with the soldiers and 
there were also cudgel blows."
73
  During that time, "army tanks were patrolling the streets of 
Lima at night, going around the Congress, the judiciary offices and strategic zones in order to 
avoid riots. Army contingents took over television broadcasters and newspapers headquarters, 
imposing censorship. The intervention also reached out foreign news broadcasters such as 
AFP, whose offices were occupied that same night by an army commander and two soldiers 
as a 'security measure', they said."
74
 Fujimori's self-coup was rejected by 50% and supported 
by 37% of the Peruvians.
75
 
After the self-coup, a new Congress was elected on November 22, 1992, which had the sole 
purpose of writing a new constitution for Peru and laying the foundation for the next general 
elections in 1995. Due in part to opposition parties not participating in the elections, 
legislators that were backed by Fujimori were able to secure a majority of seats in the new 
elected Constituent Congress.
76
 Initially, this congress would only last until the new 
constitution was promulgated, however, it lasted until the next general elections of 1995.
77
  
The new Constitution was promulgated in December 1993. It eliminated the non-consecutive 
reelection provision and established that presidents would be allowed to run for up to two 
consecutive elections.
78
 Newspapers of the time agreed that the political ‘timing’ for 
reforming electoral laws couldn’t be more perfect, pointing out how economic success was 
behind this political move: 
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By the time Alberto Fujimori was elected in 1990, Peruvians were praying for one 
thing only: order. The country was on the brink of economic and social disaster. 
Inflation had reached 7,650% a year and the left-wing guerrillas of the Shining Path 
had grown ever more menacing. Under President Fujimori they got order, and now 
they want more of it. Never mind that he staged an autogolpe last year in which he 
threw away the legitimacy of his rule by seizing near-dictatorial powers. What 
matters is that prices now rise a mere 2% a month and that the once-invincible 
guerrillas are no longer a threat to the survival of the Peruvian state. So Peruvians 
will probably be only too happy to help Mr Fujimori consolidate his achievements. 
In a national referendum on October 31
st
 he is asking the country to approve 
constitutional changes that would allow presidents to run for re-election (beginning 
with himself) and would also allow the death penalty for terrorist crimes.” (“El chino 
or chinochet," The Economist Historical Archive, October 30, 1993, p. 68). 
After the Constitution was reformed in 1993, it was stated that the consecutive reelection ban 
would be replaced by a rule allowing presidents to run for up to two consecutive terms. This 
constitution was approved through a referendum that allowed him to run for reelection in 
1995. Still enjoying high popularity due to the success of his economic policies, Fujimori 
managed to win the presidency again, defeating former UN secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar. 
Furthermore, his allies in Congress also had a good result in the elections: "With an ease that 
reportedly surprised the incumbent himself, Fujimori won nearly two-thirds of the valid votes 
in presidential balloting on April 9, 1995. Equally surprising was the showing of his ruling 
coalition (Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría), which won 67 of 120 congressional seats with 51.5 
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percent of the vote, humbling the leading 'traditional' parties, none of whom surpassed the 5 
percent threshold needed to retain legal registration."
79
  
Still enjoying high popularity in Peru, Fujimori announced his intentions for running for a 
third presidential term. There was a controversy regarding the eligibility status of Fujimori 
for running for reelection. Taking into account that he was in his second term, technically 
speaking he shouldn't be allowed to run for a third term. However, his allies at the new 
elected Congress supported his claim that the restrictions did not apply to him as the new 
Constitution was approved when he stared his second term, which then, according to this 
interpretation should be counted as his first term. Thus, even though there were objections 
about it, "...nevertheless, the Congress on August 23 [1996] paved the way for Fujimori to 
stand for a third term by voting, after a heated debate, that his initial incumbency was 
excluded from an existing two-term limit since it began under the previous constitution."
80
  
After a while, however, political events at the time together with an increasing sense of 
authoritarian rule by Fujimori had a negative effect on his popularity: "On December 17, 
1996; about 25 members of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) stormed a 
reception of the Japanese embassy in Lima, taking nearly 600 guests prisoner...."
81
 The 
conflict resulted in "an assault of the complex by Peruvian commandos April 22, 997, during 
which all of the rebels were killed. In the wake of the crisis Fujimori's popularity, which had 
crested at 70 percent, plummeted to a low of 27 percent, in part because of a move by the 
government-controlled Congress to dismiss three members of the Constitutional Tribunal 
who had voted against the president's bid to seek a third term...".
82
 These manoeuvres by 
Fujimori surely showed to political actors what could happen if they opposed his agenda. 
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Fujimori was supported by other democratic players in his attempt for standing for a third 
term: "In late December 1999 the National Election Board accepted Fujimori's argument that 
he was not bound by the two-term limit because he had assumed office before adoption of the 
current constitution. "
83
 Thus, Fujimori ran for a third term and successfully won over his 
main opponent, Alejandro Toledo, in a run-off election. Nevertheless, his popularity started 
to dramatically decrease.  
Things didn’t end well for Fujimori after he went for his third term. Even though he was 
allowed to compete again, he faced increased criticism both internal and from the 
international community as it appeared to the public and international observers that he was 
trying to curve the law to stay in office. A series of corruption scandals were the tipping point 
of the political crisis. After the "public release of a videotape showing the former presidential 
adviser Vladimiro Montesinos Torres paying US$15,000 to former Congressman Alberto 
Kouri Buchamar to join the party Perú 2000"
84
 ,  Fujimori announced new elections in which 
he wouldn't participate. 
Colombia: Uribe’s failed attempt to stay in office 
Alvaro Uribe's journey to reform the Colombia constitution illustrates very well the dynamics 
for reelection reform. Uribe was Colombia's president from 2002 to 2010. All the elements 
for a successful reelection were there -- a charismatic leader that tackled efficiently the 
political and economical problems of Colombia. He, like Fujimori, was introduced as the 
‘new politician’ -- someone who would break with Colombia's political past, bringing a new 
era for democracy in Colombia. During his first term, economic and political troubles were 
turned into economic growth and political stability. This made him one of the most popular 
Colombian politicians of his time and paved the way for him to reform the Constitution in 
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order to run for a second term. However, his ambitions to stay in office for a third term were 
cut short when the Constitutional Court of Colombia ruled that he was not allowed to run for 
another reelection, not even after being one term out of office. Uribe decided to abide to the 
Court's decision and with that he set an important precedent regarding reelection in his 
country, strengthening in this way the two-terms rule.  
When putting together all the elements that helped Uribe to get reelected, it is clear that 
although certain economic and political conditions were met, this wasn't enough for him to 
keep reforming the electoral laws to stay in office. In this case, Colombian institutions – the 
system of checks and balances-- were important elements for containing Uribe's ambitions.  
This could mean that, at the most, favourable conditions and political stability may be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for reelection reform to occur. So this case illustrates 
how different democratic controls may be the key to enforce term limits provisions.  
Uribe was an outsider and didn't run for any of the traditional parties. He had a conservative 
platform in the economic front, supporting free markets and a limited role of the state in the 
economy. Taking into account that he didn’t belong to any of the traditional parties, he was a 
surprising strong contender at the end of the presidential race, ending up winning the post 
with a majority of the vote (53%). According to accounts of The Economist, Uribe survived 
"assassination attempts and the slurs of opponents"; he won important experience in politics 
during his time as a provincial governor, winning "a clear mandate from the voters to tackle 
the violence of the FARC guerrillas. In a presidential election on May 26th, Mr Uribe, a 
lifelong Liberal who ran as an independent, won 53% of the vote. That was well ahead of 
Horacio Serpa, the official Liberal candidate, with 32%. By winning an absolute majority, Mr 
Uribe avoided a run-off election which might have prompted further attempts on his life."
85
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Uribe ran a campaign for the presidency of Colombia with the promise of confronting the 
Colombian guerrilla FARC. He proposed an agenda based on what he called "democratic 
security" or 'seguridad democratica," a series of policies based on the idea that in order to 
bring about economic prosperity, security problems should be addressed.
86
 He supported 
economic liberalism and promised to fight corruption and eradicating poverty.
87
 In this 
regard, it was noted that "Mr Uribe was not elected as a peacemaker, however. He has 
promised to double the security forces, revive Colombia's war-crippled economy, crack down 
on corruption and seek extra aid from the United States and from development banks."
88
 The 
support at the polls also would allow him to become a reformer: "His strong mandate gives 
Mr Uribe the chance to push ahead with economic and political reforms aimed at freeing 
resources for defence spending and attacking corruption. He has the support of much of the 
Liberal party, and of Mr Pastrana's Conservatives."
89
  
According to several reports, Uribe became a very popular president because of his 
successful policies. This allowed him to push for a reelection reform. During his 
administration, there was a positive economic outlook. In this regard, "economic recovery 
was recorded in the mid-2000s, as annual GDP growth reached 7.5 percent in 2007, with 
corollary declines in inflation and unemployment. Inflation, which had been in double digits 
in 2000, slowed to 5.5 percent in 2007, while the unemployment rate over the same period 
fell from 20 percent to 11.2 percent."
90
  These figures for sure help to see why Uribe became 
so popular and why he thought he could succeed in being reelected. 
Presidential consecutive reelection was not part of the democratic tradition of Colombia. In 
this regard, "the Constitution of 1910 banned immediate reelection and presidents were able 
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to run for reelection only after staying one term (of four years) out of office.
91
 However, in 
the Constitution of 1991 "a no-reelection provision was added,  and this provision continued 
until the reelection reform implemented during the Uribe presidency" .
92
 Quite strategically, 
"Uribe started his campaign for a reelection reform at the peak of his popularity, knowing 
that this will mean that his reelection chances were pretty high."
93
  
In 2004 Uribe announced his intentions of reforming the Colombian Constitution of 1991 to 
implement consecutive reelection. Before this, reelection was prohibited by the Constitution 
of 1991.
94
  In October 2003 Uribe first tried to reform the Colombian Constitution but "it 
failed because the electoral turnout fell short of a mandate of 25 percent."
95
 Thus, a year later 
he tried to implement his reforms again this time through the Congress. There was opposition 
to a reelection reform in Congress, with opposition parties fearing that this measure would 
make the electoral competition for the presidency unfair. The debate about the reelection 
reform began in April 2004, and there were eight sessions for deliberating about the reform.
96
   
Traditionally, the Liberal and Conservative parties had obtained the majority of seats in 
Congress (see Table C). But the elections of 2002 changed this record: "... on March 10, both 
of the traditional parties were outpolled in legislative balloting by an unprecedented 
aggregate of minor candidates, most of whom declared their support for the new chief 
executive".
97
 Although the main opposition party during the Uribe administration, the Liberal 
Party, won the largest number of seats both in the Senate and the Chamber of deputies -- 28 
and 54 seats, respectively (see Table D) --, the majority of seats was in the hand of the 
coalition of parties supporting Uribe. The same happened in the 2006 legislative elections: 
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the Liberal Party won the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives but "the 
majority of seats once more was won by an aggregate of parties allied with the president."
98
 
This debilitation of the main opposition party, the LP, made it easier for Uribe to have his 
reelection ambitions accomplished (see Table D). 
Table C. Composition of the Senate 
 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 
Colombian 
Liberal Party 
66 56 48 28 18 
Colombian 
Conservative 
Party 
38 20 15 13 18 
National 
Conservative 
Movement 
1 1 7 6 0 
Others 9 25 32 55 66 
Total 114 102 102 102 102 
Source: Observatorio del Poder Legislativo en América Latina. 
(http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/colombia.htm) 
 
Table D. Composition of the Chamber of Deputies 
 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 
Colombian 
Liberal Party 
119 88 86 54 35 
Colombian 
Conservative 
Party 
62 40 26 21 29 
National 
Conservative 
Movement 
3 6 4   
Others 15 29 45 91 102 
Total 199 163 161 166 166 
Source: Observatorio del Poder Legislativo en América Latina. 
(http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/colombia.htm) 
 
Members of the main opposition party, the Colombian Liberal Party -- which was the largest 
party in the Senate with 28 senators and also in the House of Representatives with 54 
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deputies
99
--, together with allies from small parties and independent legislators, rejected 
Uribe's reelection reform both at the Senate and the House of Representatives;
100
 however, 
Uribe's legislators supporters were able to form a larger coalition, gathering the necessary 
votes for approving the measure.  
The supporters of Uribe argued that he needed another period in office in order to 
successfully carry out the policies of this "democratic security project", mainly, to continue 
his "fight against the illegal armed groups."
101
 His supporters highlighted the "success of his 
policies" in reducing the violence across the country, and his 80% popularity ratings among 
Colombians.
102
 Besides the economic recovery, there were significant advances in the 
national security, and both achievements "maintained President Uribe's approval rating in the 
70 to 80 percent range, the highest of any Latin American leader."
103
 
Thus, with the votes of the Conservative Party and small parties that were supporters of 
Uribe, the reelection reform was approved in the Senate. After several congressional debates 
in the Senate, the reform ended up being "approved with 58 votes in favour and 21 
against."
104
 Members of the Liberal Party and from other opposition groups and independent 
legislators who opposed the reform "abandoned the legislative session when the reform was 
being voted.
105
  
With the successful approval in the Senate, the chances of it being also approved in the 
Lower Chamber increased, furthermore because some deputies were aware of the popularity 
of Uribe. In December, 2004, the Colombian deputies approved the constitutional reform 
                                                          
99
 Legislativa, Observatorio del Poder Legislativo en América Latina, 
[http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/colombia.htm#Evolución_de_la_composición_de_la_Cámara_de_Represe
ntantes_(1982-2006)]  
100
  See BBCMundo, "Colombia: liberales rechazan reelección", April, 2004, and "Colombia más cerca de la 
reelección", May, 2004 
101
  "Colombia: liberales rechazan...," op.cit. 
102
 "Colombia: liberales rechazan...", op.cit. 
103
 Political Handbook of the World, 2010, p. 298. 
104
 BBCMundo, "Colombia más cerca de la reelección", May, 2004. 
105
 BBCMundo, "Colombia más cerca de la reelección", May, 2004. 
146 
 
allowing the immediate reelection "for and only once."
106
  At the end, 115 deputies approved 
the reform (out of 166 total deputies) and 15 voted against it after the eight sessions in which 
the deputies debated the reform.
107
 The senator Héctor Elí Rojas denounced that the 
government was offering "benefits" to deputies for their vote in favour of the reform, but the 
government rejected these accusations.
108
 His undeniable popularity and the achievements of 
his policies contributed to Uribe’s success in obtaining support from legislators.109  
However, the support wasn't unanimous; there were still legislators who opposed the reform. 
In this regard, members of the opposition parties argued that the president was "changing the 
rules of the game" for obtaining the presidency.
110
 Joaquin Vives, member of the opposition 
Liberal Party, stated when the reform was approved that "this day will be remembered in the 
history as the moment in which this Chamber has made a monumental historical mistake; 
today, the equilibrium needed for competing for the public power in Colombia has been 
broken."
111
 In exchange for the approval of the reform, the government agreed to implement 
a law "to make sure that there was an equal access for opposition parties to mass media and 
in the financing of electoral campaigns." 
112
 
After the Constitution was amended to allow reelection, Uribe announced his intention to run 
again for the presidency. For his first reelection, on 11 November, 2005, the Colombian 
Constitutional Court approved the Congress' law establishing the rules for presidential 
reelection.
113
 Thus, by November 2005, Uribe officially announced that he would run for 
reelection.
114
 For his second campaign, he continued focusing on his agenda about 
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"democratic security", saying that "democratic security and social policies go hand in hand. 
Security creates trust, investment, and resources for social policies and these, once achieved, 
bring with them the support of public opinion needed for keeping security policies afloat."
115
 
He was reelected for a second period, from 2006 to 2010. This time, he was reelected with a 
wider support: "the March 2006 legislative elections gave the pro-Uribe parties a majority of 
seats in the Congress, a strong signal that Uribe would win reelection. In a peaceful fist-round 
balloting on May 28, 2006, Uribe won convincingly --the first time an incumbent Colombian 
president had been reelected in more than a century."
116
  
By the end of his second mandate, Uribe announced his intentions of running again for a third 
term. This time again, the Colombian Congress supported Uribe’s attempt to amend the 
Constitution to allow for a third term but the Constitutional Court rejected this attempt. After 
the Constitutional Court rejected the Congress' law, Uribe had to face an important choice: to 
finish his administration as a democrat who helped to decrease Colombia’s problems or to 
become a dictator in the making. As it was observed, "...Yet, when Mr Uribe first took office, 
back in 2002, Colombia was in serious danger of becoming a failed state. Mr Uribe has 
indeed accomplished much. But for Colombia to progress it needs strong institutions that 
would have been in danger of erosion under the rule of an eternal strongman."
117
 Luckily for 
Uribe’s legacy and Colombia’s democracy, the Colombian Constitutional Court enforced the 
2004 constitutional amendment that established that presidents were allowed to run for only 
two consecutive terms. In this regard, he will not be able to run for office even if he stepped 
out of office for one term. It is interesting to notice that part of the reasons the Court gave to 
stop Uribe from running again was to protect Colombia's institutions: 
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"The Constitutional Court approved an amendment in 2005 that allowed Mr Uribe to 
run for a second term, which he won in 2006. But the wording of the court's ruling 
foreshadowed Friday's decision, specifically permitting re-election only one more 
time. In the latest ruling the court said the proposed referendum would have 
attempted to change the spirit of the constitution and would have altered the system 
of checks and balances..." 
118
  
It was clear for Colombia what was at stake in Uribe's reelection outcome. The media widely 
discussed that Uribe's proposed reform would indeed weaken Colombia's democracy and 
make him an aspiring dictator. On the other hand, the Court not only discussed the effects of 
this reform for the functioning of Colombia's democracy but also discussed the procedures by 
which Uribe was trying to get reelected. The fact that the Court was very punctual in 
observing that there was a compliance of the due process was an important step in enforcing 
term limits. Very often incumbents try to find creative ways to bend the law in order to 
extend their tenures (Maltz, 2007), so the fact that the Court made an effort to make sure that 
the process of reform was fully legal was an important measure in enforcing the provisions: 
Colombia's Constitutional Court, by blocking President Alvaro Uribe from seeking 
the presidency ever again, resolved the two-time leader's quandary over whether to 
try to stay in power or leave with his legacy intact. The country had been on 
tenterhooks for months while it awaited the approaching decision of the court which 
finally made its ruling late on Friday February 26th."(…) "By a vote of 7 to 2 the 
court concluded that a referendum that would have sought to allow Mr Uribe to run 
for a third term in elections in May was unconstitutional. The court ruled that the 
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measure was fraught with irregularities and 'substantial violations to democratic 
principles.
119
  
Particularly important, was the Court's revision of the referendum process, making sure that it 
followed the correct process: 
"It ruled that a petition campaign that started the referendum process and its passage 
through Congress was loaded with irregularities, which the court president said was 
a 'grave violation' of electoral laws and procedural norms. Also in its passage 
through Congress the ambiguous wording of the referendum question was changed 
to allow the president to seek immediately a third term, rather than after four-year 
gap. The court said that the change was unconstitutional. (...) With the court 
resolving what Mr Uribe had called his 'dilemma of the soul' over whether to run 
again, the popular president said after the ruling that he would work for Colombia 
'from any trench' for the rest of his life.". (…)"120  
According to the procurador (or the inspector-general)
121
 of Colombia, Edgardo Jose Maya, 
among the irregularities in the procedures for approving a third term, was that Congress 
members voted the reform without a proper debate about it. Also, members of the opposition 
parties complained that there weren’t good conditions for debating the initiative.122  
Together with the opposition of the procurador and opposition legislators, the role of the 
Constitutional court was key for enforcing the two-terms limit provision. By enforcing the 
two-term limits provision, the court also helped to protect the interbranch balance of power: 
"The ruling demonstrated the court's independence, which Mr Uribe's critics claimed had 
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been lost through a blurring of lines between the branches of government. A former court 
magistrate, Manual Jose Cepeda, said the ruling was a 'triumph' for state institutions that 
many had worried would not work."
123
 However, while it should be appreciated that 
democratic controls, in this case the Constitutional Court, worked, it was equally important 
that Uribe decided to accept the Court’s decision. The Colombian case shows that the way 
reelection is obtained matters. It certainly helps if major democratic players also support the 
president in his quest for seeking reelection. The case of Peru's Fujimori, in contrast, 
illustrates how a reelection that is not backed by democratic institutions and democratic 
procedures may produce a weak mandate.  
Conclusions 
 
This paper has revised the problem of the maintenance of democratic institutions, especially 
those institutions that limit the presidential power. I have developed a game-theoretical model 
that shows the basic choices that democratic actors face when confronting a popular president 
that wants to extend his tenure. The model predicts that in order to preserve these institutions, 
democratic actors need to solve collective action dilemmas and together oppose the 
president's intent to reform constitutional provisions that set limits to the presidential tenure. 
At the same time, the model indicates that these victories for preserving a limited government 
may help to strengthen the checks and balances system of new democracies. In order to 
illustrate these theoretical arguments, I have revised the cases of Peru and Colombia.  
 
What I found after revising those cases was that the enforcement of these institutions and the 
strategic interaction between political actors is not a linear event, most of the time there are 
several rounds of strategic interaction, and sometimes it is not totally clear how this collective 
action unfolds and what is the strategic reasoning of the actors -- leaders -- that are trying to 
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stop the president's ambitions. However, I believe that the presented model captures the 
general dynamics of term limits enforcement. Mainly, the cases illustrate the importance of 
democratic players such as congresses, courts and electoral commissions in the enforcement 
of these provisions. When these actors are united to defend the constitutional limits on 
presidents, not even a popular president is able to defy them. While the current literature 
points out that term limits provisions are often eliminated by powerful, popular presidents, 
these cases show that this cannot be done without, at least, the implicit complicity of other 
democratic actors. Thus, the preservation of democratic constraints on governments is a 
collective task.  
 
In the case of Peru and Colombia, there are some important differences regarding the 
resilience and choices of democratic controls. In both cases, democratic controls resisted at 
first the power-concentration campaigns started by the incumbent presidents. In Colombia the 
Constitutional Court intervened to enforce the two-term limits provisions, whereas in Peru 
the Congress failed to enforce the two-terms rule, allowing Fujimori to run for a third term in 
2000. In the case of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, he decided to abide to the Court’s 
decision and did not run for a third term. Fujimori, on the other hand, together with a newly 
elected Congress was able to extend his tenure but at the cost of facing increasing criticism 
for this controversial decision. So, the stories prove the importance of analysing the role of 
different democratic players in reelection reform; specifically, how they react whenever an 
incumbent embarks on a campaign for power-concentration by changing key democratic 
institutions such as term limits. The conclusion of the comparison of both cases is that the 
way term limits were abolished matter – whether they have been abolished by proper means 
or by challenging the decisions of other democratic controls, such as the Congress or 
Constitutional Courts.  
152 
 
 
The limitations of the model are clear. It has difficulties in capturing all the details and 
nuances of the empirical cases, particularly, the irregular dynamics of strategic interaction 
between actors. On the empirical front, there are also some limitations in using only two 
cases as it is not possible to derive general conclusions; however, it is the only way to test the 
general model, as it requires to assess the responses of individual actors. A more general 
empirical strategy, let say, one large statistical analysis would have made difficult to prove 
some of the theoretical claims of the model. Finally, after revising the cases it was not 
entirely possible to demonstrate that there is a link between these confrontations among 
democratic players and the strengthening of the checks and balances system. Without 
following the cases for a larger span of years, it is difficult to test this proposition. To do so, it 
would have been necessary to revise the relevance of these players after these confrontation 
with the president have taken place. However, I believe that this model can provide a 
theoretical guide to develop such empirical study in future research. 
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Winning Voters Over: 
Elections, presidential term limits and strategic policy-making in  
Latin America (1990-2010). 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of elections on public spending by analysing 18 Latin 
American countries from 1990 to 2010. I claim that elections set conflicting incentives for 
office holders: On the one hand, they have incentives to increase the public spending to meet 
the demands of their constituents and thus get reelected; on the other, they have incentives to 
be fiscally conservative, especially if they are confident that they are going to be reelected. In 
this regard, the prospect of being reelected encourages incumbents to be fiscally responsible. 
They would prefer not to deal with fiscal unbalances in case they are going to be in office for 
another term. Thus, they have to think about the coming electoral race but also about their 
future mandate. How do presidents deal with these two conflicting incentives? The empirical 
analysis of the spending policies of Latin American presidents shows that they have 
developed a rather smart strategy: they increase the spending which is most likely to win the 
vote over: social spending, that is, spending on education, healthcare, and poverty reduction 
programs. At the same time, they keep an eye on the general spending as to avoid generating 
high levels of public deficit. 
I. Introduction 
This paper investigates the effects of elections on public spending. In order to do so, the 
paper contrasts the propositions of two different approaches to explaining the relationship 
between elections and public spending: the political budget cycles theory (PBC) and the 
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presidential term limits (PTL) literature. According to the PBC theory, around election time, 
politicians have incentives to increase public spending so as to create an artificial economic 
boom that may enhance their electoral chances. In other words, elections may lead to 
opportunistic behaviour (Rogoff, K., 1990). In contrast to this approach, the PTL literature 
claims that politicians who are eligible for reelection will put in more effort to keep spending 
low. They want to avoid fiscal unbalances which, in turn, may damage not only their electoral 
chances but also their  ability to administrate the country during their next mandate (Besley 
and Anne Case, 1995). Thus, according to this approach, elections create incentives for 
public officers to be fiscally conservative.  
Although the PBC and PTL approaches have developed into two different research agendas, 
quite often they address the same topic: the relationship between elections and public 
spending. The PBC literature aims to find out whether public spending is increased before 
election years, creating cycles of spending; the PTL literature investigates whether running 
for re-election affects incumbents’ decisions about public spending. Still both approaches 
arrive at opposite conclusions: while the PBC theory states that elections lead to increases in 
public spending and taxes, the PBC theory argues that elections lead representatives to keep 
public spending and taxes low. It is quite surprising then that very little academic effort has 
been made to compare the assumptions, theoretical models, and empirical findings of both 
areas of research.  
In this paper, I argue that by contrasting these two theoretical approaches we bring into light 
hidden assumptions often made about how elections affect incumbents’ fiscal policy 
decisions. Often both research agendas depart from very different assumptions and their 
predictions and empirical findings are contradictory. These assumptions, although not always 
explicitly stated, can make a huge difference in the way we think about how elections affect 
incumbents’ fiscal policy decisions. The fact that these assumptions are sometimes 
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contradictory proves the necessity of reviewing them in depth. The most significant 
theoretical difference is, I will argue, the importance that they assign to the chief executive as 
an individual in the electoral process. Does the fact that he is eligible for reelection -- i.e., the 
presence of individual reelection incentives -- affect his fiscal policy choices? For the PTL 
literature individual incentives matter, that is, whether the president himself is eligible for 
reelection or not can make an important difference. In contrast, for the PBC theory, what 
matters is the whole 'political system' which ensures that the electoral chances of the party in 
power are enhanced regardless of whether the incumbent himself is running for reelection. 
Also, the approaches arrive at opposite conclusions about the effect of elections on public 
spending. While the PBC theory concludes that elections lead to short-sighted fiscal policy 
choices, the PTL literature states that incumbents with reelection incentives will make 
responsible choices. 
In order to analyse and evaluate these two theoretical approaches, I will review public 
spending in 18 Latin American countries, from 1990 to 2010. The paper concludes that 
individual incentives do matter, as incumbents that are eligible for reelection show different 
levels of spending compared with presidents facing term limits.  Overall, the empirical 
findings of the paper suggest that elections provide complex incentives for officeholders. 
Elections create an incentive to use the public budget so as to meet the demands of their 
constituents -- and thus be reelected, -- but also they require candidates to bear long-term 
consequences in mind. Especially if they are confident that they are going to be reelected they 
certainly prefer not to deal with fiscal problems during their next term. So, how do presidents 
deal with these two conflicting incentives? The empirical analysis of the spending choices of 
Latin American presidents shows that they have developed a rather smart strategy: they 
increase the spending which is likely to attract more votes: social spending, that is used for 
education, healthcare, and poverty reduction programs. At the same time, they try to control 
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the general spending so as to avoid generating high levels of public deficits. Thus, data 
reveals that on average, presidents that are eligible for reelection have solved this dilemma by 
focusing on visible spending that has electoral impact but try to keep deficits low. In order to 
test this analysis, and following Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose (2011), I have developed a 
model that tries to isolate electoral incentives from other variables that may affect office 
holders’ fiscal decisions. Specifically, I will distinguish three elements: experience or 'time' 
in office, 'electoral incentives', and 'political survival'.
124
 Each of these elements may impact 
fiscal policy outcomes so it is useful to try to assess the impact of each one of them.   
In contrast to previous research, I try to see if policymakers spend strategically and how those 
strategic choices are affected for term limit provisions. In particular, rather than claiming that 
reelection creates one specific type of incentives regarding spending -- as the PTL and PBC 
approaches suggest--, I claim that it sets rather complex and sometimes conflicting incentives 
for spending, which may lead to different choices of fiscal policy-making. This way to 
understand the relationship between elections and public spending may help us to see more 
clearly the links between election incentives, political institutions (rules of the game), 
individual choices, and fiscal policy outcomes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section one discusses assumptions and predictions of the 
PTL and PBC approaches regarding public spending and elections, as well as existing 
empirical evidence supporting the theoretical propositions. The PBC literature is abundant so 
I will only review the most influential work about it. In the case of the PTL literature, the 
research is still on-going so I will review in more detail the main research published up to 
now. Specifically, I will review the ‘reputation-building model’ (Besley-Case, 1995), which 
is the theoretical background for most of the PTL literature. Then, those basic assumptions 
and predictions are compared to the premises of the PBC theory. In section two, the variables 
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 The last model, the 'political survival' one, was inspired by the ideas of Barry Ames (1990). 
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of this study will be presented as well as the methodological strategy for testing the 
theoretical propositions. Both theories are tested empirically in section three. Finally, section 
four discusses some methodological challenges and the robustness of the statistical findings.  
II. Literature review 
What is the impact of elections on public spending? Presidential Term Limits (PTL) and 
Political Budget Cycles (PBC) literatures offer some answers, but these answers differ in 
important ways. Particularly, three elements are treated differently in both literatures. The 
first element is the importance of the individual in the theoretical argument. Most of the PBC 
theoretical and empirical models deal with the relationship between elections and fiscal 
outcomes on a systemic level. Even when incumbents are facing term limits, they will 
manipulate the budget in order to get their party reelected. Thus, elections have an impact on 
public spending regardless of whether the incumbent himself is running for reelection. This is 
why most of the PBC literature, in its empirical tests, does not distinguish whether or not the 
incumbent is running for reelection and only focuses on whether there is a difference in the 
level of spending in election years compared to years in which there are no elections. If that is 
the case, the PBC literature should be able to explain how the 'system' operates in such a way 
as to make incumbents to care for the "future of the party" and not only for their own future. 
Or, at least, it should make explicit how the candidate’s future may be connected with the 
future of the party.  
In contrast, the PTL theoretical arguments start with an ambitious individual who wants to 
get reelected and, because of that, has incentives to implement fiscal policies that will win as 
many citizens' votes as possible. Thus, the PTL literature stresses the importance of reelection 
incentives, stating that in absence of these incentives, elected officials may exhibit a different 
behaviour. According to PBC theory, politicians will increase spending around elections with 
the aim of winning elections, and decrease it afterwards and thus create ‘cycles’ of spending. 
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For the PTL literature, the cases in which the incumbent is unable to run for reelection –i.e., 
when he is facing a term limit— are an opportunity to create a counterfactual to the previous 
point. In effect, if elections create incentives for spending, then, an incumbent who cannot 
run for reelection should behave in a different way, since he does not have those electoral 
incentives (Carey, 2003). But in its empirical tests, the PBC  literature tries to overcome this 
problem by assuming that the incumbent wants his party to win the election, thus, even when 
he cannot run for reelection, he will still engage in opportunistic behaviour to support 
whoever is the candidate of his party. However, scholars using this assumption have made 
little attempt to fully explore the links between parties and candidates and how parties 
manage to convince the current incumbent to help the party's next candidate to win elections.  
The second element in which the approaches differ is timing and strategic behaviour. The 
PBC theory presents incumbents as engaging in strategic behaviour: public spending is 
manipulated just in critical times, that is, during elections years or near the election year. 
Elections create incentives for manipulating public spending only during specific times rather 
than permanently modifying incumbent’s decisions about public spending. In this sense, they 
manipulate the spending around elections so as to create just an illusion of a booming 
economy to lure voters. In the PTL research, this question has not been empirically 
addressed. Models and empirical analysis of the PTL literature assume that elections provide 
incentives for the incumbents that are permanent. An incumbent who can be reelected will 
behave differently during his whole administration from an incumbent who faces term limits 
and therefore cannot run for another election. 
Finally, models developed by each theoretical approach predict different fiscal policy 
outcomes and also have reached different empirical conclusions about whether or not 
elections lead to fiscal irresponsibility. Following the model of Rogoff (1990), ‘Political 
Budget Cycles’ models predict that spending is increased during election years, leading to the 
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increase of taxes afterwards while the PTL research agenda, mainly based on Besley-Case’s 
‘Reputation-Building Model’ (1995), states that elections create incentives for incumbents to 
take care of fiscal discipline, so they will make an effort to keep spending and taxes low.  
Term Limits Literature 
According to the ‘Reputation-Building Model,’ developed by Besley and Case (1995) and 
frequently used for analysing the impact of elections on fiscal policy outcomes (see for 
example Johnson and Crain, 2004), the desire of being reelected affects incumbents’ 
decisions about fiscal policy. Specifically, the model predicts that incumbents aspiring to be 
reelected will make an effort to hold spending and taxes low.  
The model starts with the assumption that each elected official puts in a certain amount ‘w’ of 
“effort” into policymaking, which is an unobservable action. This in turn “probabilistically 
affects” voter’s utility ‘r’ and, taking this into account, voters decide whether or not the 
incumbent should be reelected. Then, if reelected, the incumbent gets a reward or payoff, 
which consists in keeping office for another term. Knowing this, officeholders will choose to 
put in the amount of effort that increases their chances to keep office. According to Besley 
and Case “individuals are keen while in office to develop a reputation that enhances re-
election chances.” (Besley and Case, 1995, p. 770). So, “incumbents increase effort in the 
hope that it will convince voters that they have high values of w” (Ibid., p. 770), that is, they 
want to convince voters they are making a great effort to keep spending low. 
Based on the principal-agent literature, the model establishes that elections set a specific 
incentive scheme, leading elected officials to certain behaviours while discouraging others. 
Therefore, we should expect different fiscal policies from a politician who can run for 
elections again compared with one who is unable to do so, i.e., an incumbent who is term-
limited. In effect, if elections have any effect on officeholders regarding their fiscal policy 
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choices, then a term limit should eliminate those electoral incentives. Thus, “in a world with 
imperfect information where both voters and incumbents behave rationally, a binding term 
limit should have implications for policy choice” (Besley and Case, 1995, p. 771).” 
Specifically, “we would expect to see different application of effort when term limits are 
binding relative to when term limits do not bind which may show up in all manner of policy 
choices.” (Besley and Case, 1995, p. 773).  In this way, in institutional arrangements which 
permit incumbents running up to two terms, we should find that officials will build a good 
reputation in their first term because of the expectation of being reelected the next term; but 
once reelected they put in less effort. By extension, in places where reelection is not allowed 
at all we should expect that incumbents put in little effort since there is no future reward. 
According to Besley and Case, the model predicts that elected officials who are in their last 
term (‘lame duck’ incumbents) will put in less effort, resulting in increased taxes and 
spending (Ibid. p. 786). 
But why should putting in less effort lead the incumbent to increase spending and taxes? 
Although it is quite clear why a non-term-limited and a term-limited incumbent would 
behave differently, it is not clear from the model’s assumptions how the predictions about 
fiscal outcomes where derived. The model goes from stating that elections set a specific 
incentive scheme to saying that the possibility of being reelected will lead the incumbent to 
keep spending and taxes low. In this regard, the model lacks an explicit link between its 
assumptions and the predictions about fiscal policy outcomes. It is possible to argue that 
elections lead to different outcomes. Indeed, some authors make the opposite argument, i.e., 
that elections lead to increases in spending and taxes. This is precisely the basic premise of 
the ‘Political Budget Cycles (PBC)’ theory: that in order to get re-elected, incumbents will 
increase the public spending in an election year with the aim of increasing their chances of 
winning elections. 
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According to the PBC theory, incumbents manipulate the fiscal policy in order to get re-
elected (see Rogoff, 1990; Alesina, Alberto and N. Roubini, 1992; and Drazen, 2000). These 
different predictions may be due to the different assumptions from which both the PBC and 
PTL research agendas depart. Specifically, they differ in three key aspects: Firstly, the 
relevance of political parties in defining the fiscal policy; secondly, the depiction of voter’s 
preferences, and finally, the extension of the electoral influence over policy-makers. While 
the PTL literature highlights the preferences of the incumbent as an individual, the PBC 
theory is based on the assumption that what matters is not the electoral success of one 
individual but that of the collective, that is, the political party. Also, while the PTL literature 
assumes that voters always prefer politicians to keep public spending low, the PBC theory 
suggest that voter’s preferences regarding fiscal policy are heterogeneous and sometimes 
voters may reward politicians who increase spending in specific public goods and services for 
their constituents (see Drazen and Eslava, 2008). Finally, while the PTL literature holds that 
the electoral incentives influence politicians throughout all years of their administration, the 
PBC theory holds that these incentives are at work only during critical times, that is, during 
the election year itself or around election times. In this sense, for the PBC literature, public 
spending is strategically increased only during election years, or the year before the election, 
but then it decreases during non-election years, creating ‘cycles’ of public spending.  
To test their model, Besley and Case (1995) analyse the behaviour of U.S. governors from 
1950 to 1986. Specifically, they test the impact of term limits on policy choices about 
spending and revenue. The authors find that, consistent with their model, a binding term limit 
affects policy choices. They conclude that their results agree with the theory stating that when 
an incumbent cannot run again for elections they care less about building a reputation and 
therefore put in less effort to keep taxes and expenditures down (Besley and Case,1995, p. 
781).  
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Following the study of Besley and Case (1995) on the effects of term limits on fiscal policy 
outcomes, many authors have employed their research strategy to analyse other countries and 
longer periods of time. The empirical analysis of these last studies shows mixed results. 
Johnson and Crain (2004), for example, compare presidents and prime ministers who can run 
for reelection with those who are in their last allowed term (“lame duck” incumbents). They 
analyse 48 countries for the period 1972-1990 and find that expenditures are higher during 
lame duck administrations compared to non-lame ducks incumbents. So they conclude that 
“as predicted and as Basley-Case observed in the American States, politicians appear to exert 
less effort to hold down spending when they cannot stand for re-election compared to when 
re-election remains an option (Johnson and Crain, 2004, p. 77).” The authors also find that 
there is “substantial evidence that expenditures and revenues increase in the lame duck term 
for countries that have implemented a term limitation rule” (Johnson and Crain, 2004, p. 82). 
Finally, Johnson and Crain  (2004) also analyse the long-term effect of term limits on the size 
of the government, finding that a two-term limit rule generates cycles in the spending but 
does not increase the size of the government overall, while the one-term rule increases 
slightly but steadily the size of the government.  
Studying the case of the United States, and after controlling for variables that recent literature 
consider significant such as divided government, electoral competence, and partisan 
ideology, Uppal and Glazer (2011) find that a term-limited governor spends significantly less 
than does a non-term-limited governor; thus, they arrive at the opposite conclusion: “Total 
spending as a share of income is 0.14-0.18% lower for a state in which the governor cannot 
stand for election than for a state in which he can.”(p.17). After revising a larger sample of 
countries, Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2008) come to a different conclusion than Basley-Case 
(1995), Johnson and Crain (2004), and Uppal and Glazer (2011). These authors test the 
hypothesis that a term limit may change the behaviour of an officeholder using a sample of 
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52 countries from 1977 to 2000. The authors conclude that in the case of expenditures, they 
have been “unable to find significant differences in the behaviour of term-limited and non 
term-limited chief executives” (Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti, 2008, p.1). According to their 
analysis, the basic problem with previous studies is that they have mostly focused on the case 
of the U.S. in which, unlike many other countries, elections are candidate-centred and 
political parties are not as strong as in other countries. The second problem with those 
studies, according to Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti (2011), is that they have omitted “the very 
significant lagged expenditure variable” (Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti, 2011, p. 9). They 
conclude that “the driving force in the determination of government spending is its previous 
year’s value, while term limits have no effect at all” (Ibid., p. 8).  
Another recent contribution to the PTL literature is the work of Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and 
Rose (2011). The most important contribution of these authors is the distinction of what they 
call “accountability effects” and “competence effects” of elections. According to these 
authors, the accountability effects are the result of reelection incentives on incumbents, 
whereas the competence effects are due to the fact that reelected incumbents “are more likely 
to be competent both because they have survived re-election and because they have 
experience in office” (Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011, p. 171). Thus, in their study, 
these authors treat differently the presidents who are in their first term but cannot be re-
elected for another term and lame duck presidents. In both cases incumbents are not eligible 
for another term, but, according to their theoretical argument, lame duck presidents have 
more experience than first-term presidents and that should be taken into account. This is a 
major contribution to the study of term limits as previous literature treated both first term 
presidents who were not eligible for another term and lame ducks alike, without making a 
distinction (cf. Johnson and Crain, 2004). After analysing panel data from US states for the 
period 1950-2000, the authors find that, among other things, spending is lower under first-
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term governors who can be re-elected for another term than it is under governors who are in 
their first term but are not eligible for another term. They also find that under reelected 
incumbents the spending is lower than under first term incumbents (Alt, Bueno de Mesquita 
and Rose, 2011,p. 171). They conclude that both accountability and competence have a 
negative impact on gubernatorial spending levels.  
Political Business Cycle Theory 
The Political Business Cycle (PBC) theory proposes a relationship between elections and 
economic outcomes. Broadly speaking, this theory suggests that in order to get reelected, 
government officials will try to manipulate the performance of the economy before elections. 
The objective is to create an economic boom before elections to incentivize people to vote for 
the incumbent executive. Because there is an "opportunistic pre-electoral manipulation" of 
economic variables, this theory is also known as the "opportunistic model" (see Drazen, 
2000). Throughout the years, scholars have proposed models that modify and develop this 
general idea.  
While most of the studies on PBC use as their main independent variable the occurrence of 
elections, the dependent variable varies. Drazen (2000) classifies the main versions of the 
PBC models into two broad groups, the "monetary-based PBC" and "fiscal-based PBC" 
models. In the first group, the "monetary-based PBC" model, authors focus on the 
manipulation of monetary policy, which affects mainly macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation, economic growth and unemployment. In the second group, the "fiscal-based PBC", 
authors focus on the manipulation of fiscal policy, which affect government spending, 
taxation, public deficit and debt (Drazen, 2000, p. 77). There is also a third model, proposed 
by Drazen himself (2000) that uses both fiscal and monetary policies. Drazen calls this third 
model the "active-fiscal, passive-monetary (AFPM) model" (Drazen, 2000). 
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The specification of the economic variables also varies across the different studies, with some 
authors using yearly data while others use quarterly data or even more desegregated 
information. Finally, there are variations regarding the chosen time frame, with some models 
suggesting that the effects of this economic manipulation start to occur one or two years 
before elections and others suggesting that the main effects only occur during the election 
year.  
Building on Keynesian economic notions, Nordhaus proposed the first PBC model (1975). 
This model sustains that elected officials will try to implement an expansionary monetary 
policy with the objective of incentivising economic growth and employment. According to 
Rose (2006), this model "showed that if reelection-minded politicians can exploit the trade-
off between inflation and unemployment known as the Phillips curve, and if voters base their 
decisions on recent economic performance, the incumbent will find it optimal to expand the 
economy prior to elections." (Rose, 2006, p. 402; see also Drazen, 2000).  
However, some authors notice that the Nordhaus model presupposes irrational voters. In 
order for policy makers carrying out this manipulation to be successful, one needs to assume 
irrational voters because after "each election, output and employment return to their natural 
rates but inflation is higher" (Rose, 2006; see also Lucas, 1976). This is why other authors 
tried to modify this model. Instead of focusing on macroeconomic variables, they use fiscal 
variables. Thus, in 1990, Rogoff proposed one of the first modified versions of the PBC 
model, which holds that what elected officials manipulate before elections is fiscal policy. 
Rogoff's version (1990) has since been known as the "political budget cycles theory" instead 
of the "business cycles theory." This version used variables such as public deficit, 
government spending and taxes. In its current, and more generally known version, this model 
"suggests that reelection-minded incumbents temporarily increase spending in election years 
and defer the tax increases needed to pay for new spending to non-election years. It follows 
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that deficits should rise before elections and fall after elections" (Rose, 2006, p. 407). Rogoff 
starts his analysis by noting that previous PBC models were based on the notion of "voter 
myopia". It requires that voters ignore the fact that at the end of the cycle there would be 
inflation while employment and output will go back to their previous levels. Therefore, he 
proposed an alternative version in which voters, as well as policymakers, were "rational, 
utility-maximizing agents." (Rogoff, 1990, p. 21). Different from previous models, though, is 
that in Rogoff's version, there is asymmetric information between voters and the incumbent 
government. Thus, voters must choose between the incumbent, who can be indefinitely 
reelected, and an unknown challenger. The incumbent sends signals that he is competent by 
providing collective goods. But voters are unaware -- hence the asymmetrical information -- 
that they will have to pay for those goods in the future with more taxes. Rogoff states in a 
footnote that "[i]f the incumbent can only run for reelection a finite number of times, then the 
model predicts [that] there will be no political budget cycle in the last period." (1990, p. 24). 
Recently, Drazen (2000) has proposed a model that takes into account both fiscal and 
monetary policy. His model is named the "active-fiscal, passive-monetary (AFPM) model" 
(Drazen, 2000). Drazen's model shows that it may be easier for democratically elected 
officials to try to manipulate fiscal rather than monetary policy for usually central banks or 
another independent authority controls the monetary policy. Therefore, it is much harder for 
opportunistic policymakers to manipulate monetary policy. However, Drazen claims, this 
independent authority will at times react to the "shocks" caused by the manipulation of fiscal 
policy by elected officials, which means that there may be some indirect effects of this 
opportunist behaviour on monetary policy as well. 
Furthermore, Drazen (2000) finds that the literature produced in the decades after the 
publication of Nordhaus' work has not provided convincing empirical evidence to sustain the 
postulates of the PBC model as originally proposed, that is, that the economic activity 
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increases before elections. Instead, he found that the majority of research on PBC has found 
some evidence for the fiscal-based PBC version, which coincides with other authors' 
findings.  
These models have been tested on municipal, state and country level and across all the 
regions of the world. However, the main problem of the empirical research on PBC is that 
there is not enough consistency throughout the research. This makes it very difficult to draw 
general conclusions. In this sense, even though the theory has been one of the most revised 
and tested across the world, the studies differ in many important aspects. As mentioned 
earlier, not all authors use the same economic variables and even when they do, they use 
different samples of countries or only revise one country. Also, the use of different time 
periods in the case studies makes it difficult to compare these cases. Furthermore, there are 
variations in the type of control variables studied. Another complication arises from the use 
of very different specifications of models to statistically test the hypotheses. So, in terms of 
generalization, we can only say that different studies provide evidence for the manipulation 
of economic variables before elections in some of the countries studied. What we can say 
though is that some of these studies find evidence for these economic cycles in the cases they 
have studied. Particularly, as Drazen sustains, there is some evidence for the manipulation of 
fiscal variables. For example, Alesina and Roubini (1992) found that in the case of 18 OECD 
economies, "the <political business cycle> hypothesis, as formulated in Nordahaus (1975) on 
output and unemployment is generally rejected by data" (p. 59). However, they found that 
there was an increase in inflation levels "perhaps as a result of pre-electoral expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies" (Ibid). After revising the occurrence of business cycles in Latin 
America,  Barberia and Avelino (2011) found that "elections provoke increases in the fiscal 
deficit for Latin American democracies...". There are also several studies focused on 
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particular countries. For example, for the case of Germany, Berger and Woitek (1997) 
rejected "the Nordhaus hypothesis of opportunistic cycles" for the period 1950-1989. 
In the following section, I will test the Basley-Case (1995) model in Latin America, where 
political parties are important players in the policy-making process. The period under study is 
1990-2010 (for country specifics, see Table 4). In this sample we find important variations in 
reelection rules, ranging from no reelection at all to reelection for another immediate term, to 
regulations that require a term out of office before candidates can run for elections again. 
This will allow me to test for different reelection schemes and test if these variations have an 
effect on fiscal policy outcomes. Different from previous research, I will compare the 
performance of presidents under these different rules during election years. This will allow 
simultaneous testing of some of the predictions of the PTL and PBC theories. The advantage 
of focusing on Latin America is that there are significant variations in reelection rules across 
the region (see Tables 1 and 2) and, at the same time, political parties are strong players. This 
allows investigating the different assumptions of the theories.  
Nieto-Parra and Santiso (2009) conducted a study similar to the investigation in this paper. 
They find that consecutive reelection has an impact on fiscal variables such as current 
expenditure and capital expenditure. However, there is an important methodological 
difference in the classification of reelection rules: Nieto- Parra and Santiso's study only 
classifies rules for immediate reelection, on the one hand, and non-immediate and forbidden 
reelection, on the other, which makes the interpretation of results very different from Alt, 
et.al, (2011). I believe that the classification of Nieto-Parra and Santiso makes it difficult to 
separate the electoral incentives from the experience incentives, and that is why I prefer to 
follow the methodology used by Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose (2011). 
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Table 1. Duration of the Presidential term in Latin America, as of 2010 
Country Term Length Period covered 
Argentina I Six-year term 1983  - 1995 
Argentina II Four-year term Rule in place since 1996 * 
Bolivia I Four- year term 1985 - 1997 
Bolivia II Five-year term Rule in place since 1998 * 
Brazil I Five-year term 1945 - 1994 
Brazil II Four-year term Rule in place since 1995 * 
Chile I Six-year term 1945 - 2005 
Chile II Four-year term Rule in place since 2006 * 
Colombia Four-year term 1974 - 
Costa Rica Four-year term 1953 - 
Dominican Republic Four-year term 1978 - 
Ecuador Four-year term 1978 - 
El Salvador Five-year term  1984 -  
Guatemala I Five-year term  1985 - 1992 
Guatemala II Four-year term Rule in place since 1993* 
Honduras Four-year term 1981 - 
Mexico Six-year term 1994 - 
Nicaragua I Six-year term 1984 - 1996 
Nicaragua II Five-year term Rule in place since 1997 * 
Panama Five-year term 1989 - 
Paraguay Five-year term 1993 - 
Peru I Six-year term 1963 - 1980 
Peru II Five-year term Rule in place since 1980 * 
Uruguay I Four-year term 1942  -1966  
Uruguay II Five-year term Rule in place since 1967* 
Venezuela I Five-year term 1958 - 1999 
Venezuela II Six-year term Rule in place since 2000* 
Source: Updated from Jones (1995). The period's first year reflects the first year covered in Jones (1995) dataset and not 
necessarily the first year in which the rule was implemented. The last year covered in Jones' dataset was 1995. The sources I 
used for the rest of the years (1996- 2010) were mostly current constitutional texts, the Political Handbook of the World 
(2010), The Economist Historical Archive, and BBCMundo's reports (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america) to 
situate the exact year of the reform.' reports for situating the exact year of the reform. See Appendix 1 for more details about 
the sources consulted for updating this table. 
 * Countries in which there were constitutional changes in the last two decades that modified the length of the presidential 
term. 
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Table 2. Rules about the Renewal of the Presidential term in Latin America, as of 2010 
Country Renewal of the term Period covered 
Argentina I After one interim term 1983 - 1992 
Argentina II Two consecutive terms, then one interim term 1993 - 
Bolivia I After one interim term 1985 - 2008 
Bolivia II Two consecutive terms, then no reelection 2009 -  
Brazil I After one interim term 1945 - 1997 
Brazil II Two consecutive terms, then one interim term 1998 - 
Chile  After one interim term 1945 - 
Colombia I After one interim term 1974 - 1990 
Colombia II No reelection 1991 - 2004 
Colombia III Two consecutive terms, then no reelection 2004 - 
Costa Rica I No reelection 1953 - 2002 
Costa Rica II After two interim terms 2003 - 
Dominican Republic No limit 1978 - 
Ecuador I No reelection  1978 -2008 
Ecuador II Two consecutive terms, then no reelection 2009 - 
El Salvador After one interim term 1985 - 
Guatemala  No reelection 1985 - 
Honduras No reelection 1981 - 
Mexico No reelection 1994 - 
Nicaragua  After one interim term 1985 - 
Panama After two interim terms 1989 - 
Paraguay No reelection 1993 - 
Peru I After one interim term 1980 - 1992 
Peru II Two consecutive terms, the one interim term 1993 - 2000 
Peru III After one interim term 2001 - 
Uruguay  After one interim term 1970 -  
Venezuela I After two interim terms 1958 - 1999 
Venezuela II Two consecutive terms, then no reelection 2000 - 2008 
Venezuela III No limits 2009 - 
Sources: Jones (1995) for data until the year 1995. Carey (2003) for data until the year 2001. And for the period from 2001 
to 2010 I consulted mostly current constitutional texts and the Political Handbook of the World (2010), The Economist 
Historical Archive, and BBCMundo's reports (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america) to situate the exact year of 
the reform.' The classification of reelection rules comes from Carey (2003). 
 
III. Model: Elections as a restriction 
This model departs from the assumption that reelection incentives do matter. Thus, I expect 
to see different policy choices from incumbents that can be reelected compared to those who 
are facing a term limit. In this model, I assume that both types of incumbents -- the 
incumbent that is eligible for reelection and the one that is facing a term limit -- want to 
maximize the achievements of their administrations. This means they will need to spend "x" 
177 
 
amount of money in order to achieve 'n' projects of their economic agendas. These projects 
can go from investing in public education to projects on security and so on. Both incumbents 
are given a 'g' fixed budget to carry out their projects. However, incumbents that are seeking 
reelection have two restrictions: 1) they have to think about voter's demands and preferences 
and 2) they have to think about the future, i.e., their next term. In this model, incumbents do 
not have as primary goal to maximize voter's preferences but their own preferences although 
subject to different democratic restrictions which are defined by the political institutions in 
place. Thus, elections are a type of constraint on incumbents that want to be reelected.  
PTL models emphasize that the prospect of reelection affects incumbents’ behaviour in a way 
that they put greater effort into policy-making compared to incumbents that cannot be 
reelected. However, incumbents facing term limits do not necessarily exhibit a completely 
unconcerned, reckless behaviour. Although neither type of incumbent has a strict mandate 
from voters, incumbents seeking reelection have to take into consideration voter's preferences 
over spending. Suppose that 'z' is the type of spending that voters prefer. A reelecion-seeking 
incumbent will try to figure out what type of spending is the one that increases the probability 
that voters will support him at the ballot box, that is, he tries to figure out what is the 'z' 
spending. Also, they have to think about the effects of their current policies on their possible, 
future term. Thus, if 'g' is the total available public income, a reelection-seeking incumbent 
must spend (g - x) on his projects and [(g - x) - z] on voter's demands. Also, 'g' must equal the 
total spending 'y'. That's is, while the term-limited incumbent is only concerned about his 
present administration's achievements, the reelection-seeking incumbent is concerned about 
his present and future achievements. 
In this regard, the reelection-seeking incumbent knows that if public spending surpasses the 
available income, his country may face financial imbalances in the next years and, if 
reelected, he will have to deal with these problems eventually. So, he has to consider how 
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present economic decisions affect the country's finances in the future. Meanwhile, 
incumbents facing a term limit do not have to take into consideration these restrictions, and 
thus they may try to accomplish their projects without worrying about its future effects on the 
country's finances. This means, on the one hand, that reelection-seeking incumbents are more 
likely to increase 'z', the type of spending that may bring in more votes, but at the same time 
they will try to keep total spending in balance with total revenues. On the other hand, term-
limited incumbents are more likely to spend the entire budget on their projects 'x' --even when 
some of them are not very appealing to voters. Also, there is higher probability that they 
increase the public deficit since they do not have to worry about the future. Therefore, in the 
absence of institutional restrictions, incumbents are more likely to care only about their own 
economic agenda, which may or may not coincide with the agenda of the majority of voters. 
These differences in institutional frameworks may lead incumbents to make different policy 
choices, which may be noticeable during their whole administration but especially during 
election years. So, if there are budget cycles, they must be more pronounced in the case of the 
reelection-seeking incumbents. These are the main factors to consider: 
(1) g =  total amount of income available to an incumbent, 
(2) y = total public spending, 
(3) z = the type of expenditure that brings in more votes -- at least, it must bring in enough 
votes to win the election, 
(4) x = the amount of public budget that the incumbent spends on his preferred economic 
projects,  
(5) k = the borrowing capacity (budget deficit limit) for a given country, where k > g.  
then: 
The utility function (preferences) of the reelection-seeking incumbent regarding the public 
spending is u1(x), thus his maximization problem is: 
max u1(x) such that    z+x/g ≤ 1,  g ≤ y     (x, z, and g > 0 ) 
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and the maximization problem for the term-limited incumbent regarding the public spending 
is: 
max u2(x) such that  x/k ≤ 1,      x ≤  k,  x> 0 and k > g. 
For the sake of simplicity, the above functions are ordinary linear utility functions and all 
they tell us is what the factors are that incumbents will take into account when making fiscal 
policy decisions. As we can see, if we consider that 'z' -- that is, the budget used for covering 
the demands of voters -- is a constant, then the amount of money that incumbents spend on x 
depends on the budget constraint in the case of the reelection-seeking incumbent and on the 
level of deficit constraint in the case of the term-limited incumbent. That is, the reelection-
seeking incumbent will try to keep a balanced budget while the term-limited incumbent will 
increase the public deficit as much as the fiscal laws of his country permit it. If the fiscal laws 
of the country of the term-limited incumbent require the budget to be in equilibrium, then the 
levels of deficit will be similar to those in the case of the reelection-seeking incumbent. 
However, the reelection-seeking incumbent is still constrained by voters' spending demands. 
The model supposes that z ≠ x; however, there could be cases in which what voters want and 
what the incumbents want are the same policies, and so, the only difference between the 
fiscal policies of both types of incumbents is the level of spending. Finally, taking into 
consideration that the reelection-seeking incumbent is a strategic actor, he may want to attend 
voters demands 'z' mostly during election years and during other years he will try to 
maximize 'x'. Thus, general predictions of the model are the following: 
A. Type of spending 
a. Presidents who are eligible for reelecion will increase the spending that voters favour 
more than presidents who face a term limit.  
b. Presidents who are eligible for reelection will especially increase voter's preferred 
spending around election years more than presidents facing a term limit. 
B. Fiscal responsibility 
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a. Presidents who cannot be reelected will increase the public deficit more than 
presidents who can be reelected.  
 
Methodology 
To test the effects of term limits provisions on public spending, I will use three models that 
classify incumbents into different categories. The first model, the 'reelection incentive' model, 
simply classifies presidents into two categories: presidents who can run for reelection, 
whether in consecutive elections or after stepping out of office one or more terms; and 
presidents who are not eligible for reelection, that is, presidents who can only serve one term 
and presidents who have been in power more than one term but are currently in their last 
allowed period ('lame ducks' presidents). This model doesn't distinguish between reelection 
incentives and experience. The basic objective of it is to see if the mere existence of 
reelection incentives can make a difference in the results.  
The second model, 'the incumbent's status model,' classifies presidents according to how long 
they have been in office. We have four categories of presidents. First of all, we have the 
group of the presidents who can only be in office for one term, the "no reelection" (NR) 
category. This category will serve as a benchmark for trying to evaluate how other different 
provisions and time in office may affect the level of public spending. Thus, I will compare 
this category with the remaining three categories. In the second category we have presidents 
who are in their first term and are allowed to run for reelection (FTRA). With this category, 
the model tries to isolate the effects of 'reelection incentives' from the effects of 'time in 
office' (cf. Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011) as these presidents are in their first term 
and therefore are the ones with less experience in office but, at the same time, they are also 
eligible for reelection. This means that when compared against the NR category, the impact 
of this category will tell us how much having reelection incentives matters for decisions 
about public spending.  
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The third group of presidents belong to the 'lame duck' category (Lameduck), in which we 
have presidents who are in their second term which is also their last one. The objective of this 
category is to measure experience alone. Presidents in this group have experience in office 
but can no longer be reelected and therefore they lack reelection incentives. In Latin America, 
usually, “lame duck” presidents can be found in countries in which reelection is allowed just 
once, that is, rules that allow two consecutive terms only. As of 2010, the last year of the 
dataset, we don't have countries allowing up to three or four consecutive terms and presidents 
serving their last terms on those periods. We only find lame ducks in countries with two-
terms provisions. We have presidents serving a third term but they belong to countries that 
don't limit the number of times a president may run for reelection (non-consecutive  
reelection). Lastly, we have the 'unlimited reelection' (UR) category, in which there are no 
limits in the number of times a president may run for reelection although in most of the cases 
those reelections cannot be consecutive but presidents have to stay one or more terms out of 
office before competing again for reelection. This last category will show us the impact of the 
effects of both experience and reelection incentives. These four categories capture the 
variation regarding reelection provisions in Latin America while allowing to differentiate the 
effects of elections from the effects of experience in office (cf. Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and 
Rose, 2011). 
Finally, the last model classifies presidents into two groups: presidents who were reelected 
and presidents who weren’t. I call this model 'the survival model' as it tries to assess what 
kind of presidents where reelected by voters in Latin America: did presidents who are 
conservative in spending or the presidents who were irresponsible in spending have better 
chances of being reelected? Here the direction of causality is tested; maybe candidates who 
spend more are the ones that voters choose for staying in office --in a kind of 'natural 
selection' mechanism that benefits presidents who spend more-- rather than presidents 
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spending more due to reelection incentives. Thus, this model tests if the different levels in 
spending that we may observe are the result of voter preferences. Here elections appear to be 
more an accountability tool rather than a mechanism creating incentives for certain 
behaviours. This model is particularly interesting in Latin America where we find several 
cases of reelection reform. Thus, in the category of 'presidents that were reelected' we have 
many presidents that initially, due to constitutional provisions, were unable to run for 
reelection and therefore had no reelection incentives. However, after the implementation of 
constitutional reforms allowing reelection those presidents were reelected. So this model will 
permit us to see whether presidents who ended up being reelected exhibit different patterns of 
spending when compared to those that were not reelected.  
The three models are tested in different regressions due to the overlapping of a number of 
cases for some of the categories. Because of this, we have a high correlation between some of 
these categories that can lead to multicollinearity. The correlation is high for some categories 
but it is not perfect, otherwise it would be meaningless to test these different models. 
In this section, I use two different estimators for evaluating the impact of term limits 
incentives on government spending, random-effects and pooled OLS estimators. As it is well 
known, the OLS estimator does not take into account heterogeneity between the units of 
analysis, in this case, heterogeneity between countries. For these cases, fixed-effects (FE) and 
random-effects (RE) estimators are commonly used. I have discarded the FE estimator 
because the main independent variable of the model, term limits provisions, is time-invariant 
for the majority of the countries in the dataset. The FE model doesn't consider cases that are 
time-invariant and thus the model would end up with very little information for estimating the 
coefficient of the variable. For this reason, I will only use the RE model. However, the RE 
model has its own drawbacks, of which the most worrisome is the possibility of 
overestimating the impact of the independent variables as well as their statistical significance. 
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I will also report the pooled OLS coefficients; although the OLS is an estimator that doesn't 
take into account unit's heterogeneity, it gives us consistent estimations of the coefficients. 
We can then compare them with the RE model's coefficients so as to have a reference for the 
consistency of our estimations.  
For most of the variables, the RE model gives results with a lower level of significance than 
the pooled OLS. Thus, as expected, once the initial heterogeneity of units is accounted for 
(which is done by the RE model), the significance level for most of the categories and 
variables decreases. I will discuss only the results of the RE models; the pooled OLS model 
coefficients are reported only as a benchmark to show how consistent our estimations are in 
different regression models. It is interesting to note, when the RE and Pooled OLS models 
yield very different results, the RE model's results are not significant most of the time. So, in 
these cases, even when the pooled OLS gives statistically significant results, this difference 
tells us that we probably do not have enough information to draw conclusions about those 
variables effects. 
Regressions 
The model uses as dependent variable ‘social spending’ for this is probably the kind of 
spending that incumbents would be most tempted to manipulate in order to win elections. 
Also, I will use as dependent variable public deficit as a way to measure fiscal responsibility. 
The main independent variables are related to the different reelection rules. As explained 
earlier, they will be tested in three different models. Regarding the control variables, it 
includes a dummy variable for the year in which an election is held. Following the work of 
Drazen (2001), I have included a variable for the ideology of the president’s party. Drazen 
argues that presidents who belong to left-wing parties will increase the social spending more 
because their political agenda is focused on distribution and social welfare. Right-wing 
parties are usually more concerned with keeping the fiscal deficit low; therefore, they try to 
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keep social spending low in order to have a balanced budget and thus avoid fiscal deficit and 
increases in the public debt (Ibid). There is also a variable measuring the number of years an 
incumbent has been in office. The model also includes one variable related to the Congress, 
which measures whether there is a unified government or a divided government. Regarding 
the importance of Congress for policymaking, see Morgenstern and Nacif (2002); Wes 
(1998); Pereira and Mueller (2004); Cheibub (2006); Dabla-Norris et al, (2010); and Fabrizio 
and Mody (2006). Finally, following the literature (see for example Johnson and Crain, 2004) 
I have included a group of economic and demographic variables that influence spending such 
as population and GDP. According to the theory, all these economic and demographic 
variables should be positively related to government spending. Table 3 summarizes the 
variables and describes how they have been operationalized for the empirical tests.   
We then have the following model: 
 
General model 
Fiscal policy outcome = Term limits variables + control variables (partisan ideology + years 
in office + Congress' support +  election year + population + GDP) + error term (µ) 
Y= β0 + β1X1+ (β2X2+ β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6+  β7X7)+ µ  
Model 1  
Fiscal policy outcome = reelection incentives + control variables + µ 
Model 2 
Fiscal policy outcome = incumbent's status + control variables + µ 
Model 3 
Fiscal policy outcome = reelected incumbent + control variables +  µ 
Dependent variable: 
Y = fiscal policy outcome (social spending or public deficit) 
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Independent variables: 
X1 = term limits categories: model 1 (dummy variable measuring reelection incentives versus 
no reelection incentives); model 2 (categorical variable: no re-election (NR)/ first term, re-
election allowed (FTRA)/ lame duck president (lameduck)/ unlimited re-election (UR)); 
model 3 (dummy variable: reelected versus no reelected). 
X2...7 = control variables (partisan ideology, years in office, election year, divided 
government, GDP, population) 
µ = error term 
Testable Hypotheses  
A. Type of spending 
c. Presidents who are eligible for reelecion will increase social spending more than 
presidents who face a term limit.  
d. Presidents who are eligible for reelection will increase social spending around 
election years more than presidents facing a term limit. 
e. Presidents who spend more have a higher probability of being reelected than 
presidents who spend less. 
B. Fiscal responsibility 
b. Presidents who cannot be re-elected will increase the public deficit more than 
presidents who can be reelected.  
c. Presidents with more time in office will increase public deficit more than presidents 
with less experience in office. 
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Table 3. Variables 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Social expenditure 
(continuous variable) 
 
 This variable measures the share of resources allocated to 
social spending as a share of total government spending. It 
takes into account spending in health, education, poverty 
reduction and social security. It is measured as a percentage 
of total government expenditure. 
Public deficit  General government net lending/borrowing (% GDP) 
General expenditure  General government total expenditure (% GDP) 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Reelection incentives 
(dummy variable) 
 
 Dummy variable taking on 1 when presidents can be 
reelected and 0 otherwise. 
 Incumbent  status 
(categorical variable) 
 No reelection (NR). Dummy variable taking on 1 when 
presidents are one-term limited and 0 otherwise. Presidents 
cannot serve for another term even after being out from 
office during one or more terms. This is the most restrictive 
rule regarding presidential reelection. 
 
 First term, reelection allowed (FTRA). Dummy variable 
taking on 1 when presidents are in their first term and they 
can be reelected for another consecutive term or can be re-
elected after being one or more terms out from office. It 
takes 0 otherwise. 
 
 Lame ducks  (Lameduck). Dummy variable taking on 1 
when presidents have been re-elected for another term but 
this is their last one (“lame ducks” presidents). It takes 0 
otherwise. 
 
 Unlimited re-election (UR). Dummy variable taking on 1 
when presidents can be reelected, either in consecutive 
elections or after stepping out of office one or more terms. It 
takes 0 otherwise. 
 
Electoral survival 
(dummy variable) 
 Reelected. This is a dummy variable taking on 1 when 
presidents were reelected and 0 otherwise. 
 
CONTROLS 
Unified government   
 Dummy variable, takes on 1 under unified government (that 
is, when the president's party controls a congressional 
majority) and zero otherwise. 
Presidential elections  Dummy variable, takes on 1 in election year and zero 
otherwise. 
Years in office.  Number of years a president has been in office. 
President’s party 
orientation. 
 Categorical variable classifying the president’s party into 
leftist(Left), centrist (Center) or rightist (Right). The 
category that will be left out in the regression models is the 
'right' category. 
Population   Total country's population. Continuous variable in units. 
GDPpc  Gross Domestic Product per capita. Continuous variable. 
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Data 
In order to test these hypotheses, I built a dataset containing information about presidential 
term limits provisions and fiscal policy outcomes. Table 4 shows all the countries included in 
the study. The dataset assembles yearly information. To determine the periods to be analysed 
for each country I considered both the type of political regime and data availability. In the 
case of the dependent variables (fiscal outcomes), it was possible to collect data from 1990 to 
2010 for social expenditure; for figures related to the total government expenditure and 
public deficit, most of the data starts from the late 90's to 2010. In the case of political 
variables, information was available for each year from the 70's up to today, however, I 
limited the study to the years in which elections were reasonably fair, free and contested.  
Since I depart from the assumption that incumbents care about winning elections, it is 
essential that elections were meaningful. Thus, it is important that countries fulfil, as a 
minimum, the conditions for being counted as 'electoral democracies'. This is why I excluded 
all the years in which countries where considered as non-democratic. In order to determine 
the periods of study I follow mostly the classification of Latin American regimes by Smith 
and Ziegler (2008) for the period 1978-2004. These authors classify regimes as 
nondemocratic (hard-line and moderate); semi-democratic, and democratic (illiberal and 
liberal). Both types of democratic regimes, the illiberal and liberal ones, are electoral 
democracies. Smith and Ziegler define an electoral democracy as a regime where elections 
"were free and fair: if adult suffrage was more or less universal, if all serious candidates 
could run, if any candidate could win, if votes were counted accurately, if victory went to the 
contender with the highest number of votes (according to transparent decision rules), and if 
the winner acquired effective authority as a result." (Smith and Ziegler, 2008, p. 48). 
Countries that partially exhibit these characteristics are classified as semi-democracies (Ibid.).  
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Table 4. Sample Data 
 Country Years included in 
the dataset  
Year since the country is 
considered  'democracy'* 
1 Argentina 1990-2010 1983 - 2004 
2 Bolivia 1990-2010 1983 - 2004 
3 Brazil 1990-2010 1990 - 2004 
4 Colombia 1990-2010 1978 - 2004 
5 Costa Rica 1990-2010 1978 - 2004 
6 Chile 1990-2010 1989 - 2004 
7 Dominican Republic 1990-2010 1978 - 2004 
8 Ecuador 1990-2010 1979 - 1995 ;  2001- 2004 
9 El Salvador 1993-2010 1994 - 2004 
10 Guatemala 1990-2010 1996 - 2004 
11 Honduras 1990-2010 1997 - 2004 
12 Mexico 1990-2010 2000 - 2004 
13 Nicaragua 1990-2010 1990 - 2004 
14 Panama 1990-2010 1994 - 2004 
15 Paraguay 1994-2010 1993 - 2004 
16 Peru 1990-2010 1990,  2001 - 2004 
17 Uruguay 1990-2009 1985 - 2004 
18 Venezuela 1990-2006 1978 - 1998 
          * Source: Smith and Ziegler (2008). The category of 'democracy' includes the 'liberal democracies' and 'illiberal democracies'. 
As we can see, with the exception of El Salvador (1993), Ecuador (1996 - 1999), Mexico 
(1990 - 1999), Peru (1991- 2000), and Venezuela (1999 - 2004) which are classified as 'semi-
democratic' during the specified years, all the country-years (1990-2004) included in the 
dataset fall into the 'democracy' category. The dataset excludes all the years in which 
countries are considered nondemocratic; the only exception in the dataset is Ecuador in 2000, 
which is classified by Smith and Ziegler as "moderate non-democracy". In the year 2005, 
Freedom House democratic rankings, the main source for the Smith and Ziegler's 
classification, show similar democratic indicators to those of the last year of Smith and 
Ziegler's classification. For the next years, from 2006 to 2010, I consulted The Economist 
Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy (2006 - 2010 reports) which classifies the majority of 
Latin American Countries as "full democracies" and "flawed democracies". Both categories 
require that countries also meet the elements of an electoral democracy. There were important 
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democratic regressions during those years, though, with Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela reclassified as "hybrid regimes" in 2010 by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. The Economist Intelligence Unit definition of a hybrid regime  is similar to 
the category of "semi-democracy" in Smith and Ziegler's study (2008). As of 2010, none of 
the countries included in the dataset has been classified as an "authoritarian regime" though. 
In this regard, reasonably fair elections have been regularly held across the region.  
In the case of the term limits provisions, I used as a starting point the classifications of Jones 
(1995) and Carey (2003) for the period 1995- 2001 and I completed the rest of the years 
using several sources that are listed in Appendix 1. In the final dataset we have 472 
observations: 172 years for the category of "no-reelection"; 202 years for the category of 
FTRA (44 years in which consecutive reelection was allowed, 158 years in which non-
consecutive reelection was allowed, 129 years in which presidents can be reelected after one 
interim term and 29 years in which presidents can be reelected after two interim terms); 26 
years with lameduck presidents, and 65 years in which presidents where able to run for an 
unlimited number of elections. Also, in 267 years presidents had reelection incentives while 
in 198 years presidents did not have reelection incentives. Finally, as the data shows, there 
are 163 observations of presidents that were reelected and 304 observations of presidents that 
were not reelected.  
Results 
 
Panel Models (POLS and Random Effects) 
Results from the statistical tests tell a coherent story. The outcomes of the first model, the 
"reelection incentives model," are reported in Table 5. Incumbents that are eligible for 
reelection show higher levels of social spending than incumbents facing term limits. But, at 
the same time, incumbents that have reelection incentives show lesser deficit levels than 
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incumbents who cannot be reelected. These results suggest that incumbents with reelection 
incentives are careful in the kind of spending they target for electoral ends: increasing social 
spending may bring electoral gains but increasing the overall spending thereby generating a 
higher deficit may be counterproductive in the long run. They may end up lowering their 
electoral prospects if the economy is negatively affected as a result of irresponsible spending. 
So, incumbents with reelection prospects focus only on the kind of spending that may bring 
voters' support while being careful not to create risks of macroeconomic troubles. Both the 
REM and Pooled OLS estimators give us the same signs for the coefficients, although -- as 
expected -- the Pooled OLS regression estimates a slightly bigger effect of the main variables 
than the REM model. All the main variables are statistically significant at 10 per cent or 
higher. 
Table 5. Reelection Incentives (Model 1) 
 
 Social expenditure Public deficit General expenditure 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Reelection 
incentives 
4.541954** 
(1.771387) 
9.744212***    
(1.43663)      
-1.167395*   
(.6450274)     
-1.386654***   
(.4605458)     
-2.13468    
(1.37922)     
4.086128***   
(.9077305)      
President's 
party ideology 
(center) 
-3.737499**   
(1.569859) 
-3.28627   
(2.190852)     
1.364276*   
(.7245398)      
1.480574**    
(.645839)      
-.4697809   
(1.039026)     
-3.305295**   
(1.274205)     
President's 
party ideology 
(left) 
-.8181679   
(1.178673) 
-4.489696 *** 
(1.507198)     
.4664125   
(.5328977)      
.7955954   
(.4850257)      
.8139825   
(.7724879) 
1.514875   
(.9569623)      
Years in 
office 
.0761328   
(.2107423) 
-.4997299   
(.3335194)     
.1685442   
(.1179944)      
.1419602   
(.1222346)      
-.0810171   
(.1520721)     
-.319568   
(.2415333)     
Unified 
government 
2.310491**   
(1.072424) 
5.789378***   
(1.489992)      
.1860487   
(.5893838)      
.3967668   
(.5699491)      
-.547362   
(.8038357)     
.1094654   
(1.126377)      
Election year 
(presidential 
elections) 
.1305707   
(.9943984) 
-.6072436   
(1.660607)     
-.6235255   
(.5215704)     
-.6163529   
(.5464889)     
.247369   
(.6645472)      
.5093377   
(1.079155) 
Population 
 
.1444758***     
(.04134) 
.0909096***   
(.0156601)      
-.0200329***   
(.0081291)     
-.0211075***   
(.0055217)     
.0509526   
(.0371932)      
.0735364***   
(.0109126)      
GDPpc .0012078***   
(.0002371) 
.0018426***    
(.000251)      
.0003399*** 
(.0000976)      
.0003011***   
(.0000757)      
.000647***   
(.0001769)      
-.000093   
(.0001494)     
R-squared 0.2925                                         0.4421 0.1246                                         0.1292 0.1210 0.2893 
Observations 273 273 247 247 248 248 
 Number of groups = 18.  For the random-effects regressions, the r-squared reported is the overall explained variance.     
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%; Significant at 1% .Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6 shows the result of the "incumbent status model." In this case the main variable, term 
limits provisions, is disaggregated into four categories. The category that was left out -- and 
the one to which the remaining three categories will be compared --, is the "no reelection" 
category. By creating these four categories, I try to assess not only the impact of reelection 
incentives but also the impact of 'experience' (cf. Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose, 2011). 
So, we have the category of the incumbents who are in their first term and can be reelected 
for another term (FTRA), then we have the 'lameduck category' in which we have incumbents 
who are in their second term and cannot keep running for reelection, and then the 'unlimited 
reelection' category in which we have incumbents who are in their second or third term and 
can keep running for reelection in the future. This last category includes incumbents who can 
be reelected in a consecutive reelection and those who have to wait one or two terms before 
running again for reelection. These three categories are compared with the "no reelection" 
category. The general intuition here is that there are two elements that may influence the 
incumbents choices regarding public spending. The first one is the 'reelection incentives' 
element, and the second one is the 'experience' of the incumbent. So, we can expect that, for 
example, the 'Lameduck' presidents' record reflect the interplay of both factors when 
compared with the 'no reelection' category. Hence while lameduck presidents are not eligible 
for running for reelection, the fact that they have already been in office will probably make a 
difference when compared with those presidents who are in their first term and cannot be 
reelected and who therefore have both less experience in office and no reelection incentives. 
Also, we would expect to see different results for presidents who have experience in office 
and have reelection incentives and those who only have reelection incentives (Alt, Bueno de 
Mesquita and Rose, 2011). 
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Table 6. Incumbent status (Model 2) 
 
 Social expenditure Public deficit 
 
General expenditure 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Incumbent 
status 
(FTRA) 
6.942859***   
(2.182931)      
9.497497***   
(1.568811)      
-.3340684   
(.7790326  ) 
-.9497846*   
(.5115005 )    
-1.439136   
(1.721852)     
4.656528***   
(.9811522)      
Incumbent 
status 
(Lameduck) 
8.061211**   
(3.697186)      
-3.452642   
(4.017077)     
1.335426     
(1.5924)      
.4848373    
(1.369716) 
.7454894   
(2.875165)      
10.6923***   
(2.638815)      
Incumbent 
status (UR) 
6.719138***   
(2.240877)      
9.379297***   
(2.060233)      
-1.773658**   
(.8411956)     
-2.161482***   
(.6232368 )    
-2.208886   
(1.733063)     
5.065323***   
(1.200694)      
President's 
party ideology 
(center) 
-3.643386**   
(1.556846)     
-3.300748   
(2.198939) 
1.269125*    
(.736804)      
1.550705**   
(.6450915)      
-.58161   
(1.056265)     
-3.018743**   
(1.240907)     
President's 
party ideology 
(left) 
-.6644644   
(1.176052)     
-4.632565***   
(1.521858)     
.3393581   
(.5412573) 
.8576543*   
(.4845728)      
.7195715   
(.7884211)      
1.705793*   
(.9322031)      
Years in 
office 
-.0561183   
(.2316644)     
-.4093449   
(.3653398)    
.2173736*   
(.1205881)      
.1838658   
( .1250306)      
-.054698   
(.1599509)     
-.453932*   
(.2407516)     
Unified 
government 
-2.58273**   
(1.072539)     
5.787643***   
(1.514658)      
.0971513   
(.5895409)      
.3194138   
( .5697467)      
-.5617769   
(.8093531)     
.3126794   
(1.097565)      
Election year 
(presidential 
elections) 
.2337557   
(1.015626)      
-.8620746   
(1.708213) 
-.7403793   
(.5210401)     
-.7220394   
(.5493287)     
.1774496   
(.6820567)      
.8746261   
(1.057078 )     
Population 
 
.1470298***   
(.0429643)      
.0895964***   
(.0158476)      
-.0171999*   
(.0091663)     
-.0190469***   
(.0056118 )    
.0503035   
(.0360165)      
.0774982***   
(.0108099)     
GDPpc .0011473***   
(.0002396)      
.0018561***   
(.0002541)      
.0003329***   
(.0001033)      
.000268***   
(.0000773)      
.0006538***   
(.0001796)      
-.0001201   
(.0001485)     
R-squared 0.2974 0.4437 0.1287 0.1435 0.1303 0.3357 
Observations 273 273 247 247 248 248 
 Number of groups = 18.  For the random-effects regressions, the r-squared reported is the overall explained variance. 
 * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%; Significant at 1% .Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
First of all, we can see that incumbents belonging to the FTRA group show higher social 
spending levels than presidents in the NR category. Then we have the category of the 
'unlimited reelection (UR)' which shows a slightly lesser impact on spending than the FTRA 
group when compared to the NR category but it is also positive. Regarding the 'lameduck' 
category, we can see that the REM model estimates a higher coefficient when compared to 
the other categories, while the pooled OLS model gives us not only a very different 
coefficient but a different sign as well. The coefficient of the REM model for the 'lameduck' 
category is positive and significant at the 10 percent level while the coefficient of the pooled 
OLS model is negative but it is not significant. This may be due to the fact that the 'lameduck' 
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category has the smallest number of presidents in it, and thus makes it difficult for the 
regression models to estimate the coefficients. We know that the REM model tends to 
overestimate the effect of certain variables as well as their significance. This happens mainly 
when the units of analysis have few cases (see Kennedy, 2003). We also know that in these 
cases it is better to choose the pooled OLS model to get consistent estimations. Bearing in 
mind the clear disagreement between the models the most probable explanation is that, as 
shown by the pooled OLS model, the difference of the 'lameduck' and the NR category is not 
significant. All in all, the discrepancy in the results tell us to be cautious about the 
relationship between reelection incentives and increases in all type of public spending: maybe 
politicians think that not all spending helps to get more votes.  
Compare the results of this 'incumbent status model' with our first model, the 'reelection 
incentives model.' Here we have results pointing in the same direction. In our first model we 
simply classify presidents into two categories, creating a dummy variable that takes on 1 
when the president can be reelected -- for one or more additional terms -- and zero when 
presidents cannot be reelected -- and which includes both presidents who could only be in 
office for one term and those who could serve more than one term but were in their last 
allowed term, that is, 'lameduck' presidents. In the second model, the category of presidents 
who can be reelected is broken down into two categories: presidents who are in their first 
term -- and thus the ones with less experience in office -- and those who are in their second or 
third term and thus have more experience (there are no presidents in their fourth term in the 
dataset). The 'no reelection' category is also divided into two groups: the ones who can only 
be in one term and those who were able to stay in office for more than one term but are 
currently in their last one, that is, lameduck presidents. The category with most presidents in 
it is the FTRA presidents, that is, presidents who are in their first term and who can keep 
running for reelection. All the presidents in the FTRA belong to the 'presidents with 
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reelection incentives' category of our first model, and therefore, we would expect similar 
results. In this regard, we can see that, in effect, the coefficient of the FTRA category is close 
to the coefficient of the 'presidents with reelection incentives' of the first model but, also as 
expected, it is not exactly the same. Finally, another interesting result of the model is that 
having more experience --i.e., being in second or third term-- doesn't make a big difference 
with respect to those who are in their first term. The effect of experience alone couldn't be 
unambiguously determined. As said before, the REM and pooled OLS regressions show very 
different coefficients for the lameduck category.  
In the case of government deficit, the 'status of incumbent' model shows important results. 
First of all, we can notice that both the REM and pooled OLS regressions give us the same 
signs for the coefficients and that the coefficients themselves are not too far off in both 
regression models. Consistent also with the 'reelection incentives model', the FTRA and UR 
categories have a negative relationship with the government deficit, meaning that presidents 
that can be reelected for at least one more term are more cautious regarding the level of 
general spending than presidents who cannot be reelected. Even so, presidents in the UR 
category -- those who can be reelected for more than one term-- are the ones exhibiting lower 
levels of deficit than the FTRA presidents -- that is, those who are in their first term and can 
only be reelected for another term. We can then conclude that the longer you expect to be in 
office, the more careful you are with the management of public finances and thus with the 
level of the budget deficit. However, only the UR category is significant at the 10 per cent 
level. The lameduck category's coefficient is positive, which could mean that experience 
leads to more spending. But this result wasn't significant, not even at the 10 per cent level. 
Finally, the third model, the electoral survival model, shows that in the case of general 
expenditure there was a positive relationship between this variable and being reelected, which 
means that voters in Latin America reward presidents who spend more, which is just as the 
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theory explained and, to some extent, also reveals why presidents with reelection ambitions 
want to increase spending. The other two variables, social expenditure and public deficit 
results were inconsistent in the REM and Pooled OLS regressions and not significant. 
Table 7. Electoral survival (Model 3) 
 
 Social expenditure Public deficit General expenditure 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Random-
effects 
regression        
 
Pooled OLS 
regression 
Reelected 
 
-.5653347   
(1.182484)     
.815473   
(1.509562)      
.4096414   
(.5586808)      
-.2765501   
(.4895485)     
1.476212*   
(.8817798)      
5.240418***   
(.9092034)      
President's 
party ideology 
(center) 
-3.311635   
(1.506408)     
-1.136224   
(2.368675) 
1.312102*   
(.7443194)      
1.489194**   
(.6844944)      
-.8891606   
(1.043035)     
-4.387768***   
(1.270514)     
President's 
party ideology 
(left) 
-.016969**   
(1.121387)     
-4.042075   
(1.640793)     
.4261653   
(.5404055)      
.7090773     
(.51131)      
.746276   
(.7792877)      
.8061279   
(.9494128)      
Years in 
office 
.0884172   
(.2052262)      
-.2477507   
(.3647699)     
.1715529   
(.1213249)      
.1272493   
(.1269455)      
-.1481036   
(.1541272)     
-.3180324   
(.2357256)     
Unified 
government 
-2.64779   
(1.055231)     
3.230297**    
(1.56324)      
.4874863   
(.5959842)      
.8717842   
(.5779979)      
-.7923287   
(.8167569)     
-.650461   
(1.073327)     
Election year 
(presidential 
elections) 
-.0731336*   
(.9581875)     
-1.284704   
(1.790812)     
-.6110224     
(.53615)     
-.5616319   
(.5685328)     
.3481398   
(.6712691)      
-.650461   
(1.073327)     
Population 
 
.2379783***   
(.0556726)      
.0576728***   
(.0162414)      
-.018949**    
(.008135)     
-.0163002***   
(.0055489)     
.0537942   
(.0343267)      
.0523357***   
(.0103084) 
GDP pc .0011346***   
(.0002444)      
.0024077***   
(.0002566)      
.0002917***   
(.0000974)      
.000224***  
(.0000762)      
.0004507**   
(.0001871)      
.0001195   
(.0001413)      
R-squared 0.1807                                         0.3449 0.0863                                         0.0970 0.2362                                         0.3180 
Observations 275 275 249 249 250 250 
    * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%; Significant at 1% .Standard errors in parentheses.  
      Number of groups = 18.  For the random-effects regressions, the r-squared reported is the overall explained variance.     
 
The variable for election years, the variable that was trying to find out if differences in 
spending and public deficit were especially important during electoral years, turned out to be 
not significant in all the models. This may be due to the way that the fiscal variables were 
measured. Possibly quarterly measures (one year before and after elections) instead of annual 
data could have been better able to find spending budget cycles. However, these results can 
still be used as a benchmark when compared with future research. It also could be possible 
that in the last years, incumbents and policymakers in general are finding it more difficult to 
manipulate the public spending in time for the electoral cycle and that is why differences in 
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spending can be observed throughout the whole administration and not only in specific years. 
As expected, the coefficients of the variables 'Population' and GDP proved to be positive and 
highly significant in all the models about social expenditure. The results for the rest of the 
control variables were inconsistent, with some models showing the variables as significant 
and in others insignificant at the 10 per cent level. Furthermore, in some cases the signs of 
these variables were inconsistent across the two models.  
 
Time-Series, Cross-Section Models (TSCS) 
In this section, I will carry out additional statistical tests using Time-Series, Cross-Section 
models (TSCS). The main source of my analysis is the work of Beck and Katz (1995b) and 
Podesta (2000). To carry out these additional tests, I used the statistical package "RStudio," 
which is a free software that allows users to perform traditional linear regressions along with 
more complex panel and TSCS analysis. Before running new regressions, I replicated with 
RStudio the previous section's tests that I ran using the Stata software and the results were the 
same, no difference. So, the results of these two sections can be replicated with either Stata or 
RStudio.  
In the case of the Stata package, the usual command for estimating TSCS models is the "xt" 
option, which allows to estimate the Parks-Kmenta method
125
, the FGLS model (xtgls), and 
the Beck-Katz method, the PCSE (xtpcse) (see Podesta, 2000). In the case of the RStudio 
statistical program, there are several options for regression analysis of TSCS models but as 
long as the data is balanced, the analysis is straightforward; for unbalanced panels, though, it 
is necessarily additional steps. Mainly, it is important to indicate that the data is unbalanced, 
                                                          
125
 Podesta (2000) states that two of the most common methods for estimating regression models that use 
TSCS data are the Beck and Katz model (1995) and the Parks-Kmenta model. In the case of the first model, the 
Beck and Katz model, the authors co-wrote papers in which they detail this methodology. In the case of the 
Parks-Kmenta model, the model was first proposed by Parks (1967) and further elaborated by Kmenta (1986)  
but Podesta (2000) says that they have a similar base and thus he has named it as the "Parks-Kmenta method". 
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which means that sometimes there could be more time-observation for some unites than 
others. After indicating the format of the data, the researcher can use the "gls" command for 
the GLS model and either pcse or vcovBK commands for the PCSE model. 
Both panel-data and TSCS-data contain time and space observations. However, according to 
Beck and Katz (2006), the main difference between common panel-data and TSCS data is the 
proportion of time-observations in relation to space-observations. Usually, panel-data 
contains a large set of units that are observed for a relatively short time period; for example, 
economic data of 70 countries for two years, which would bring a total of  140 observations. 
By contrast, TSCS data usually consist of a small set of unites, let's say, 30 countries, 
observed by a long number of times, for example, during 10 or more years. According to 
Beck (2006), "TSCS data typically have the opposite structure of panel data: a relatively 
small number of units observed for some reasonable length of time. Thus, methods that are 
appropriate for the analysis of panel data are not necessarily appropriate for TSCS data and 
vice versa." (Beck, 2006, p. 1). Because in TSCS data the time dimension is usually large, 
this type of data is also known as "longitudinal data". Here, the most important element is to 
observe the proportion between the time series and the cross-sectional data: when the time-
series data is larger than the cross-sections data, we have TSCS type of data.  
TSCS-data analysis was initially developed to address comparative political economy 
questions (see Podesta, 2000; Beck, 2006). It was common that scholars were interested, for 
example, in understanding the impact of political variables on the economy of OECD 
countries, that is, developed countries. However, sometimes the researcher had only data for 
less than 30 countries, which may affect the significance of the statistical tests. This is why, 
by adding the time dimension -- that is, the same unit observed several times--, helped to deal 
with this problem of few observations. 
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One of the main problems for analysing TSCS data is that its "designs often violate the 
standard OLS assumptions about the error process" (Podesta, 2000, p.9), which means that 
for the OLS estimations to be BLUE, it is important that the "errors have the same variance 
(homoschedasticity) and that all of the errors are independent of each other."
126
  In the case of 
TSCS data these assumptions rarely hold up, which may lead to the problem of obtaining an 
inaccurate estimation of the standard errors (Ibid).  In order to address these problems, there 
are two popular estimation techniques that have been developed.  
The first estimation technique is the Parks-Kementa method, and "is an application of the 
generalized  least squares (GLS) estimation"
127
 which is often used instead of the OLS 
estimation method because it "is based on less restrictive assumptions concerning the 
regression  the behaviour of the disturbance ... than the classical regression model" [Polesta 
2000 (Kmenta, 1986)]. The main characteristic of this method is that it utilizes an estimate of 
the covariance matrix of errors and that is why it is also known as the 'feasible' GLS method 
(see Beck, 2006). The main purpose of this technique is to remove serial correlation of the 
errors as well as the contemporaneous correlation of the errors that is often found in TSCS 
data. The second technique is the method developed by Beck and Katz (1995b), known as the 
Panel-Corrected, Standard Errors (PCSE) method, which proposes "to retain OLS parameter 
estimators but replace OLS standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors that take into 
account the contemporaneous correlation of the errors and perforce heteroschedasticity" 
(Podesta, 2000, pp. 16-17). 
As expected, and in comparison to the previous models -- the POLS and the Random models 
-- in the TSCS  regressions the significance of the majority of the variables was considerably 
reduced (see Tables 8a-10c). When comparing the PCSE results with the POLS regression 
                                                          
126
 Ibid, footnote no.3. 
127
 Podesta (2000, p. 13). As explained earlier, this method comes from the work of Parks (1967) and Kmenta 
(1986), see Podesta (2000) for more details about this method. 
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results, we can see that although the statistical significance of all variables decreased, almost 
all term limits variables that were previously significant remain significant. The only 
exception is the case of "public deficit" in model 5, as the "FTRA" category appears as not 
significant in the PCSE regression but it was previously significant under the POLS model. In 
the case of the PCSE and GLS regressions, there are some discrepancies for the variable 
"general expenditure" (models 5 and 6): the GLS model estimation appears with negative 
sign while it was positive under the PCSE estimation, but it is not significant. 
                            
Table 8a. Reelection incentives  
 Model 4: Social expenditure 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Social expenditure 
 
 PCSE GLS- REML 
Reelection incentives 9.744212* 5.640** 
President's party ideology (center) -3.28627 -2.856 
President's party ideology (left) -4.489695 0.118 
Years in office -0.499729 -0.478* 
Unified government 5.78937- 3.421* 
Election year (presidential 
elections) 
-0.60724 0.5421 
Population 0.090909- 0.0034 
GDPpc 0.00184** 0.0017** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1 
 
 
Table 8b. Reelection incentives  
Model 4: Public deficit 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Public deficit 
  PCSE GLS- REML 
Reelection incentives -1.38665*** -1.4999 
President's party ideology (center) 1.48057* 0.8849 
President's party ideology (left) 0.79559* 0.6562 
Years in office 0.14196 0.0535 
Unified government 0.39676 0.2324 
Election year (presidential 
elections) 
-0.61635 -0.2326 
Population -0.021107* -0.0254 
GDPpc 0.00030108  * 0.0003 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1  
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Table 8c. Reelection incentives  
Model 4: General Expenditure 
 
Independent 
Variables 
General expenditure 
 PCSE GLS- REML 
Reelection incentives 4.0861e+00-   3.830580 
President's party ideology (center) -3.3053e+00   -0.460 
President's party ideology (left) 1.5149e+00   -0.587572 
Years in office -3.1957e-01 0.022160 
Unified government 1.0947e-01   -0.578657 
Election year (presidential 
elections) 
5.0934e-01   -0.110015 
Population 7.3536e-02 **  0.048802 
GDPpc  -9.2977e-05   0.000317 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1 
 
 
Table 9a. Incumbent status  
Model 5: Social Expenditure 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Social expenditure 
 PCSE GLS- REML 
Incumbent status (FTRA) 9.497* 1.500 
Incumbent status (Lameduck) -3.452 -11.367- 
Incumbent status (UR)  9.379* 3.391 
President's party ideology (center) -3.300 -2.996 
President's party ideology (left) -4.632** -0.076 
Years in office -0.409 -0.474 
Unified government 5.787 - 3.246 
Election year (presidential elections) -0.862 0.337 
Population 0.089 - -0.015 
GDPpc 0.001** 0.001- 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1  
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Table 9b. Incumbent status  
Model 5: Public deficit  
 
Independent 
Variables 
Public deficit 
 PCSE GLS- REML 
Incumbent status (FTRA) -0.949 -0.986 
Incumbent status (Lameduck) 0.484 1.313 
Incumbent status (UR)  -2.161* -1.914- 
President's party ideology (center) 1.550* 0.916 
President's party ideology (left) 0.857 0.695 
Years in office 0.183 0.074 
Unified government 0.319 0.152 
Election year (presidential elections) -0.722 -0.242 
Population -0.019* -0.022- 
GDPpc 0.00026* 0.0003- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1  
 
Table 9c. Incumbent status  
Model 5: General expenditure  
 
Independent 
Variables 
General expenditure 
 PCSE GLS- REML 
Incumbent status (FTRA) 4.6565* 4.4204- 
Incumbent status (Lameduck) 10.6923* 3.2994 
Incumbent status (UR)  5.06532* 5.6757- 
President's party ideology (center) -3.0187 -0.5093 
President's party ideology (left) 1.7057 -0.5007 
Years in office -0.4539 - -0.0663 
Unified government 0.3126 -0.8343 
Election year (presidential elections) 0.8746 0.1270 
Population 0.0774 ** 0.0544- 
GDPpc -0.0001 0.0003- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1  
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Table 10a. Electoral Survival  
Model 6: Social expenditure  
 
Independent 
Variables 
Social expenditure 
 PCSE GLS- REML 
Reelected 0.8154 -1.6845 
President's party ideology (center) -1.13622 -2.523 
President's party ideology (left) -4.042074 0.964 
Years in office -0.24775 -0.367 
Unified government 3.23029 3.027- 
Election year (presidential elections) -1.28470 0.340 
Population 0.05767 -0.0275 
GDPpc 0.00240*** 0.0019- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1 
 
 
Table 10b. Electoral Survival  
Model 6: Public deficit  
 
      
Independent 
Variables 
Public deficit 
 PCSE GLS- 
REML 
Reelected -0.27655 0.3119 
President's party ideology (center) 1.4891* 1.0999 
President's party ideology (left) 0.7090 0.544 
Years in office 0.12724 0.0235 
Unified government 0.8717 0.7072 
Election year (presidential elections) -0.56163 -0.155 
Population -0.0163* -0.022** 
GDPpc 0.0002240 0.0003** 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1 
 
 
Table 10c. Electoral Survival  
Model 6: General expenditure  
 
Independent 
Variables 
General expenditure 
 PCSE GLS- REML 
Reelected 5.24041*** 3.1836*** 
President's party ideology (center) -4.387768 - -1.4870 
President's party ideology (left) 0.80612 -0.3516 
Years in office -0.31803 -0.009 
Unified government -0.65046 -1.4894 
Election year (presidential elections) 0.490636 -0.1506 
Population 0.05233 - 0.0355** 
GDPpc 0.000119 0.00036** 
 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ -’ 1 
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Conclusions 
The literature about democracy and economic outcomes is vast. But at the center of it is the 
more specific question about the relationship between democratic elections and economic 
outcomes. We place a lot of hope on elections, after all, the existence of popular, regular 
elections is the most important difference between democracies and dictatorships. The fact 
that popular representatives are chosen and kept in power by the people is thought to be one 
of the most important elements of a democracy and this very fact brings multiple positive 
consequences. For instance, the legislator that is about to face elections may have incentives 
to work harder for providing legislation that tackles the main problems of his district. We 
expect that ambitious politicians seeking reelection will show better records on human rights, 
employment and security. After all, if they do not produce good results how can they expect 
to be reelected? But, what happens then when the policymaker doesn't have these incentives? 
What happen if he cannot keep competing in elections? The term limits literature tries to 
address this question. And the answer it may offer could have important implications for the 
way we think about democracy. So, although this study is about elections and economic 
policy outcomes, the implications go beyond this. It is also about how efficient democratic 
mechanisms are in influencing the behaviour of the elected leaders.  
In this regard, this study tries to contribute to this new line of research. The findings suggest 
that presidents that can be reelected make different policy choices than presidents facing term 
limits. However, the analysis suggests that it is not always obvious what kind of behavior or 
policy they must embrace, at least on the field of economic policies. On the one hand, they 
have incentives to please their constituents, which means they should spend money, but, on 
the other hand, if they are not spending responsibly they could put the welfare of their voters 
at risk in the long run. What the study of Latin American elections shows is that presidents of 
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the region have found a smart way to address these conflicting demands. Although literature 
about it suggest that politicians should chose between the short and the long run -- and that 
elections encourage to think about the long run -- this study shows that they have found a 
way to have their cake and eat it too: the spending on social issues -- such as education, 
healthcare and poverty reduction -- is higher in the cases of presidents that are eligible for 
reelection but, at the same time, the overall spending is such that the deficit levels are smaller 
for presidents with reelection ambitions. This means that, probably, presidents that can be 
reelected have decreased spending in other areas of the general budget. Although some 
statistical tests offered some evidence supporting these hypotheses, it is important to say that 
not all statistical tests showed the same results, there were some discrepancies between the 
models. Particularly, the random-effects model and the GLS model showed that there could 
be a negative relationship between general spending and reelection incentives. Although 
these results were not significant, it should lead us to conduct further tests for exploring the 
possibility that there could be certain type of public spending that politicians consider as not 
helpful for getting more votes. 
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Appendix 1.Data sources 
Variable Source 
Social expenditure CEPAL: Estadísticas e indicadores sociales para América Latina 
(1980-2010). 
General government 
expenditure 
“General Government Total Expenditure” (percent of GDP). The 
data comes from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Economic Outlook Database, September, 2011. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.as
px 
Government deficit International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 
Database, September, 2011. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.as
px 
Term Limits Rules 
 
The data about presidents comes from the "World Political Leaders 
(1980 - 2010)" database (Zárate Political Collections: 
http://zarate.eu/countries.htm).  
The information for term limits rules comes from Jones (1995) and 
Carey (2003), Political Handbook of the World (2010) and from the 
original political constitutions of Latin America. 
The constitutions were consulted on the  
Biblioteca Miguel de Cervantes database:  
(http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/portales/constituciones_hispanoa
mericanas/) and 
Political Database of the Americas (PDBA) at Georgetown 
University (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/).  
The Economist Historical Archive and BBCMundo's reports 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america) were also consulted 
to situate the exact year of the reform. 
Unified government, 
Number of years in 
office by president, 
Presidential elections, 
and President’s party 
orientation (ideology) 
 
 
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and 
Patrick Walsh, 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: 
The Database of Political Institutions." 15:1, 165-176 (September), 
World Bank Economic Review. (2010 updated version). 
Population  World Bank national data, and OECD National Accounts data files, 
2011. 
GDP  World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts 
data files, 2011. 
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